On 24/04/11 23:28, Lukas Fleischer wrote:
On Sun, Apr 24, 2011 at 11:25:52PM +1000, Allan McRae wrote:
On 23/04/11 09:32, Dan McGee wrote:
Allan and I today, and Denis in the past, noticed some issues with
having a shared public key database and locking that gpg wants to do
when reading from it. Here is an interesting bit from the apt
changelog:
apt (0.6.2) experimental; urgency=low
* Provide apt-key with a secret keyring and a trustdb, even though we
would never use them, because it blows up if it doesn't have them
> From what I gather, they don't use the trustdb for the reasons we are
seeing; instead it looks like they have another keyring named
"trusted.gpg" and go forth with the assumption that everything in
there is to be trusted.
Looking into this, I believe that we are hitting an entirely
separate issue. The reason for a lack of trustdb in the Debian case
appears to be more to do with keyring management that anything else.
The main issue here is that gpg(me) creates a lock file in the
keyrings home directory whenever it uses a keyring. Our keyring
directory only has write permissions for the root user and thus when
pacman is not being run as root (such as the "pacman -Qip<pkg>"
case), it can not create a lock file.
We can work around this by making the /etc/pacman.d/gnupg directory
have 777 permissions. The {pubring,secring,trustdb},gpg files will
still have only root write permissions so I guess this is safe as
long as those files are created as part of the pacman package
itself... Also, unless I am missing something even if other files
are added in that directory by a user, they should not affect gpg.
Still... 777 permissions on that directory sounds scary.
Eh? Giving a directory "777" permissions still allows arbitrary users to
delete and subsequently re-create files with write permissions. So this
might be a bad idea, here.
Ah crap... I knew there was something I was missing. 1777 permissions
then.
Allan
