Ack, thank you for the candid feedback, it's helpful On Tue, Aug 6, 2024, 6:10 PM Alex Gaynor <alex.gay...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Neil, > > Answering on behalf of the Python Cryptographic Authority, which > develops pyca/cryptography, the most widely used Python cryptography > library. We distribute binary builds that statically link a copy of > OpenSSL. > > 1) Yes, we're fine with dropping TLS 1.0/1.1 on this time frame. > Frankly, we'd be fine dropping it faster. > > 2) We would not re-enable TLS1.0/1.1 in our releases. Users wishing to > use these protocols would be responsible for building and linking > their own OpenSSL. > > 3) I don't have a good answer for you. I think systems programming is > fairly impoverished in terms of ways to emit _runtime_ warnings. I'd > suggest focusing on compile-time warnings. > > Alex > > On Tue, Aug 6, 2024 at 7:29 AM Neil Horman <nhor...@openssl.org> wrote: > > > > Neil Horman <nhor...@openssl.org> > > 4:19 AM (42 minutes ago) > > to openssl-security > > > > OpenSSL is currently considering the deprecation of the TLS 1.0/1.1 > > protocols. Currently TLS1.1 and TLS 1.0 are disabled at run time, and > > requires enablement by reducing the ssl security level value. > > > > The current proposal under consideration is to explicitly disable TLS > > 1.0/1.1 at build time, in our 4.0 release (tentatively scheduled to > release > > in the next 12-18 months), with an eye to completely remove the impacted > > code in a future major release. The default configuration could be > > overridden to re-enable TLS 1.0/1.1 at build time. > > > > Questions to the community are: > > > > 1) Are distributions/users comfortable with this approach in the time > frame > > proposed? > > > > 2) Would builders of OpenSSL consider using the default configuration > (with > > TLS1.0/1.1 disabled in 4.0), or would they ship with these protocols > > re-enabled in their builds? > > > > 3) If the deprecated protocols are re-enabled, what would constitute a > > reasonable warning mechanism to inform users that these protocols are > going > > away at some point in the future to pressure users to update to a newer, > > more secure protocol? > > > > Input on these questions is requested and appreciated > > > > -- > All that is necessary for evil to succeed is for good people to do nothing. >
