Am Fri, 7 Aug 2026 09:52:57 +0800 schrieb fourie <[email protected]>:
> Yes. On systems where SCTP is built as a loadable module rather than > built into the kernel, > unloading the sctp module and preventing it from being loaded should > mitigate exploitation > of this issue. What I am missing is if any other conditions need to be met for a suser to exploit this. I'd presume that the user needs to be able to run their own network namespace. Or does it even work without it? No extra privileges of any kind needed? Gladly, my systems are once again safe from this as we disable module loading after a startup phase. But it would be good to know if the SCTP functionality would be available to anyone or just to users with their own network namespaces, further reason to never ever allow those (which of course makes a number of container setups less fun, but not relevant to my HPC use case). Alrighty then, Thomas PS: I'd have to read up on SCTP to figure out if I'd ever miss that functionality. So far there is a good bet for this kind of bug that it is in code I never intended to run, and hence probably shouldn't even include in my kernel build. -- Dr. Thomas Orgis HPC @ Universität Hamburg
