On 4-Apr-2009, at 21:17, Kevin Callahan wrote:
> perhaps, a must see ...
> http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/04032009/watch.html
Worth reading, without having a stupid webpage:
BILL MOYERS: Welcome to the Journal.
For months now, revelations of the wholesale greed and blatant
transgressions of Wall Street have reminded us that "The Best Way to
Rob a Bank Is to Own One." In fact, the man you're about to meet wrote
a book with just that title. It was based upon his experience as a
tough regulator during one of the darkest chapters in our financial
history: the savings and loan scandal in the late 1980s.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: These numbers as large as they are, vastly
understate the problem of fraud.
BILL MOYERS: Bill Black was in New York this week for a conference at
the John Jay College of Criminal Justice where scholars and
journalists gathered to ask the question, "How do they get away with
it?" Well, no one has asked that question more often than Bill Black.
The former Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention now teaches
Economics and Law at the University of Missouri, Kansas City. During
the savings and loan crisis, it was Black who accused then-house
speaker Jim Wright and five US Senators, including John Glenn and John
McCain, of doing favors for the S&L's in exchange for contributions
and other perks. The senators got off with a slap on the wrist, but so
enraged was one of those bankers, Charles Keating — after whom the
senate's so-called "Keating Five" were named — he sent a memo that
read, in part, "get Black — kill him dead." Metaphorically, of
course. Of course.
Now Black is focused on an even greater scandal, and he spares no one
— not even the President he worked hard to elect, Barack Obama. But
his main targets are the Wall Street barons, heirs of an earlier
generation whose scandalous rip-offs of wealth back in the 1930s
earned them comparison to Al Capone and the mob, and the nickname
"banksters."
Bill Black, welcome to the Journal.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Thank you.
BILL MOYERS: I was taken with your candor at the conference here in
New York to hear you say that this crisis we're going through, this
economic and financial meltdown is driven by fraud. What's your
definition of fraud?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Fraud is deceit. And the essence of fraud is, "I
create trust in you, and then I betray that trust, and get you to give
me something of value." And as a result, there's no more effective
acid against trust than fraud, especially fraud by top elites, and
that's what we have.
BILL MOYERS: In your book, you make it clear that calculated
dishonesty by people in charge is at the heart of most large corporate
failures and scandals, including, of course, the S&L, but is that
true? Is that what you're saying here, that it was in the boardrooms
and the CEO offices where this fraud began?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Absolutely.
BILL MOYERS: How did they do it? What do you mean?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, the way that you do it is to make really bad
loans, because they pay better. Then you grow extremely rapidly, in
other words, you're a Ponzi-like scheme. And the third thing you do is
we call it leverage. That just means borrowing a lot of money, and the
combination creates a situation where you have guaranteed record
profits in the early years. That makes you rich, through the bonuses
that modern executive compensation has produced. It also makes it
inevitable that there's going to be a disaster down the road.
BILL MOYERS: So you're suggesting, saying that CEOs of some of these
banks and mortgage firms in order to increase their own personal
income, deliberately set out to make bad loans?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yes.
BILL MOYERS: How do they get away with it? I mean, what about their
own checks and balances in the company? What about their accounting
divisions?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: All of those checks and balances report to the CEO,
so if the CEO goes bad, all of the checks and balances are easily
overcome. And the art form is not simply to defeat those internal
controls, but to suborn them, to turn them into your greatest allies.
And the bonus programs are exactly how you do that.
BILL MOYERS: If I wanted to go looking for the parties to this, with a
good bird dog, where would you send me?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, that's exactly what hasn't happened. We
haven't looked, all right? The Bush Administration essentially got rid
of regulation, so if nobody was looking, you were able to do this with
impunity and that's exactly what happened. Where would you look? You'd
look at the specialty lenders. The lenders that did almost all of
their work in the sub-prime and what's called Alt-A, liars' loans.
BILL MOYERS: Yeah. Liars' loans--
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Liars' loans.
