On 21 April 2014 13:59, Will Holcomb <[email protected]> wrote: >> 2. If the voting site tracks which identity it gives to which human, the >> identity is trivially unmasked. > > The voting site doesn't have access to the identities, only the identity > service.
So the voting site who knows real world identities gets a code from the pseudonym server, and gives the code to the human. The human redeems the code on the pseudonym server and gets a pseudonym. The two must collude to unmask the user. >> That's a lot of trust to place in the voting site. > > > Any sort of electronic voting will have to have some element of trust. You > can't have a digital poll without someone collecting the votes. I disagree (on the first part). Most electronic voting systems aim to provide vote auditing, by which you can ensure that your vote was unmodified and included in the total. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_systems > I've been trying to figure out if there's a solution possible through doing > away with the secrecy of the vote. The mechanism for allowing a person to > avoid unsavory repercussions from their positions could be done by excluding > identities from consideration. Alternately, assert there is no way to reveal how you voted, dubbed 'receipt freeness' from the above wikipedia article. -tom _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list [email protected] http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
