> Hi OTRers, > > This is vmon from Internet (eQualit.ie/Cryptocat/Tor etc) ;). > > I am curious to know if there has been any publication or attempt to > proof the security of the OTR protocol in terms of "provable security", > reduction of OTR security to its primitives or even merely a precise > mathematical definition and modeling of the various adversaries, > addressed in the design of the protocol (Confidentiality, Authenticity, > forward secrecy and deniablitiy) and their computational resources. > > I would really appreciate if someone points me to such works. That > would be a great help and a grand favor :) > >
I'm aware of two works that attempt to formalize and prove the security of OTR: - Mario Di Raimondo, Rosario Gennaro, and Hugo Krawczyk: "Secure Off-the-Record Messaging" - Joseph Bonneau , Andrew Morrison: "Finite-State Security Analysis of OTR Version 2" _______________________________________________ OTR-dev mailing list [email protected] http://lists.cypherpunks.ca/mailman/listinfo/otr-dev