BILL MOYERS: Why did they call them liars' loans?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because they were liars' loans.
BILL MOYERS: And they knew it?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: They knew it. They knew that they were frauds.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Liars' loans mean that we don't check. You tell us
what your income is. You tell us what your job is. You tell us what
your assets are, and we agree to believe you. We won't check on any of
those things. And by the way, you get a better deal if you inflate
your income and your job history and your assets.
BILL MOYERS: You think they really said that to borrowers?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: We know that they said that to borrowers. In fact,
they were also called, in the trade, ninja loans.
BILL MOYERS: Ninja?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yeah, because no income verification, no job
verification, no asset verification.
BILL MOYERS: You're talking about significant American companies.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Huge! One company produced as many losses as the
entire Savings and Loan debacle.
BILL MOYERS: Which company?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: IndyMac specialized in making liars' loans. In 2006
alone, it sold $80 billion dollars of liars' loans to other companies.
$80 billion.
BILL MOYERS: And was this happening exclusively in this sub-prime
mortgage business?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: No, and that's a big part of the story as well. Even
prime loans began to have non-verification. Even Ronald Reagan, you
know, said, "Trust, but verify." They just gutted the verification
process. We know that will produce enormous fraud, under economic
theory, criminology theory, and two thousand years of life experience.
BILL MOYERS: Is it possible that these complex instruments were
deliberately created so swindlers could exploit them?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Oh, absolutely. This stuff, the exotic stuff that
you're talking about was created out of things like liars' loans, that
were known to be extraordinarily bad. And now it was getting triple-A
ratings. Now a triple-A rating is supposed to mean there is zero
credit risk. So you take something that not only has significant, it
has crushing risk. That's why it's toxic. And you create this fiction
that it has zero risk. That itself, of course, is a fraudulent
exercise. And again, there was nobody looking, during the Bush years.
So finally, only a year ago, we started to have a Congressional
investigation of some of these rating agencies, and it's scandalous
what came out. What we know now is that the rating agencies never
looked at a single loan file. When they finally did look, after the
markets had completely collapsed, they found, and I'm quoting Fitch,
the smallest of the rating agencies, "the results were disconcerting,
in that there was the appearance of fraud in nearly every file we
examined."
BILL MOYERS: So if your assumption is correct, your evidence is sound,
the bank, the lending company, created a fraud. And the ratings agency
that is supposed to test the value of these assets knowingly entered
into the fraud. Both parties are committing fraud by intention.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Right, and the investment banker that — we call it
pooling — puts together these bad mortgages, these liars' loans, and
creates the toxic waste of these derivatives. All of them do that. And
then they sell it to the world and the world just thinks because it
has a triple-A rating it must actually be safe. Well, instead, there
are 60 and 80 percent losses on these things, because of course they,
in reality, are toxic waste.
BILL MOYERS: You're describing what Bernie Madoff did to a limited
number of people. But you're saying it's systemic, a systemic Ponzi
scheme.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Oh, Bernie was a piker. He doesn't even get into the
front ranks of a Ponzi scheme...
BILL MOYERS: But you're saying our system became a Ponzi scheme.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Our system...
BILL MOYERS: Our financial system...
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Became a Ponzi scheme. Everybody was buying a pig in
the poke. But they were buying a pig in the poke with a pretty pink
ribbon, and the pink ribbon said, "Triple-A."
BILL MOYERS: Is there a law against liars' loans?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Not directly, but there, of course, many laws
against fraud, and liars' loans are fraudulent.
BILL MOYERS: Because...
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because they're not going to be repaid and because
they had false representations. They involve deceit, which is the
essence of fraud.
BILL MOYERS: Why is it so hard to prosecute? Why hasn't anyone been
brought to justice over this?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because they didn't even begin to investigate the
major lenders until the market had actually collapsed, which is
completely contrary to what we did successfully in the Savings and
Loan crisis, right? Even while the institutions were reporting they
were the most profitable savings and loan in America, we knew they
were frauds. And we were moving to close them down. Here, the Justice
Department, even though it very appropriately warned, in 2004, that
there was an epidemic...
