can you please elaborate on the resultant harm if a non-authorized user
receives a copy of the data? Depending upon what that threat is, I can
imagine a number of additional issues that would need to be elucidates.
Note that if this is because the regulations say that the database must
only respond to requests from authorized master, that does not actually
lead to a requirement to prevent eavesdropping. The database is still
only responding to requests from authorized participants.
Yours,
Joel
On 1/27/2012 3:01 PM, [email protected] wrote:
Joel,
A white space database MUST respond with available channel information
only to a certified master device.
Threat 5 is about master devices which have not been approved/certified by
a regulatory body in a specific country.
What threat 5 essentially implies in terms of security requirements is the
need for the data to be encrypted. The response message MUST be encrypted
by the white space database so that a MiTM cannot read the data and use
that information.
-Raj
On 1/27/12 1:49 PM, "ext Joel M. Halpern"<[email protected]> wrote:
Most of this looks good.
The last one does not seem to make sense to me.
I presume I am missing something. What follows is why I am confused,
with apologies if I have overlooked something.
Given the nature of the system, the number of ways for a non-cooperative
client to get the information about what the compliant clients are
allowed to do seems myriad. And the number of ways a non-compliant
client can mis-behave is also myriad.
So I do not actually understand the threat.
I can imagine privacy-driven confidentiality with regard to requests. I
hope we don't have to go there, but that would be a threat that I would
think was more of an issue than receving a copy of a response.
Yours,
Joel M. Halpern
On 1/27/2012 2:39 PM, [email protected] wrote:
Hello,
While discussing the requirements we concluded that it would be useful
to
have a threat model for PAWS. Below is an initial writeup of the threat
model. This threat model can be included in the Security considerations
section of the Use-case and Requirements I-D. Security requirements can
be
derived from this threat model.
Comments welcome.
-Raj
Threat model for the PAWS protocol
----------------------------------
Assumptions:
............
o It is assumed that an attacker has full access to the network medium
between the master device and the white space database. The attacker
may be able to eavesdrop on any communications between these
entities. The link between the master device and the white space
database can be wired or wireless and provides IP connectivity.
o It is assumed that the master device or the white space database
have NOT been compromised from a security standpoint.
Threat 1: Obtain master device authentication/authorization secrets
The master device needs to authenticate itself with the white
space database prior to requesting channel information. The
attacker may try to get access to the secrets of the master
device which can be used maliciously. The effect of such an
attack being successful would result in a malicious client
replaying the stolen authentication/authorization secrets to a
white space database.
Threat 2: Spoofed white space database
A master device discovers a white space database(s) thru which
it can query for channel information. The master device needs
to ensure that the white space database with which it
communicates with is an authentic entity. The white space
database needs to provide its identity to the master device
which can confirm the validity/authenticty of the database. An
attacker may attempt to spoof a white space database and
provide responses to a master device which are malicious and
result in the master device causing interference to the primary
user of the spectrum.
Threat 3: Modifying a query request
An attacker may modify the query request sent by a master
device to a white space database. The attacker may change the
location of the device or the capabilities in terms of its
transmit power or antenna height etc. which could result in the
database responding with incorrect information about available
channels or max transmit power allowed. The result of such an
attack is that the master device would cause intereference to
the primary user of the spectrum. It could also result in a
denial of service to the master device by indicating that no
channels are available.
Threat 4: Modifying a query response
An attacker could modify the query response sent by the white
space database to a master device. The channel information or
transmit power allowed type of parameters carried in the
response could be modified by the attacker resulting in the
master device using channels that are not available at a
location or transmitting at a greater power level than allowed
resulting in interference to the primary user of that
spectrum. Alternatively the attacker may indicate no channel
availability at a location resulting in a denial of service to
the master device.
Threat 5: Using query response information
An attacker may be a master device which is not certified for
use by the relevant regulatory body. The attacker may listen to
the communication between a valid master device and white space
database and utilize the information about available channels
in the response message by utilizing those channels. The result
of such an attack is unauthorized use of channels by a master
device which is not certified to operate.
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