http://www.confickerworkinggroup.org/wiki/uploads/Conficker_Working_Group_Le
ssons_Learned_17_June_2010_final.pdf

 

http://gcn.com/Articles/2011/01/26/Conficker-Working-Group-lessons.aspx?s=gc
ndaily_270111
<http://gcn.com/Articles/2011/01/26/Conficker-Working-Group-lessons.aspx?s=g
cndaily_270111&p=1> &p=1

 

Group finds a way to thwart Conficker (no thanks to government)

Despite some funding and organizational backing, agencies' involvement
described as zero

o    By
<http://gcn.com/forms/emailtoauthor.aspx?AuthorItem=%7bC4126F0C-6B16-4232-98
5C-93F86A33A188%7d&ArticleItem=%7bA04CCC28-5581-4A78-910F-A7543D4E7E54%7d>
William Jackson

o    Jan 26, 2011

The efforts of a public/private working group to combat the fast-spreading
Conficker worm offer a model for future cyber defense, but the federal
government made little contribution, according to a study commissioned by
the Homeland Security Department.

The Conficker Working Group is an ad hoc organization of more than 30
companies and Internet registrars, universities and government agencies,
including the FBI and Homeland Security Department. They came together in
early 2009 to combat what has been described as one of the largest and most
serious cybersecurity threats of the past decade.

The group reported success in preventing Conficker's author from gaining
control of its botnet, although the group was unsuccessful in remediating
the millions of infected computers.

DHS' Science and Technology Directorate commissioned a
<http://www.confickerworkinggroup.org/wiki/uploads/Conficker_Working_Group_L
essons_Learned_17_June_2010_final.pdf> report on lessons learned from the
effort to help identify best practices. The study was conducted by Rendon
Group and completed in June, but the report was only recently released
publicly.

"In coordinating to stop the botnet threat, the CWG became a model for cyber
defense," the report concludes. "Thanks to this effort, we can glean a
number of valuable lessons to guide how future efforts may be initiated,
organized and managed."

  _____  

Related coverage:

 <http://gcn.com/articles/2010/05/10/cybereye-051010.aspx> Has Conficker
spurred a new model for security response?

  _____  

But federal collaboration was found lacking. One person interviewed for the
report described the government's participation as "zero involvement, zero
activity, zero knowledge." Information sharing was described as one-way,
with information going to the government and little returning. Any real
information sharing between the working group and government generally was
on a personal basis between individuals rather than at an organizational
level.

Nevertheless, the government did fund some reverse engineering efforts on
the malware.

Conficker appeared in 2008 and gained attention because of its rapid rate of
infection and use of advanced techniques to spread and communicate, taking
advantage of things such as the Domain Name System, encrypted peer-to-peer
communications and auto-run capabilities. It appeared to be a well-designed
piece of malicious code. Although it was intended to create a botnet that
continually upgraded itself, its ultimate purpose and its author are still
not known.

One of the working group's early actions was to register or block domains
that the worm would use for command and control. As part of that effort, the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, a working group member,
for the first time agreed to waive mandatory registration fees for Conficker
domains so that the working group could preempt the command and control
system. That cooperation was cited as one of the primary reasons for the
working group's success.

"The Conficker Working Group sees its biggest success as preventing the
author of Conficker from gaining control of the botnet," the report states.
"Nearly every person interviewed for this report said this aspect of the
effort has been successful. The blocking of domains continues and the
Working Group has indicated they will maintain their effort."

The group's biggest failure was its inability to remediate infected
computers and eliminate the botnet. In spite of remediation efforts,
millions of computers remain infected.

According to the responses of the working group, the elements that worked
included:

o    Private-sector collaboration. The working group structure was a
successful example of private-sector collaboration and a model for future
efforts, according to most of the members.

o    Informal organization. Although the lack of formal organization might
appear to be a negative, many members of the group said the informal
structure, including "the meritocracy and self-policing," were positives.

o    Strong social networks that facilitate trust. The informal social
networks that brought the group together appeared to work for most of the
people in the core group. However, they also resulted in unintended omission
of other potential stakeholders from which the group could have benefited.

o    Subgroup structure. The subgroup organization was successful and is
already being used as a model for future groups.

o    Data sinkholing. Much of the data from infected computers attempting to
contact command and control servers was sinkholed on servers and shared with
most who requested access.

o    Cooperation from ICANN and top-level domains. Members of the working
group viewed this cooperation as a precedent that will help future efforts
and discourage malware authors from believing they can easily exploit that
portion of DNS.

Elements that did not work, in addition to the lack of effective federal
cooperation, included:

o    Remediation. The ability of the group to remediate infected computers
was limited in its success and was not a central goal of the group when it
was created.

o    Communication with ISPs. Several people pointed to uncoordinated
communication between the working group and Internet service providers as a
weakness.

o    Public relations. Public relations efforts at times did more to
increase hype than help deliver pertinent information.

o    Lack of accountability. Groups must be prepared for error, hold people
accountable and have backup systems in place. However, because the group was
composed primarily of volunteers, many of whom had full-time jobs, it was
hard to find time to doublecheck lists and to establish and enforce
accountability.

The Conficker Working Group still is in operation and continues to block
tens of thousands of domains per day to disrupt the Conficker command
systems. One member told interviewers the group "will remain in place while
the threat is out there."

 



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