>The list in the current threat models text that I proposed is by no >means >exhaustiveĊ Or intended to be. The intent is to derive a key set of >security requirements for the protocol. The focus is on those threats >that >are relevant to the device-2-database protocol rather than to the much >more expansive topic of white space technology.
Yes, but ... Without determining if there are technical mitigation mechanisms we should not be rejecting threats. The threats should all be examined and we should explicitly determine what is in scope versus unilaterally as part of the editing process. As an interesting example - if there is a natural disaster, should there be protocol mechanisms to enable use of emergency services without direct Internet connectivity to the DB? Loss of service (emergency and normal) usage of WS is a threat that should be listed and may or may not be addressed by technical or procedural mechanisms. Paul _______________________________________________ paws mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/paws
