Hi, Does anyone know of any strategies to prevent, identify, or work-around malicious nodes in a structured overlay? I'm specifically interested in Chord's ring overlay. It seems like there are a lot of things a malicious node could to to interfere with normal operations (e.g. routing / lookup / etc..), or to bypass certain regions of the ring.
Examples of things that a malicious node could do ... 1. Imagine someone wanted to prevent others from accessing a key-value pair. That person would create a malicious node with an id of hash(key), ensuring that queries for that key would end up at the malicious node. When the malicious node receives queries for that key, it simply ignores them or responds that the key was never set. 2. This is similar to the one above. Imagine someone wanted to prevent others from accessing a key-value pair, but a legitimate node already existed with an id of hash(key). That person would create a malicious node with an id of hash(key) - 1. When other nodes ask the malicious node to be routed to that key, the malicious node would respond with a node other than it's successor, ensuring that the request never gets routed to its true destination. 3. Imagine someone wanted to cut out a portion of the nodes in the overlay. That person would create a malicious node that has its finger table set to skip over a bunch of existing nodes in front of it. Are there strategies to deal with this, or is this just something that's expected with Chord's design (as in peers can't be untrusted nodes)? _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list [email protected] http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
