Hi Ian, On Freitag, 22. Mai 2015, Ian Goldberg wrote: > No, there is no reason to believe that the 1536-bit DH group used by OTR > is vulnerable.
is it really a single group for all? how about (optionally) creating a new,
client specific one, on installation? and how about using eg. 4096 bits?
if I understand correctly, in a few years 1536 bits might not give sufficient
protection anymore, if attacked liked this, and if there is a a full take of
the otr communication then the "forward secrecy" is gone :/
cheers,
Holger
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