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THE REDIRECTION
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Is the Administration’s new policy benefitting our enemies in the war on
terrorism?

The New Yorker | 2007-03-05

A STRATEGIC SHIFT

In the past few months, as the situation in Iraq has deteriorated, the
Bush Administration, in both its public diplomacy and its covert
operations, has significantly shifted its Middle East strategy. The
“redirection,” as some inside the White House have called the new
strategy, has brought the United States closer to an open confrontation
with Iran and, in parts of the region, propelled it into a widening
sectarian conflict between Shiite and Sunni Muslims.

To undermine Iran, which is predominantly Shiite, the Bush Administration
has decided, in effect, to reconfigure its priorities in the Middle East.
In Lebanon, the Administration has coöperated with Saudi Arabia’s
government, which is Sunni, in clandestine operations that are intended to
weaken Hezbollah, the Shiite organization that is backed by Iran. The U.S.
has also taken part in clandestine operations aimed at Iran and its ally
Syria. A by-product of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni
extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile
to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda.

One contradictory aspect of the new strategy is that, in Iraq, most of the
insurgent violence directed at the American military has come from Sunni
forces, and not from Shiites. But, from the Administration’s perspective,
the most profound—and unintended—strategic consequence of the Iraq war is
the empowerment of Iran. Its President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has made
defiant pronouncements about the destruction of Israel and his country’s
right to pursue its nuclear program, and last week its supreme religious
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said on state television that “realities
in the region show that the arrogant front, headed by the U.S. and its
allies, will be the principal loser in the region.”

After the revolution of 1979 brought a religious government to power, the
United States broke with Iran and cultivated closer relations with the
leaders of Sunni Arab states such as Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. That
calculation became more complex after the September 11th attacks,
especially with regard to the Saudis. Al Qaeda is Sunni, and many of its
operatives came from extremist religious circles inside Saudi Arabia.
Before the invasion of Iraq, in 2003, Administration officials, influenced
by neoconservative ideologues, assumed that a Shiite government there
could provide a pro-American balance to Sunni extremists, since Iraq’s
Shiite majority had been oppressed under Saddam Hussein. They ignored
warnings from the intelligence community about the ties between Iraqi
Shiite leaders and Iran, where some had lived in exile for years. Now, to
the distress of the White House, Iran has forged a close relationship with
the Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.

The new American policy, in its broad outlines, has been discussed
publicly. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
January, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that there is “a new
strategic alignment in the Middle East,” separating “reformers” and
“extremists”; she pointed to the Sunni states as centers of moderation,
and said that Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah were “on the other side of that
divide.” (Syria’s Sunni majority is dominated by the Alawi sect.) Iran and
Syria, she said, “have made their choice and their choice is to
destabilize.”

Some of the core tactics of the redirection are not public, however. The
clandestine operations have been kept secret, in some cases, by leaving
the execution or the funding to the Saudis, or by finding other ways to
work around the normal congressional appropriations process, current and
former officials close to the Administration said.

A senior member of the House Appropriations Committee told me that he had
heard about the new strategy, but felt that he and his colleagues had not
been adequately briefed. “We haven’t got any of this,” he said. “We ask
for anything going on, and they say there’s nothing. And when we ask
specific questions they say, ‘We’re going to get back to you.’ It’s so
frustrating.”

The key players behind the redirection are Vice-President Dick Cheney, the
deputy national-security adviser Elliott Abrams, the departing Ambassador
to Iraq (and nominee for United Nations Ambassador), Zalmay Khalilzad, and
Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi national-security adviser. While Rice
has been deeply involved in shaping the public policy, former and current
officials said that the clandestine side has been guided by Cheney.
(Cheney’s office and the White House declined to comment for this story;
the Pentagon did not respond to specific queries but said, “The United
States is not planning to go to war with Iran.”)

