China: The First Mature Fascist State

Posted By Michael Ledeen On January 20, 2011 @ 7:34 am In Uncategorized | 55
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For nearly ten years, I have been arguing that China may well be the first
example of a mature fascism in power.  The highest praise imaginable has
been bestowed on this theory, by the People’s Republic itself.  When I
published an updated version of my theory (first published in the Wall
Street Journal in  2002 and reprised in different form in NRO thereafter) in
the Far East Economic Review in May, 2008, the entire issue was banned in
China.

On the occasion of Mr. Hu’s visit to Washington, it seems appropriate to
revisit this theme, which seems to me to have been abundantly confirmed by
events.

May 2008


Beijing Embraces Classical Fascism


by Michael Ledeen


Posted May 2, 2008 

In 2002, I speculated that China may be something we have never seen before:
a mature fascist state. Recent events there, especially the mass rage in
response to Western criticism, seem to confirm that theory. More
significantly, over the intervening six years China’s leaders have
consolidated their hold on the organs of control—political, economic and
cultural. Instead of gradually embracing pluralism as many expected, China’s
corporatist elite has become even more entrenched.

Beijing Embraces FascismEven though they still call themselves communists,
and the Communist Party rules the country, classical fascism should be the
starting point for our efforts to understand the People’s Republic. Imagine
Italy 50 years after the fascist revolution. Mussolini would be dead and
buried, the corporate state would be largely intact, the party would be
firmly in control, and Italy would be governed by professional politicians,
part of a corrupt elite, rather than the true believers who had marched on
Rome. It would no longer be a system based on charisma, but would instead
rest almost entirely on political repression, the leaders would be
businesslike and cynical, not idealistic, and they would constantly invoke
formulaic appeals to the grandeur of the “great Italian people,” “endlessly
summoned to emulate the greatness of its ancestors.”

Substitute in the “great Chinese people” and it all sounds familiar. We are
certainly not dealing with a Communist regime, either politically or
economically, nor do Chinese leaders, even those who followed the radical
reformer Deng Xiaoping, seem to be at all interested in treading the
dangerous and uneven path from Stalinism to democracy. They know that
Mikhail Gorbachev fell when he tried to control the economy while giving
political freedom. They are attempting the opposite, keeping a firm grip on
political power while permitting relatively free areas of economic
enterprise. Their political methods are quite like those used by the
European fascists 80 years ago.

Unlike traditional communist dictators—Mao, for example—who extirpated
traditional culture and replaced it with a sterile Marxism-Leninism, the
Chinese now enthusiastically, even compulsively, embrace the glories of
China’s long history. Their passionate reassertion of the greatness of past
dynasties has both entranced and baffled Western observers, because it does
not fit the model of an “evolving communist system.”

Yet the fascist leaders of the 1920s and 1930s used exactly the same device.
Mussolini rebuilt Rome to provide a dramatic visual reminder of ancient
glories, and he used ancient history to justify the conquest of Libya and
Ethiopia. Hitler’s favorite architect built neoclassical buildings
throughout the Third Reich, and his favorite operatic composer organized
festivals to celebrate the country’s mythic past.

Like their European predecessors, the Chinese claim a major role in the
world because of their history and culture, not just on the basis of their
current power, or scientific or cultural accomplishments. China even toys
with some of the more bizarre notions of the earlier fascisms, such as the
program to make the country self-sufficient in wheat production—the same
quest for autarky that obsessed both Hitler and Mussolini.

To be sure, the world is much changed since the first half of the last
century. It’s much harder (and sometimes impossible) to go it alone.
Passions for total independence from the outside world are tempered by the
realities of today’s global economy, and China’s appetite for oil and other
raw materials is properly legendary. But the Chinese, like the European
fascists, are intensely xenophobic, and obviously worry that their people
may turn against them if they learn too much about the rest of the world.
They consequently work very hard to dominate the flow of information. Just
ask Google, forced to cooperate with the censors in order to work in China.

Some scholars of contemporary China see the Beijing regime as very nervous,
and perhaps even unstable, and they are encouraged in this belief when they
see recent events such as the eruption of popular sentiment against the
Tibetan monks’ modest protests. That view is further reinforced by similar
outcries against most any criticism of Chinese performance, from human
rights to air pollution, and from preparations for the Olympic Games to the
failure of Chinese quality control in food production and children’s toys.

In all these cases, it is tempting to conclude that the regime is worried
about its own survival, and, in order to rally nationalist passions, feels
compelled to portray the country as a global victim. Perhaps they are right.
The strongest evidence to support the theory of insecurity at the highest
levels of Chinese society is the practice of the “princelings” (wealthy
children of the ruling elites) to buy homes in places such as the United
States, Canada and Australia. These are not luxury homes of the sort favored
by wealthy businessman and officials from the oil-rich countries of the
Middle East. Rather they are typically “normal” homes of the sort a
potential émigré might want to have in reserve in case things went bad back
home.

