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Algeria’s Response to the Revolt in Libya


Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 21

May 27, 2011 02:28 PM Age: 3 hrs

Category: Terrorism Monitor, Global Terrorism Analysis, Home Page,
Military/Security, Foreign Policy, Africa 

By: Dario Cristiani
<http://www.jamestown.org/articles-by-author/?no_cache=1&tx_cablanttnewsstaf
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Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika with Colonel Mu’ammar Qaddafi

African support for military intervention in Libya against Colonel Qaddafi
has been far cooler than that displayed by the United States and Europe (see
Terrorism Monitor, April 14). Among the African countries critical to the
success of NATO activities in Libya, Algeria has rapidly emerged as one of
the most critical voices against international intervention in neighboring
Libya. 

In March, Algeria voted against the Arab League’s resolution calling for a
no-fly zone over Libya, fearing that it would lead to the intervention of
foreign ground forces and stressing the need to preserve Libya's security
and territorial integrity (AP, March 12).

In April, Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci once again expressed
Algeria's fear that some forces were aiming to split Libya and that
terrorists could take advantage of the resulting instability, turning the
country in a major regional black market for weapons. Medelci also announced
his total support for the political solution suggested by the African Union
(Le Temps d’Algérie, April 10). Algeria avoided condemning the Qaddafi
regime when the Libyan army crossed the border into the Tunisian town of
Dhuheiba in pursuit of rebels on April 29—an incursion that sparked protests
from the Tunisian government concerning the infringement of its sovereignty
(Tout Sur l’Algérie, April 30).

Libyan rebels have accused Algeria of supporting Qaddafi in several ways.
The rebel Transitional National Council (TNC) sent a memorandum to Arab
League Secretary-General Amr Musa claiming Algeria had provided military
equipment, weapons and mercenaries to Libya, but Medelci strongly denied
these allegations (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 19; Ennahar, April 19). A few
days later, Medelci returned to the accusations, saying that the charges
from the TNC were dilatory tactics that had nothing to do with the current
crisis in Libya (Echorouck, April 22; L’Expression, April 22). Algerian
Interior Minister Dahou Ould Kablialater stated during an interview that he
expected very tense relations between his country and Libya if the rebels
seize power (Ennahar, May 3).

If seen only through the historical prism of Algerian-Libyan relations,
Algiers’ stance on the intervention in Libya cannot be easily explained.
Like many other countries, Algeria has had a very volatile relationship with
Qaddafi’s Libya. Algeria supported Libya against Egypt in the border war of
1977, and brokered a peace deal between Libya and Chad in the late 1980s.
For many years, the two countries shared good relations based on their
support for the West Saharan Polisario Front, a common anti-colonial
rhetoric and their criticism of Israel. That said, several points of tension
emerged in their relations: 

• Algeria remained cool to Qaddafi’s efforts to increase influence over
Tuareg groups in the Sahara/Sahel region.

• Algeria alleged that Libya allowed weapons to be shipped through its
territory to Islamist forces during the Algerian civil war of the 1990s.

• Relations were disturbed by the signing of a unity pact between Libya and
Algerian rival Morocco (the Treaty of Oujda) in 1984, a realpolitik response
to the exclusion of these two countries from the Treaty of Concord and
Fraternity signed in 1983 by Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania. [1]

Nonetheless, Algeria is more or less openly supportive of Qaddafi in this
conflict for a complex mix of reasons related to its security, its political
stability and its regional geopolitical role:

• Security concerns: The greatest concern for Algeria is that an unstable
Libya could turn into a major safe haven and source of weapons for al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Documents recently found in the Bin Laden
residence in Abbottabad concerning the “specific attention” paid to Algeria
will further aggravate Algerian perception of this threat (L’Expression, May
14). Even though AQIM's threat is not as strong as in the past, it still
represents a major security concern for Algeria. A Libyan implosion could
provide AQIM with greater opportunities to buy weapons from Libyan arsenals
and to expand its activities to new territories. Algerian officials have
strongly stressed this point since the very beginning of the conflict.
Moreover, these concerns are shared by other regional countries such as
Chad, Mali and Niger (AFP, May 1; El Moudjahid, April 29).

• Political concerns: It is worth recalling that the wave of uprisings in
the Middle East and North Africa started with protests in Tunisia and
Algeria in December 2010. While the Tunisian revolt ended with the fall of
the Ben Ali regime, in Algeria these events did not end in the overthrow of
President Abdul-Aziz Bouteflika. It is likely that memories related to the
violence of the civil war are still too recent and represent a powerful
deterrent to a full-scale revolt. However, the Algerian government is
mindful that continuing social turmoil within that country could provide the
base for stronger future revolts aimed at overthrowing the current Algerian
government. If Qaddafi should lose power, Algeria fears that it could be
next in line for a revolution. A Qaddafi defeat could boost the ambitions of
those groups looking for a regime change in Algeria. Moreover, Algeria’s
hostility to NATO action in Libya was dictated by the resilience of its
colonial memory; the idea of having French troops at its borders is seen as
a major psychological threat to the Algerian people. 

• Regional concerns: Given the highly personalized foreign policy of Qaddafi
and the intensity of clashes between Tripoli’s government and the rebels, it
is likely that the foreign policy of a Libya freed from the Qaddafi regime
will be completely different from that currently in place, which would have
the potential of harming Algerian interests. Diplomatic dynamics suggest
that France could have a stronger influence over Libya, given the support
that Sarkozy has provided to the rebels. A new Libya could also have
different regional policies dependent on its relationship with Western
powers, characterized by a total rupture with Qaddafi’s choices. In this
sense, a major threat to Algeria could be represented by a Libyan-Moroccan
rapprochement, or, once its internal situation calms down, by Egypt
increasing its influence over its western neighbor.

Conclusion

Algeria has a clear interest in avoiding a Qaddafi defeat, which could turn
into a major security and geopolitical disaster for Algiers. However, this
does not imply that Algeria is actively supporting Qaddafi’s forces. Like
any other state, Algeria has its own geopolitical interests to advance.
These interests are not related to a specific, privileged relationship
between Algeria and Qaddafi. They stem more from concrete security and
political realities. A regime change or prolonged conflict in Libya could
strongly harm Algerian interests, explaining why Algeria has assumed a
diplomatic position of opposing NATO intervention as well as criticizing the
choices and the declarations of the rebel TNC. 

Notes:

1. Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman and Richard L. Sklar, African Crisis
Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy, Berkeley, p.272, fn.7.

 



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