BILL MOYERS: Who did?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: The FBI publicly warned, in September 2004 that
there was an epidemic of mortgage fraud, that if it was allowed to
continue it would produce a crisis at least as large as the Savings
and Loan debacle. And that they were going to make sure that they
didn't let that happen. So what goes wrong? After 9/11, the attacks,
the Justice Department transfers 500 white-collar specialists in the
FBI to national terrorism. Well, we can all understand that. But then,
the Bush administration refused to replace the missing 500 agents. So
even today, again, as you say, this crisis is 1000 times worse,
perhaps, certainly 100 times worse, than the Savings and Loan crisis.
There are one-fifth as many FBI agents as worked the Savings and Loan
crisis.
BILL MOYERS: You talk about the Bush administration. Of course,
there's that famous photograph of some of the regulators in 2003, who
come to a press conference with a chainsaw suggesting that they're
going to slash, cut business loose from regulation, right?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, they succeeded. And in that picture, by the
way, the other — three of the other guys with pruning shears are
the...
BILL MOYERS: That's right.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: They're the trade representatives. They're the
lobbyists for the bankers. And everybody's grinning. The government's
working together with the industry to destroy regulation. Well, we now
know what happens when you destroy regulation. You get the biggest
financial calamity of anybody under the age of 80.
BILL MOYERS: But I can point you to statements by Larry Summers, who
was then Bill Clinton's Secretary of the Treasury, or the other
Clinton Secretary of the Treasury, Rubin. I can point you to suspects
in both parties, right?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: There were two really big things, under the Clinton
administration. One, they got rid of the law that came out of the real-
world disasters of the Great Depression. We learned a lot of things in
the Great Depression. And one is we had to separate what's called
commercial banking from investment banking. That's the Glass-Steagall
law. But we thought we were much smarter, supposedly. So we got rid of
that law, and that was bipartisan. And the other thing is we passed a
law, because there was a very good regulator, Brooksley Born, that
everybody should know about and probably doesn't. She tried to do the
right thing to regulate one of these exotic derivatives that you're
talking about. We call them C.D.F.S. And Summers, Rubin, and Phil
Gramm came together to say not only will we block this particular
regulation. We will pass a law that says you can't regulate. And it's
this type of derivative that is most involved in the AIG scandal. AIG
all by itself, cost the same as the entire Savings and Loan debacle.
BILL MOYERS: What did AIG contribute? What did they do wrong?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: They made bad loans. Their type of loan was to sell
a guarantee, right? And they charged a lot of fees up front. So, they
booked a lot of income. Paid enormous bonuses. The bonuses we're
thinking about now, they're much smaller than these bonuses that were
also the product of accounting fraud. And they got very, very rich.
But, of course, then they had guaranteed this toxic waste. These
liars' loans. Well, we've just gone through why those toxic waste,
those liars' loans, are going to have enormous losses. And so, you
have to pay the guarantee on those enormous losses. And you go
bankrupt. Except that you don't in the modern world, because you've
come to the United States, and the taxpayers play the fool. Under
Secretary Geithner and under Secretary Paulson before him... we took
$5 billion dollars, for example, in U.S. taxpayer money. And sent it
to a huge Swiss Bank called UBS. At the same time that that bank was
defrauding the taxpayers of America. And we were bringing a criminal
case against them. We eventually get them to pay a $780 million fine,
but wait, we gave them $5 billion. So, the taxpayers of America paid
the fine of a Swiss Bank. And why are we bailing out somebody who that
is defrauding us?
BILL MOYERS: And why...
WILLIAM K. BLACK: How mad is this?
BILL MOYERS: What is your explanation for why the bankers who created
this mess are still calling the shots?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, that, especially after what's just happened at
G.M., that's... it's scandalous.
