On 10.07.2024 11:23, Michel Lind wrote:
I am submitting this application on behalf of CentOS Project's Hyperscale SIG.

Myself (Michel Lind), as well as Davide Cavalca and Neal Gompa (SIG co-chairs), 
would be joining if approved.
 https://sigs.centos.org/hyperscale/sig/membership/


1. Be an actively maintained Unix-like operating system distro with substantial 
use of Open Source components

 We actively maintain CentOS Stream Hyperscale 
https://sigs.centos.org/hyperscale/communication/reports/. It is based on 
CentOS Stream with key packages upgraded or rebuilt with additional features 
enabled, intended for large-scale enterprise deployments but also potentially 
on modern desktops.

Hyperscale can be installed on x86_64 and aarch64 desktops via 
https://mirror.stream.centos.org/SIGs/9-stream/hyperscale/images/experimental/ 
- and CentOS Stream installations can be converted in place (see 
https://sigs.centos.org/hyperscale/content/repositories/main/).

2. Have a userbase not limited to your own organization

 Our membership and deliverables are open to anyone who wishes to join; 
contributors have included companies such as Meta, Datto, Twitter/X, and Intel, 
as well as individuals

3. Have a publicly verifiable track record, dating back at least 1 year and 
continuing to present day, of fixing security issues (including some that had 
been handled on (linux-)distros, meaning that membership would have been 
relevant to you) and releasing the fixes within 10 days (and preferably much 
less than that) of the issues being made public (if it takes you ages to fix an 
issue, your users wouldn't substantially benefit from the additional time, 
often around 7 days and sometimes up to 14 days, that list membership could 
give you)

 Since we provide an overlay on top of CentOS Stream and EPEL, we generally 
inherit updates as they became available - and monitor issues as soon as they 
are disclosed.

Between the three of us we have a track record of pushing EPEL security updates: 
https://bodhi.fedoraproject.org/updates/?search=&releases=EPEL-8&releases=EPEL-9&releases=EPEL-9N&releases=EPEL-8N&type=security&user=salimma%2C+dcavalca%2C+ngompa

 We are increasingly provided updates that our users need before they are fixed 
in CentOS Stream, for example:

 - pmix: https://cbs.centos.org/koji/buildinfo?buildID=50809 built on Sep 15 
2023 addressing https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41915 from Sep 9 2023 
(commit pushed for c9s on Nov 2 2023 - 
https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/rpms/pmix/-/commit/d674de0cb5d716940f01e937f2a7bb79fbd81f5c)
 - openssh: https://cbs.centos.org/koji/buildinfo?buildID=54523 built on Jul 2 
2024 addressing CVE-2024-6387 from Jul 1 2024 (fixed in Stream Jul 4)

4. Not be (only) downstream or a rebuild of another distro (or else we need 
convincing additional justification of how the list membership would enable you 
to release fixes sooner, presumably not relying on the upstream distro having 
released their fixes first?)

Our user base uses CentOS Stream in production, while the upstream project 
mostly uses it for integrating changes into upcoming RHEL releases; as such we 
not only ship newer packages (e.g. kernel, systemd, qemu) with features not 
enabled in CentOS Stream and RHEL (e.g. Btrfs) but we also need to patch 
security issues faster, given Stream receives urgent security fixes only after 
they are released for RHEL.

See examples in previous points for some issues we fixed independently of 
upstream distro - as we ship more packages in the future to support more use 
cases, the need to release security fixes faster will only grow.

Indeed, the Hyperscale SIG applies patches and versions of software that
have a different support and feature scope compared to CentOS Stream
Linux. Combined with its significant user base and existing strategy for
managing public vulnerabilities, it indicates that handling embargoed
releases would be managed professionally.


5. Be a participant and preferably an active contributor in relevant public 
communities (most notably, if you're not watching for issues being made public 
on oss-security, which are a superset of those that had been handled on 
(linux-)distros, then there's no valid reason for you to be on (linux-)distros)

We are individually members of oss-security, in addition to various 
distribution development lists

6. Accept the list policy (see above)

accepted

7. Be able and willing to contribute back (see above), preferably in specific 
ways announced in advance (so that you're responsible for a specific area and 
so that we know what to expect from which member), and demonstrate actual 
contributions once you've been a member for a while

The three of us handle security related issues, with Neal Gompa focusing on 
issues related to release engineering, and Davide and I on updates in general 
especially those that are built with specific customizations.

8. Be able and willing to handle PGP-encrypted e-mail

We are able and willing

9. Have someone already on the private list, or at least someone else who has 
been active on oss-security for years but is not affiliated with your distro 
nor your organization, vouch for at least one of the people requesting 
membership on behalf of your distro (then that one vouched-for person will be 
able to vouch for others on your team, in case you'd like multiple people 
subscribed)

Jonathan Wright from AlmaLinux can vouch for us

Although I am not a frequent contributor to the oss-security list nor a
member of the distros list, I am happy to vouch for Michel, Davide, and
Neal. All three are respected members of various open source
communities. In my experience over the past few years, they have shown a
strong commitment to ensuring timely, secure updates across the Linux
ecosystem. I have no reservations about their inclusion in these lists,
especially considering their involvement in Fedora.


Best regards,

--
_o) Michel Lind
_( ) identities: https://keyoxide.org/5dce2e7e9c3b1cffd335c1d78b229d2f7ccc04f2


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