Non credo siano da accreditare i motivi principali vantati dall'intervento USA in Afghanistan. I motivi veri non hanno molto da fare con la cattura del tuttora agente CIA, Bin Laden (semmai con il ritrovamento di altre megapatacche video), n� con la distruzione di Al Qaeda e del regime Taleban. Conta che si faccia guerra quando e dove pare, che il "terrorismo" � diventato il passamontagna sull'orrendo volto della fascistizzazione globale, e che si sia ripreso il controllo della produzione e commercializzazione dell'oppio e dell'utilizzo dei suoi proventi nell'economia di rapina degli USA (e un obiettivo imminente, nello stesso quadro, sar� il Laos, paese comunista e, perlopi�, ostacolo alla ripresa della valorizzazione USA del "Triangolo d'oro" dell'oppio. Si sono gi� viste da quelle partri le mosche cocchiere radicali). Conta il rafforzamento dello stato-nazione nordamericano - e di quelli subalterni - nella perfetta integrazione tra Stato e elementi trainanti privilegiati della produzione. Conta di aver impiegato impunemente la punizione collettiva di popoli per ricomporre sul cadavere sfilacciato della globalizzazione (cui credono ormai solo Casarini e Negri) la pi� pura strategia imperialista. Conta di aver potuto lanciare la grande controffensiva WASP-israeliana dopo la sconfitta del colonialismo 50 anni fa. Conta che il ricatto terroristico fatto da Israele agli USA ha definitivamente imposto il ruolo-guida di Israele nella crociata occidentale contro i paesi delle risorse. Conta che si sono sperimentate alcune nuove armi para-nucleari. Conta che si sia sfoltito un altro po' di umanit� eccedente. Conta che si sia infilato un cuneo nel disegno di una grande triangolo di potenza alternativa nel l'Eurasia (Russia, Cina, India e, forse, UE) e nella temutissima prospettiva di un nuovo equilibrio di forze che possa inibire il passo alle aggressioni e devastazioni USA, come al tempo dell'URSS e dei Non allineati. Fulvio Grimaldi ----- Original Message ----- From: "Nello Margiotta" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Saturday, December 22, 2001 10:42 AM Subject: Fw: The Pakistani Crisis
> > > > > The Pakistani Crisis > 2245 GMT, 011220 > > Summary > > With the Taliban withdrawal, the focus is shifting to countries that could > next face U.S. military attention, such as Somalia or Iraq. However, if > Washington really wants to break the al Qaeda network, it must deal with > Pakistan first. It will become increasingly difficult for the United States > to avoid taking some action in at least parts of that country. > > Analysis > > The mood in Washington is one of subdued satisfaction. The war in > Afghanistan has been concluded, with the primary strategic objective > achieved: the country can no longer be used as a base of operations for al > Qaeda. > > Secondary strategic objectives, though, have not been attained. The bulk of > Taliban fighters have not been killed or captured, and it will not be clear > until after winter whether their cohesion has been permanently shattered. > The senior commanders of the Taliban have also not been liquidated. Above > all, al Qaeda's leadership, particularly Osama bin Laden, still appears to > be on the loose. > > However, in any war in which the primary objective is achieved with little > cost in lives, there is ample reason for satisfaction. However, there is > another sense in Washington that events in Afghanistan have clearly given > the United States strategic initiative, and that therefore the next move is > up to the Bush administration. > > There is a spirited debate underway among policymakers at all levels as to > what such a move ought to be. Some argue that the United States should now > attack Iraq, while others want to deal with Somalia or Yemen. > > The debate itself is rooted in a perception of the world that is dubious. > The Bush administration did not choose the war in Afghanistan. It was > forced > on the United States by the actions of others and by geopolitical reality. > Al Qaeda's decision to attack, its relationship to the Taliban and the > geography and politics of Afghanistan scripted the American response. > > Washington's perception of the current situation is that it now has the > freedom to choose its next step. But what that will be just isn't clear, as > new issues will force themselves on the United States. The most important > issue, one that the United States has been assiduously avoiding, is that of > the current role and future condition Pakistan. > > Pakistan historically has been an ally of the United States, and it was a > base of operations for U.S. and allied efforts to support the mujahideen > during the Afghan-Soviet war. > > With the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S.