BILL MOYERS: Why are they firing the president of G.M. and not firing
the head of all these banks that are involved?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: There are two reasons. One, they're much closer to
the bankers. These are people from the banking industry. And they have
a lot more sympathy. In fact, they're outright hostile to autoworkers,
as you can see. They want to bash all of their contracts. But when
they get to banking, they say, ‘contracts, sacred.' But the other
element of your question is we don't want to change the bankers,
because if we do, if we put honest people in, who didn't cause the
problem, their first job would be to find the scope of the problem.
And that would destroy the cover up.
BILL MOYERS: The cover up?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Sure. The cover up.
BILL MOYERS: That's a serious charge.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Of course.
BILL MOYERS: Who's covering up?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Geithner is charging, is covering up. Just like
Paulson did before him. Geithner is publicly saying that it's going to
take $2 trillion — a trillion is a thousand billion — $2 trillion
taxpayer dollars to deal with this problem. But they're allowing all
the banks to report that they're not only solvent, but fully
capitalized. Both statements can't be true. It can't be that they need
$2 trillion, because they have masses losses, and that they're fine.
These are all people who have failed. Paulson failed, Geithner failed.
They were all promoted because they failed, not because...
BILL MOYERS: What do you mean?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, Geithner has, was one of our nation's top
regulators, during the entire subprime scandal, that I just described.
He took absolutely no effective action. He gave no warning. He did
nothing in response to the FBI warning that there was an epidemic of
fraud. All this pig in the poke stuff happened under him. So, in his
phrase about legacy assets. Well he's a failed legacy regulator.
BILL MOYERS: But he denies that he was a regulator. Let me show you
some of his testimony before Congress. Take a look at this.
TIMOTHY GEITHNER:I've never been a regulator, for better or worse. And
I think you're right to say that we have to be very skeptical that
regulation can solve all of these problems. We have parts of our
system that are overwhelmed by regulation.
Overwhelmed by regulation! It wasn't the absence of regulation that
was the problem, it was despite the presence of regulation you've got
huge risks that build up.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, he may be right that he never regulated, but
his job was to regulate. That was his mission statement.
BILL MOYERS: As?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: As president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, which is responsible for regulating most of the largest bank
holding companies in America. And he's completely wrong that we had
too much regulation in some of these areas. I mean, he gives no
details, obviously. But that's just plain wrong.
BILL MOYERS: How is this happening? I mean why is it happening?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Until you get the facts, it's harder to blow all
this up. And, of course, the entire strategy is to keep people from
getting the facts.
BILL MOYERS: What facts?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: The facts about how bad the condition of the banks
is. So, as long as I keep the old CEO who caused the problems, is he
going to go vigorously around finding the problems? Finding the frauds?
BILL MOYERS: You--
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Taking away people's bonuses?
BILL MOYERS: To hear you say this is unusual because you supported
Barack Obama, during the campaign. But you're seeming disillusioned now.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, certainly in the financial sphere, I am. I
think, first, the policies are substantively bad. Second, I think they
completely lack integrity. Third, they violate the rule of law. This
is being done just like Secretary Paulson did it. In violation of the
law. We adopted a law after the Savings and Loan crisis, called the
Prompt Corrective Action Law. And it requires them to close these
institutions. And they're refusing to obey the law.
BILL MOYERS: In other words, they could have closed these banks
without nationalizing them?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, you do a receivership. No one -- Ronald Reagan
did receiverships. Nobody called it nationalization.
BILL MOYERS: And that's a law?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: That's the law.
BILL MOYERS: So, Paulson could have done this? Geithner could do this?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Not could. Was mandated--
BILL MOYERS: By the law.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: By the law.
BILL MOYERS: This law, you're talking about.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yes.
BILL MOYERS: What the reason they give for not doing it?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: They ignore it. And nobody calls them on it.
BILL MOYERS: Well, where's Congress? Where's the press? Where--
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, where's the Pecora investigation?