On the other hand, the cult of victimhood was always part of fascist
culture. Just like Germany and Italy in the interwar period, China feels
betrayed and humiliated, and seeks to avenge her many historic wounds. This
is not necessarily a true sign of anxiety; it’s an integral part of the sort
of hypernationalism that has always been at the heart of all fascist
movements and regimes. We cannot look into the souls of the Chinese tyrants,
but I doubt that China is an intensely unstable system, riven by the
democratic impulses of capitalism on the one hand, and the repressive
practices of the regime on the other. This is a mature fascism, not a
frenzied mass movement, and the current regime is not composed of
revolutionary fanatics. Today’s Chinese leaders are the heirs of two very
different revolutions, Mao’s and Deng’s. The first was a failed communist
experiment; the second is a fascist transformation whose future is up for
grabs.

If the fascist model is correct, we should not be at all surprised by the
recent rhetoric or mass demonstrations. Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s
Italy were every bit as sensitive to any sign of foreign criticism as the
Chinese today, both because victimhood is always part of the definition of
such states, and because it’s an essential technique of mass control. The
violent denunciations of Westerners who criticize Chinese repression may not
be a sign of internal anxiety or weakness. They may instead be a sign of
strength, a demonstration of the regime’s popularity. Remember that European
fascism did not fall as the result of internal crisis—it took a bloody world
war to bring it down. Fascism was so alarmingly popular neither Italians nor
Germans produced more than token resistance until the war began to be lost.
It may well be that the mass condemnation of Western calls for greater
political tolerance is in fact a sign of political success.

Since classical fascism had such a brief life span, it is hard to know
whether or not a stable, durable fascist state is possible. Economically,
the corporate state, of which the current Chinese system is a textbook
example, may prove more flexible and adaptable than the rigid central
planning that doomed communism in the Soviet Empire and elsewhere. … Our
brief experience with fascism makes it difficult to evaluate the
possibilities of political evolution, and the People’s Republic is full of
secrets. But prudent strategists would do well to assume that the regime
will be around for a while longer—perhaps a lot longer.

If it is a popular, fascist regime, should the world prepare for some
difficult and dangerous confrontations with the People’s Republic?
Twentieth-century fascist states were very aggressive. Is it not likely that
China will similarly seek to enlarge its domain?

I believe the answer is “yes, but.” Many Chinese leaders might like to see
their sway extend throughout the region, and beyond. China’s military is not
so subtly preparing the capability to defeat U.S. forces in Asia in order to
prevent intervention in any conflict on its periphery. No serious student of
China doubts the enormous ambitions of both the leadership and the masses.
But, unlike Hitler and Mussolini, the Chinese tyrants do not urgently need
quick geographical expansion to demonstrate the glory of their country and
the truth of their vision. For the moment, at least, success at home and
global recognition of Chinese accomplishments seem to be enough. Since
Chinese fascism is less ideological than its European predecessors, Chinese
leaders are far more flexible than Hitler and Mussolini.

Nonetheless, the short history of classical fascism suggests that it is only
a matter of time before China will pursue confrontation with the West. That
is built into the dna of all such regimes. Sooner or later, Chinese leaders
will feel compelled to demonstrate the superiority of their system.
Superiority means others have to bend their knees, and cater to the wishes
of the dominant nation.

How, then, should the democracies deal with China? The first step is to
disabuse ourselves of the notion that wealth is the surest guarantor of
peace. The West traded with the Soviet Union, and gave them credits as well,
but it did not prevent the Kremlin from expanding into the Horn of Africa,
or sponsoring terrorist groups in Europe and the Middle East. A wealthy
China will not automatically be less inclined to go to war over Taiwan, or,
for that matter, to wage or threaten war with Japan.

Indeed, the opposite may be true—the richer and stronger China becomes, the
more they build up their military might, the more likely such wars may be.
It follows that the West must prepare for war with China, hoping thereby to
deter it. A great Roman once said that if you want peace, prepare for war.
This is sound advice with regard to a fascist Chinese state that wants to
play a global role.

Meanwhile, we should do what we can to convince the people of China that
their long-term interests are best served by greater political freedom, no
matter how annoying and chaotic that may sometimes be. I think we can trust
the Chinese leaders on this one. Any regime as palpably concerned about the
free flow of information knows well that ideas about freedom might be very
popular. Let’s test that hypothesis, by talking directly to “the billion.”
In today’s world, we can surely find ways to reach them.

If we do not take such steps, our risk will surely increase, and explosions
of rage, manipulated or spontaneous, will recur. Eventually they will take
the form of real actions.

  _____  

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