-Pakistani relations underwent a > transformation. Pakistan evolved politically from a secular, pro-Western > orientation until it became a bulwark of Islamic fundamentalism. To a very > great extent, the Taliban is as much a Pakistani creature as it is an > Afghan > one. > > On the other side, with the United States no longer driven by the need to > contain the Soviet Union, the U.S. government downgraded Pakistan's > strategic importance. Before Sept. 11, the United States was already > exploring two new relationships: with the Khatami regime in Iran and with > India. > > However, after Sept. 11, the United States was forced back into a difficult > and complex relationship with Pakistan. U.S. and Pakistani interests in > Afghanistan were fundamentally at odds because Islamabad had close ties > with > the Taliban and did not want them to lose power, especially to the Northern > Alliance. > > At the same time, the United States badly needed Pakistan. Washington was > incapable of containing either the Taliban or al Qaeda inside of > Afghanistan. The quantity of forces deployed simply would not achieve that > goal. > > Therefore, Pakistan's willingness to use its armed forces to seal its > border > with Afghanistan became a matter of critical importance. Even more > important, the willingness of Pakistan to use its intelligence and security > forces to uproot al Qaeda cells, disrupt Taliban control in regions where > these cells might find refuge and provide intelligence on al Qaeda > operations in the region became strategically critical. So long as Pakistan > served as active or passive sanctuary, the Afghan operation could not be > conclusive. > > The Pakistani government was caught in a serious dilemma. It could not > afford to enrage the United States. An outright refusal to cooperate with > Washington, or continued active support of the Taliban and al Qaeda, would > have made Pakistan an enemy of the United States. Given the evolution of > Washington's relationship with New Delhi, and to a lesser extent, with > Taliban enemy Iran, a direct challenge to Washington could have > crystallized > a strategic alliance that would have doomed Pakistan. > > India recognized Sept. 11 as a historic opportunity, and put two policies > into motion. The first was to be absolutely forthcoming with Washington, > offering it a host of military and intelligence accommodations including > the > right to use Indian air bases for operations. Second, it proceeded to > increase its forces in the Kashmir region in anticipation of evolving > strategic opportunities. Iran, with a much more complex internal situation, > was of course less forthcoming and less relevant to the equation. > > Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was caught between the strategic > threat > and domestic reality. He understood he had to cooperate with the United > States, but also understood there were severe limitations on that > cooperation. Orders to act against Taliban supporters could be given, but > whether Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) or other security > organs would obey those orders was questionable. > > Musharraf faced two problems. First, if he pressed too hard, he could > destabilize his government and perhaps lose power. If he did nothing at > all, > he could get trapped in a geopolitical minefield. > > The president's solution was to act against the Taliban while asking that > the United States appreciate the limits of his power. Washington, knowing > that if Musharraf fell, it would leave America in a disastrous situation in > Afghanistan, permitted the president to tread a careful, middle road. > > He acted on behalf of the United States, but not so vigorously as to lose > his power base. This meant the U.S. military was able to base only limited > forces in Pakistan, receive some cooperation from Pakistani intelligence > and > have some control placed on pro-Taliban elements in the country. > > However, the United States would still have to operate in a nation in which > Taliban support was strong and the government was intimately bound up with > the Taliban. The ultimate understanding was that the United States would > turn a blind eye to Pakistani collaboration with the Taliban, so long as > Pakistan cooperated with and never impeded the U.S. war against al Qaeda. > > On paper this arrangement seemed fine. Washington cared much more about al > Qaeda than the Taliban. The Pakistanis seemed to care mostly about the > Taliban and little about al Qaeda. Washington recognized that support for > the Taliban and support for al Qaeda came from the same quarters and > entities in Pakistan. > > Those who were willing to strike at Musharraf were equally unwilling to > cooperate in liquidating the Taliban. And since the ISI was a center of > pro-Taliban sentiment, the probability of actual cooperation was slim. > > Much of this was academic prior to the recent Tora Bora operation, when it > suddenly became a burning issue. It is far from clear that bin Laden was at > Tora Bora. Why would he choose to go there from Kandahar as the Taliban was > withdrawing from the cities? > > But it seems extremely likely that he would have tried to make his way into > Pakistan, and if he personally didn't go there, it seems certain that other > members of the command cell, as well as less senior al Qaeda operatives, > did > make their