Sorry, I wasn't clear enough about the two desirable qualities: On Tue, Jul 2, 2013 at 2:03 PM, Callme Whatiwant <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 2, 2013 at 6:48 AM, Jonas Wielicki <[email protected]>wrote: > >> On 02.07.2013 15:35, Kurt Roeckx wrote: >> > I seem to be more and more going to a PGP model, and have >> > to wonder if it's possible to use my GPG key for OTR. >> >> Honestly I think that the absence of many of the PGP features is the >> strength of OTR. OTR is so incredibly easy and, in my opinion, the only >> current example of strong crypto done right (from the user experience >> perspective). >> >> > +N for some very large N. > > OTR's strength *comes* from the lack of such features. If users are lead > to believe "one fingerprint per (account, device)" this has two desirable > qualities: > > Quality one: Their beliefs about the implications their usage of the software are more likely to be correct. Quality two: They are more likely to understand how to use the software. The second means more users, and the first means fewer security mistakes. > First, they will understand the scope of verifying a fingerprint: It is > specific to a particular device and account. What if my friend's phone is > stolen? If I have separate verifications for their laptop versus their > phone, I don't have to know how to use any software tools whatsoever > (assuming the client shows this distinction!), I simply stop trusting my > friend's phone. > > By contrast if there's some "tech" for associating and revoking keys, who > successfully use that? Average users will not practice revocation, because > it is a rare event, and so when their phone is stolen they won't know what > to do. If sharing keys across devices or accounts is common (because, IMO, > we've *miseducated* the user base), then what do they tell their friends? > "Oh, hey, stop trusting my phone, but you should still trust my laptop > access." How do they specify this? > > Also, think about the usability? How do they associate keys between > accounts or devices? Every client will have a different UI. Which users > will get this right? Only some of them. Therefore the ecosystem will be > filled with confusion: "some people share a single fingerprint among > multiple accounts and/or devices, but other's do not, so now that I'm > talking to my friend Alice, which category is she in?" "Alice knows how to > share keys between devices/accounts, and I know she sync'd her identity > between her gchat account on her phone and her laptop, but what about her > home desktop?" etc... > > That kind of usability confusion == making the wrong assumptions about > authentication == security vuln. > > Security is only as strong as its usability. > > > >> Adding complications such as key sync, key management, revocation etc. >> is not what I consider useful for the general case. >> >> > +1 > > Here's another thought experiment: > > Count the number of people who have "correctly" verified their friends OTR > fingerprint. Of those, count the ones who have "the correct" belief about > the security implications and the risks they face because of that. > > Now, do the same for PGP key verification. Add on key signing. Add on > transitive web of trust. Add revocations. > > It's no wonder that PGP software is unusable[1], because every > implementation foists all this complexity (which I posit most users ignore) > on users. My intuition is that each usability foible in the "PKI > mentality" leads to first, an order of magnitude fewer attempted users, and > then within that set *another order of magnitude* fewer users who have > "correct" beliefs about the implications of their usage. > > [1] Here, when I say "unusable" I don't mean by geeks. I mean by my mom > and my non-computer friends who anecdotally have successfully used OTR but > who have never successfully used PGP. The primary reason for this is that > I can explain how to use OTR in about 15 minutes to my mom, but I haven't > even dared to explain PGP. > > > I'd love to see actual empirical data about those counts above. Is anyone > aware of any? > > > >> regards, >> Jonas >> >> > Opinionatedly yours, > callme whatiwant > > > > >> _______________________________________________ >> OTR-dev mailing list >> [email protected] >> http://lists.cypherpunks.ca/mailman/listinfo/otr-dev >> > >
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