BILL MOYERS: The what?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: The Pecora investigation. The Great Depression, we
said, "Hey, we have to learn the facts. What caused this disaster, so
that we can take steps, like pass the Glass-Steagall law, that will
prevent future disasters?" Where's our investigation?
What would happen if after a plane crashes, we said, "Oh, we don't
want to look in the past. We want to be forward looking. Many people
might have been, you know, we don't want to pass blame. No. We have a
nonpartisan, skilled inquiry. We spend lots of money on, get really
bright people. And we find out, to the best of our ability, what
caused every single major plane crash in America. And because of that,
aviation has an extraordinarily good safety record. We ought to follow
the same policies in the financial sphere. We have to find out what
caused the disasters, or we will keep reliving them. And here, we've
got a double tragedy. It isn't just that we are failing to learn from
the mistakes of the past. We're failing to learn from the successes of
the past.
BILL MOYERS: What do you mean?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: In the Savings and Loan debacle, we developed
excellent ways for dealing with the frauds, and for dealing with the
failed institutions. And for 15 years after the Savings and Loan
crisis, didn't matter which party was in power, the U.S. Treasury
Secretary would fly over to Tokyo and tell the Japanese, "You ought to
do things the way we did in the Savings and Loan crisis, because it
worked really well. Instead you're covering up the bank losses,
because you know, you say you need confidence. And so, we have to lie
to the people to create confidence. And it doesn't work. You will
cause your recession to continue and continue." And the Japanese call
it the lost decade. That was the result. So, now we get in trouble,
and what do we do? We adopt the Japanese approach of lying about the
assets. And you know what? It's working just as well as it did in Japan.
BILL MOYERS: Yeah. Are you saying that Timothy Geithner, the Secretary
of the Treasury, and others in the administration, with the banks, are
engaged in a cover up to keep us from knowing what went wrong?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Absolutely.
BILL MOYERS: You are.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Absolutely, because they are scared to death. All
right? They're scared to death of a collapse. They're afraid that if
they admit the truth, that many of the large banks are insolvent. They
think Americans are a bunch of cowards, and that we'll run screaming
to the exits. And we won't rely on deposit insurance. And, by the way,
you can rely on deposit insurance. And it's foolishness. All right?
Now, it may be worse than that. You can impute more cynical motives.
But I think they are sincerely just panicked about, "We just can't let
the big banks fail." That's wrong.
BILL MOYERS: But what might happen, at this point, if in fact they
keep from us the true health of the banks?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, then the banks will, as they did in Japan,
either stay enormously weak, or Treasury will be forced to
increasingly absurd giveaways of taxpayer money. We've seen how
horrific AIG -- and remember, they kept secrets from everyone.
BILL MOYERS: A.I.G. did?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: What we're doing with -- no, Treasury and both
administrations. The Bush administration and now the Obama
administration kept secret from us what was being done with AIG. AIG
was being used secretly to bail out favored banks like UBS and like
Goldman Sachs. Secretary Paulson's firm, that he had come from being
CEO. It got the largest amount of money. $12.9 billion. And they
didn't want us to know that. And it was only Congressional pressure,
and not Congressional pressure, by the way, on Geithner, but
Congressional pressure on AIG.
Where Congress said, "We will not give you a single penny more unless
we know who received the money." And, you know, when he was Treasury
Secretary, Paulson created a recommendation group to tell Treasury
what they ought to do with AIG. And he put Goldman Sachs on it.
BILL MOYERS: Even though Goldman Sachs had a big vested stake.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Massive stake. And even though he had just been CEO
of Goldman Sachs before becoming Treasury Secretary. Now, in most
stages in American history, that would be a scandal of such
proportions that he wouldn't be allowed in civilized society.
BILL MOYERS: Yeah, like a conflict of interest, it seems.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Massive conflict of interests.
BILL MOYERS: So, how did he get away with it?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: I don't know whether we've lost our capability of
outrage. Or whether the cover up has been so successful that people
just don't have the facts to react to it.
