On 2/2/12 2:48 PM, "ext Stephen Farrell" <[email protected]> wrote:
> >Pretty good overall. I'll keep on my usual track since I seem >stuck on it here;-) > >On 02/02/2012 08:37 PM, [email protected] wrote: >> >> Threat 6: Third party tracking of white space device location >> >> >> A master device needs to provide its location to the white >> space database in order to obtain the channel availability >> information at that location. Such location information can be >> gleaned by an eavesdropper. A master device may prefer to keep >> the location information secret. Hence the protocol should >> provide a means to protect the location information and prevent >> tracking of locations associated with a white space database. > >What's wrong with not wanting the DB to track me (as a master >device)? Could be that current known regulators don't like >anonymous masters, but that may change. (So I think 3rd party >here is wrong.) The issue is not with the database tracking your location. It is a a malicious node which could be eavesdropping on the link between the master device and the database. The database will always have the master device's location. Whether it saves that location is an orthogonal issue, but its not the one that is captured in this threat. > >Why is it only location tracking that's of concern? Why is >exposing identity not an equal deal? Same logic as above. The concern is not about exposing location of identity to the white space database. -Raj > > >S. > _______________________________________________ paws mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/paws