The policy shift has brought Saudi Arabia and Israel into a new strategic
embrace, largely because both countries see Iran as an existential threat.
They have been involved in direct talks, and the Saudis, who believe that
greater stability in Israel and Palestine will give Iran less leverage in
the region, have become more involved in Arab-Israeli negotiations.

The new strategy “is a major shift in American policy—it’s a sea change,”
a U.S. government consultant with close ties to Israel said. The Sunni
states “were petrified of a Shiite resurgence, and there was growing
resentment with our gambling on the moderate Shiites in Iraq,” he said.
“We cannot reverse the Shiite gain in Iraq, but we can contain it.”

“It seems there has been a debate inside the government over what’s the
biggest danger—Iran or Sunni radicals,” Vali Nasr, a senior fellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations, who has written widely on Shiites, Iran, and
Iraq, told me. “The Saudis and some in the Administration have been
arguing that the biggest threat is Iran and the Sunni radicals are the
lesser enemies. This is a victory for the Saudi line.”

Martin Indyk, a senior State Department official in the Clinton
Administration who also served as Ambassador to Israel, said that “the
Middle East is heading into a serious Sunni-Shiite Cold War.” Indyk, who
is the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the
Brookings Institution, added that, in his opinion, it was not clear
whether the White House was fully aware of the strategic implications of
its new policy. “The White House is not just doubling the bet in Iraq,” he
said. “It’s doubling the bet across the region. This could get very
complicated. Everything is upside down.”



The Administration’s new policy for containing Iran seems to complicate
its strategy for winning the war in Iraq. Patrick Clawson, an expert on
Iran and the deputy director for research at the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, argued, however, that closer ties between the United
States and moderate or even radical Sunnis could put “fear” into the
government of Prime Minister Maliki and “make him worry that the Sunnis
could actually win” the civil war there. Clawson said that this might give
Maliki an incentive to coöperate with the United States in suppressing
radical Shiite militias, such as Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

Even so, for the moment, the U.S. remains dependent on the coöperation of
Iraqi Shiite leaders. The Mahdi Army may be openly hostile to American
interests, but other Shiite militias are counted as U.S. allies. Both
Moqtada al-Sadr and the White House back Maliki. A memorandum written late
last year by Stephen Hadley, the national-security adviser, suggested that
the Administration try to separate Maliki from his more radical Shiite
allies by building his base among moderate Sunnis and Kurds, but so far
the trends have been in the opposite direction. As the Iraqi Army
continues to founder in its confrontations with insurgents, the power of
the Shiite militias has steadily increased.

Flynt Leverett, a former Bush Administration National Security Council
official, told me that “there is nothing coincidental or ironic” about the
new strategy with regard to Iraq. “The Administration is trying to make a
case that Iran is more dangerous and more provocative than the Sunni
insurgents to American interests in Iraq, when—if you look at the actual
casualty numbers—the punishment inflicted on America by the Sunnis is
greater by an order of magnitude,” Leverett said. “This is all part of the
campaign of provocative steps to increase the pressure on Iran. The idea
is that at some point the Iranians will respond and then the
Administration will have an open door to strike at them.”

President George W. Bush, in a speech on January 10th, partially spelled
out this approach. “These two regimes”—Iran and Syria—“are allowing
terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of
Iraq,” Bush said. “Iran is providing material support for attacks on
American troops. We will disrupt the attacks on our forces. We’ll
interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out
and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our
enemies in Iraq.”

In the following weeks, there was a wave of allegations from the
Administration about Iranian involvement in the Iraq war. On February
11th, reporters were shown sophisticated explosive devices, captured in
Iraq, that the Administration claimed had come from Iran. The
Administration’s message was, in essence, that the bleak situation in Iraq
was the result not of its own failures of planning and execution but of
Iran’s interference.

