Hm, well, there isn't any real context there. Maybe they'd compromised at least one of the users' machines and run something like a timing attack against libpurple or libotr?
Alternatively, I wonder if maybe this could have been caused by a vulnerability in one of the third-party OTR implementations (rather than libotr or the OTR spec itself). I know some OTR clients have been known to have had implementation bugs right around that time frame that caused issues like weak keys (which would explain the NSA's inconsistency in decrypting messages). On Sun Dec 28 2014 at 6:40:06 PM Gregory Maxwell <[email protected]> wrote: > http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-35552.pdf > > From http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa- > documents-attacks-on-vpn-ssl-tls-ssh-tor-a-1010525.html > > The fact that they appear to have decrypted some but not all messages > in a log suggests to me that this is not a host compromise, or an > MITM. But potentially an attack on 1024 bit DH or AES-CTR? > _______________________________________________ > OTR-dev mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.cypherpunks.ca/mailman/listinfo/otr-dev >
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