On 11/5/19 9:03 AM, Allan McRae wrote: > On 5/11/19 11:58 pm, Morten Linderud wrote: >> On Tue, Nov 05, 2019 at 11:54:34PM +1000, Allan McRae wrote: >>> When creating or modifying repo tarballs, place a .TIMESTAMP file with >>> seconds since epoch in it. This will be used in the future to enable >>> rejecting databases older that a given threshold. >>> >>> Also skip reading the .TIMESTAMP file in sync_db_populate(). >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Allan McRae <al...@archlinux.org> >>> --- >>> > > <snip> > >>> diff --git a/scripts/repo-add.sh.in b/scripts/repo-add.sh.in >>> index caf1232d..c87409f1 100644 >>> --- a/scripts/repo-add.sh.in >>> +++ b/scripts/repo-add.sh.in >>> @@ -526,6 +526,7 @@ create_db() { >>> TAR_OPT=$(verify_repo_extension "$REPO_DB_FILE") >>> # $LOCKFILE is already guaranteed to be absolute so this is safe >>> dirname=${LOCKFILE%/*} >>> + timestamp=$(date +%s) >> >> This should probably utilize SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH or something equivalent? >> >> timestamp=$(date --date="@${SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH:-$(date +%s)}" +%s)) > > Why? I can see no reason why it should...
I don't either see value in "reproducible builds" for the actual state of the database. It's just a series of plaintext pointers to some other (hopefully reproducible) packages. If we actually did want to respect SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH, we'd need to do a lot more, like doing that for the bsdtar metadata (both file timestamps and file owners, probably sort files too, etc.) but again, I don't see how this protects the supply chain. -- Eli Schwartz Bug Wrangler and Trusted User
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