The U.S. military also has arrested and interrogated hundreds of Iranians
in Iraq. “The word went out last August for the military to snatch as many
Iranians in Iraq as they can,” a former senior intelligence official said.
“They had five hundred locked up at one time. We’re working these guys and
getting information from them. The White House goal is to build a case
that the Iranians have been fomenting the insurgency and they’ve been
doing it all along—that Iran is, in fact, supporting the killing of
Americans.” The Pentagon consultant confirmed that hundreds of Iranians
have been captured by American forces in recent months. But he told me
that that total includes many Iranian humanitarian and aid workers who
“get scooped up and released in a short time,” after they have been
interrogated.

“We are not planning for a war with Iran,” Robert Gates, the new Defense
Secretary, announced on February 2nd, and yet the atmosphere of
confrontation has deepened. According to current and former American
intelligence and military officials, secret operations in Lebanon have
been accompanied by clandestine operations targeting Iran. American
military and special-operations teams have escalated their activities in
Iran to gather intelligence and, according to a Pentagon consultant on
terrorism and the former senior intelligence official, have also crossed
the border in pursuit of Iranian operatives from Iraq.

At Rice’s Senate appearance in January, Democratic Senator Joseph Biden,
of Delaware, pointedly asked her whether the U.S. planned to cross the
Iranian or the Syrian border in the course of a pursuit. “Obviously, the
President isn’t going to rule anything out to protect our troops, but the
plan is to take down these networks in Iraq,” Rice said, adding, “I do
think that everyone will understand that—the American people and I assume
the Congress expect the President to do what is necessary to protect our
forces.”

The ambiguity of Rice’s reply prompted a response from Nebraska Senator
Chuck Hagel, a Republican, who has been critical of the Administration:

Some of us remember 1970, Madam Secretary. And that was Cambodia. And when
our government lied to the American people and said, “We didn’t cross the
border going into Cambodia,” in fact we did.
I happen to know something about that, as do some on this committee. So,
Madam Secretary, when you set in motion the kind of policy that the
President is talking about here, it’s very, very dangerous.


The Administration’s concern about Iran’s role in Iraq is coupled with its
long-standing alarm over Iran’s nuclear program. On Fox News on January
14th, Cheney warned of the possibility, in a few years, “of a
nuclear-armed Iran, astride the world’s supply of oil, able to affect
adversely the global economy, prepared to use terrorist organizations
and/or their nuclear weapons to threaten their neighbors and others around
the world.” He also said, “If you go and talk with the Gulf states or if
you talk with the Saudis or if you talk with the Israelis or the
Jordanians, the entire region is worried. . . . The threat Iran represents
is growing.”

The Administration is now examining a wave of new intelligence on Iran’s
weapons programs. Current and former American officials told me that the
intelligence, which came from Israeli agents operating in Iran, includes a
claim that Iran has developed a three-stage solid-fuelled intercontinental
missile capable of delivering several small warheads—each with limited
accuracy—inside Europe. The validity of this human intelligence is still
being debated.

A similar argument about an imminent threat posed by weapons of mass
destruction—and questions about the intelligence used to make that
case—formed the prelude to the invasion of Iraq. Many in Congress have
greeted the claims about Iran with wariness; in the Senate on February
14th, Hillary Clinton said, “We have all learned lessons from the conflict
in Iraq, and we have to apply those lessons to any allegations that are
being raised about Iran. Because, Mr. President, what we are hearing has
too familiar a ring and we must be on guard that we never again make
decisions on the basis of intelligence that turns out to be faulty.”

Still, the Pentagon is continuing intensive planning for a possible
bombing attack on Iran, a process that began last year, at the direction
of the President. In recent months, the former intelligence official told
me, a special planning group has been established in the offices of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, charged with creating a contingency bombing plan
for Iran that can be implemented, upon orders from the President, within
twenty-four hours.

In the past month, I was told by an Air Force adviser on targeting and the
Pentagon consultant on terrorism, the Iran planning group has been handed
a new assignment: to identify targets in Iran that may be involved in
supplying or aiding militants in Iraq. Previously, the focus had been on
the destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities and possible regime change.