way into the country. > > There has been a great deal of speculation as to where they will go from > Pakistan, although it is not even clear they would wish to leave the > country > at all. There are important sectors of the government, especially in the > ISI, who are prepared to actively protect them and provide them with > infrastructure for movement, communications and even training. > > Whatever Musharraf might want -- and he probably wishes that al Qaeda > members would disappear from his country so he can get on with his life -- > it is not certain that the president will or can act decisively. > > One indication of the true status of Pakistan policymaking occurred last > week when Islamic operatives attacked India's Parliament. It is difficult, > from Musharraf's point of view, to imagine a worse development right now. > The last thing he wants is to give the Indians an excuse to attack in > Kashmir. He does not want to create a crisis in which the United States is > forced to make choices at a time when Pakistan cannot fulfill American > demands. > > Unfortunately, the attack on the Parliament was likely supported by > organizations that depend on Pakistani patronage and which clearly want to > intensify the crisis between India and Pakistan. They may see their > situation inside of Pakistan deteriorating under U.S. pressure, and a > conflict with India might increase their power. > > First, the United States would be revealed as a useless ally. Second, those > Pakistanis who see some accommodation with the United States as necessary > would be discredited. Finally, an attack by India would create an > atmosphere > in which Islamic forces could flourish. > > Thus, the attack on India indicates two things. One, Islamic > fundamentalists > inside Pakistan feel pressure from Musharraf. Two, they have the ability to > act in a way that would reveal the president as incapable of controlling > his > internal forces. And that would drive a wedge between Islamabad and > Washington in exactly the way they want. > > The core of the problem is this: The next country the United States has to > deal with if it wants to break al Qaeda is not Iraq or Somalia. It is > Pakistan. The United States cannot begin the process of shutting down al > Qaeda globally until their organization inside Pakistan is broken. Al Qaeda > was always present in Pakistan, and following the Taliban collapse, its > numbers there have undoubtedly surged. Many or even all may stay because > Pakistan is a good place from which to operate. > > This means that unless the Pakistani government acts directly against al > Qaeda, the United States must either begin to treat Pakistan as a hostile > power or must abandon its strategic goals. The latter is impossible. It is > also impossible to imagine a circumstance under which Musharraf will be > able > to act effectively to destroy al Qaeda's presence in Pakistan. There are > too > many in Pakistan who would have to cooperate with this process who are > unwilling and incapable of doing so. > > Therefore, the United States is on a collision course with Pakistan, made > all the more complex by the fact that the government there is not capable > of > giving the United States what it must have. If Washington is not going to > abandon its goals, it must create a plan of operation in Pakistan. It is > difficult to imagine any circumstance under which this will not compel the > United States to take some actions against at least parts of Pakistan. > > The United States will need regional strategic support. India is ready and > waiting. China, on the other hand, is unpredictable. It is wary of U.S. > actions, hostile to increased Indian power and has longstanding relations > with Pakistan. China does have an Islamic problem, but Beijing's > geopolitical interests do not include the collapse of Pakistan. > > As the Bush administration has said, things now get harder. The hardest > part > is recognizing that the United States has not yet achieved true freedom of > action. The menu is still being drawn up by others, and from where we sit, > the next item on the menu is Pakistan. > > That is the country of refuge for Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. That is > the > country where support for them is the highest and where supporters deeply > influence major institutions. Pakistan must either change or be changed, or > the United States must abandon its ambitions relative to al Qaeda. The > United States will not abandon its fight, nor can it unilaterally act in > Pakistan, although it can manipulate internal affairs as it did in > Afghanistan. However, Pakistan is not Afghanistan, and such manipulation > could have explosive results. And for India, this is the historical > opportunity it has waited for since its founding. > > > > > > > > > The Revolution will not be televised: News at 11... > > > > grok > > Independent canadian marxist > > > > The U.S. ruling class: A godzilla monster > > that stalks the world, devouring everything. > > (apologies to Godzilla and friends) > > > > > >
