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Hi, in year 2005 there was discussion about increasing the moduli in OTR from 1536-bit discrete logs to longer key sizes. We have now year 2014 and performance improvement in computers allow much longer key sizes even in embedded devices. https://lists.cypherpunks.ca/pipermail/otr-users/2005-March/000186.html Are the limitations of ICQ still relevant for OTR ? https://lists.cypherpunks.ca/pipermail/otr-users/2005-March/000190.html I recommend also reading the "Yearly Report on Algorithms and Keysizes (2012), D.SPA.20 Rev. 1.0, ICT-2007-216676 ECRYPT II, 09/2012." http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/documents/D.SPA.20.pdf http://www.keylength.com Recently there was theoretical progress for the discrete logarithm problem: http://hal.inria.fr/hal-00835446 If performance is the primary problem with longer DH moduli, have you considered to switch elliptic curves? They support faster calculation and shorter key sizes. For example Curve25519, Curve3617, or E-521 ? http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/index.html Regards, Fedor -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJ8BAEBCgBmBQJSzrXIXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXQ4QkVFQ0NBRDcyNzU1RTk2RTQwMzlEQjc2 RTE3NDA5NTQwNTY2M0FEAAoJEG4XQJVAVmOtK78QAJMM6J+xrznPJsqxAOtJ0b7J ynB7pp0yBDFUaYHHsWCF6pdQEsR4j3nVKo2LLu6fhXIYszdrgyOX9+C69aZmP7NV 2h1ML8blPP/xo6oEw6/AuT97bvBtxgjr92AQzPv8YlIW0rXTNt3veeA4Zv4yyo80 5hvv6KueIA1UET4dwqJndBPCbFHp4OA7unZrMlOcidpXEA6t91q8u/hElyS5xxua T9ZgwTWA71UjIkv1rfsuTDzePXbmpOGR0CTdusahageQfS/x29eHomm/+nGacYnh Cc7Obwb5Z/iNCmilOiNS9tYxBcfGPFaNYFlHmulz7cHamEHsYqGHcmYriHA+h9Wk MDX//yJkeOYcBHwByoXre87hfOuWonM4Rw57UC9R97jVgO24bzMWLX3FH1Hu8Xhx cSBMwFjUpI5WkoQacgHXzIIbSSKoq3mCh1EFfWPcpuoz9ddt6zPB7mRBhyR3Esix CQaZcpxjRUzMgVnSZV19Zj4ZK5lTsCjN0HtIJj+y58YNFgR+SPVYIMmqRaWLiJsE x9Ct3GJdSSSMG+y7fhOSvwPW2WgiUAEKUDSnI9JuC4RSclqn9+/bXB+NxydO6VoN 4qebSrxMiyqeVHMv4XZFuzr5fPNl9wIjS1+lQKt3UCPJTai2AQ9UiqlJ6jhfTa8R /WOjm0Hat54VZqvgbIr0 =0Opl -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ OTR-dev mailing list [email protected] http://lists.cypherpunks.ca/mailman/listinfo/otr-dev