BILL MOYERS: Who's going to get the facts?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: We need some chairmen or chairwomen--
BILL MOYERS: In Congress.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: --in Congress, to hold the necessary hearings. And
we can blast this out. But if you leave the failed CEOs in place, it
isn't just that they're terrible business people, though they are. It
isn't just that they lack integrity, though they do. Because they were
engaged in these frauds. But they're not going to disclose the truth
about the assets.
BILL MOYERS: And we have to know that, in order to know what?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: To know everything. To know who committed the
frauds. Whose bonuses we should recover. How much the assets are
worth. How much they should be sold for. Is the bank insolvent, such
that we should resolve it in this way? It's the predicate, right? You
need to know the facts to make intelligent decisions. And they're
deliberately leaving in place the people that caused the problem,
because they don't want the facts. And this is not new. The Reagan
Administration's central priority, at all times, during the Savings
and Loan crisis, was covering up the losses.
BILL MOYERS: So, you're saying that people in power, political power,
and financial power, act in concert when their own behinds are in the
ringer, right?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: That's right. And it's particularly a crisis that
brings this out, because then the class of the banker says, "You've
got to keep the information away from the public or everything will
collapse. If they understand how bad it is, they'll run for the exits."
BILL MOYERS: Yeah, and this week in New York, at this conference, you
described this as more than a financial crisis. You called it a moral
crisis.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yes.
BILL MOYERS: Why?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because it is a fundamental lack of integrity. But
also because, if you look back at crises, an economist who is also a
presidential appointee, as a regulator in the Savings and Loan
industry, right here in New York, Larry White, wrote a book about the
Savings and Loan crisis. And he said, you know, one of the most
interesting questions is why so few people engaged in fraud? Because
objectively, you could have gotten away with it. But only about ten
percent of the CEOs, engaged in fraud. So, 90 percent of them were
restrained by ethics and integrity. So, far more than law or by F.B.I.
agents, it's our integrity that often prevents the greatest abuses.
And what we had in this crisis, instead of the Savings and Loan, is
the most elite institutions in America engaging or facilitating fraud.
BILL MOYERS: This wound that you say has been inflicted on American
life. The loss of worker's income. And security and pensions and
future happened, because of the misconduct of a relatively few, very
well-heeled people, in very well-decorated corporate suites, right?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Right.
BILL MOYERS: It was relatively a handful of people.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: And their ideologies, which swept away regulation.
So, in the example, regulation means that cheaters don't prosper. So,
instead of being bad for capitalism, it's what saves capitalism.
"Honest purveyors prosper" is what we want. And you need regulation
and law enforcement to be able to do this. The tragedy of this crisis
is it didn't need to happen at all.
BILL MOYERS: When you wake in the middle of the night, thinking about
your work, what do you make of that? What do you tell yourself?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: There's a saying that we took great comfort in. It's
actually by the Dutch, who were fighting this impossible war for
independence against what was then the most powerful nation in the
world, Spain. And their motto was, "It is not necessary to hope in
order to persevere."
Now, going forward, get rid of the people that have caused the
problems. That's a pretty straightforward thing, as well. Why would we
keep CEOs and CFOs and other senior officers, that caused the
problems? That's facially nuts. That's our current system.
So stop that current system. We're hiding the losses, instead of
trying to find out the real losses. Stop that, because you need good
information to make good decisions, right? Follow what works instead
of what's failed. Start appointing people who have records of success,
instead of records of failure. That would be another nice place to
start. There are lots of things we can do. Even today, as late as it
is. Even though they've had a terrible start to the administration.
They could change, and they could change within weeks. And by the way,
the folks who are the better regulators, they paid their taxes. So,
you can get them through the vetting process a lot quicker.
BILL MOYERS: William Black, thank you very much for being with me on
the Journal.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Thank you so much.
--
My little brother got his arm stuck in the microwave. So my mom had
to take him to the hospital. My grandma dropped acid this
morning, and she freaked out. She hijacked a busload of
penguins. So it's sort of a family crisis. Bye!
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