Two carrier strike groups—the Eisenhower and the Stennis—are now in the
Arabian Sea. One plan is for them to be relieved early in the spring, but
there is worry within the military that they may be ordered to stay in the
area after the new carriers arrive, according to several sources. (Among
other concerns, war games have shown that the carriers could be vulnerable
to swarming tactics involving large numbers of small boats, a technique
that the Iranians have practiced in the past; carriers have limited
maneuverability in the narrow Strait of Hormuz, off Iran’s southern
coast.) The former senior intelligence official said that the current
contingency plans allow for an attack order this spring. He added,
however, that senior officers on the Joint Chiefs were counting on the
White House’s not being “foolish enough to do this in the face of Iraq,
and the problems it would give the Republicans in 2008.”

PRINCE BANDAR’S GAME



The Administration’s effort to diminish Iranian authority in the Middle
East has relied heavily on Saudi Arabia and on Prince Bandar, the Saudi
national-security adviser. Bandar served as the Ambassador to the United
States for twenty-two years, until 2005, and has maintained a friendship
with President Bush and Vice-President Cheney. In his new post, he
continues to meet privately with them. Senior White House officials have
made several visits to Saudi Arabia recently, some of them not disclosed.

Last November, Cheney flew to Saudi Arabia for a surprise meeting with
King Abdullah and Bandar. The Times reported that the King warned Cheney
that Saudi Arabia would back its fellow-Sunnis in Iraq if the United
States were to withdraw. A European intelligence official told me that the
meeting also focussed on more general Saudi fears about “the rise of the
Shiites.” In response, “The Saudis are starting to use their
leverage—money.”

In a royal family rife with competition, Bandar has, over the years, built
a power base that relies largely on his close relationship with the U.S.,
which is crucial to the Saudis. Bandar was succeeded as Ambassador by
Prince Turki al-Faisal; Turki resigned after eighteen months and was
replaced by Adel A. al-Jubeir, a bureaucrat who has worked with Bandar. A
former Saudi diplomat told me that during Turki’s tenure he became aware
of private meetings involving Bandar and senior White House officials,
including Cheney and Abrams. “I assume Turki was not happy with that,” the
Saudi said. But, he added, “I don’t think that Bandar is going off on his
own.” Although Turki dislikes Bandar, the Saudi said, he shared his goal
of challenging the spread of Shiite power in the Middle East.

The split between Shiites and Sunnis goes back to a bitter divide, in the
seventh century, over who should succeed the Prophet Muhammad. Sunnis
dominated the medieval caliphate and the Ottoman Empire, and Shiites,
traditionally, have been regarded more as outsiders. Worldwide, ninety per
cent of Muslims are Sunni, but Shiites are a majority in Iran, Iraq, and
Bahrain, and are the largest Muslim group in Lebanon. Their concentration
in a volatile, oil-rich region has led to concern in the West and among
Sunnis about the emergence of a “Shiite crescent”—especially given Iran’s
increased geopolitical weight.

“The Saudis still see the world through the days of the Ottoman Empire,
when Sunni Muslims ruled the roost and the Shiites were the lowest class,”
Frederic Hof, a retired military officer who is an expert on the Middle
East, told me. If Bandar was seen as bringing about a shift in U.S. policy
in favor of the Sunnis, he added, it would greatly enhance his standing
within the royal family.

The Saudis are driven by their fear that Iran could tilt the balance of
power not only in the region but within their own country. Saudi Arabia
has a significant Shiite minority in its Eastern Province, a region of
major oil fields; sectarian tensions are high in the province. The royal
family believes that Iranian operatives, working with local Shiites, have
been behind many terrorist attacks inside the kingdom, according to Vali
Nasr. “Today, the only army capable of containing Iran”—the Iraqi
Army—“has been destroyed by the United States. You’re now dealing with an
Iran that could be nuclear-capable and has a standing army of four hundred
and fifty thousand soldiers.” (Saudi Arabia has seventy-five thousand
troops in its standing army.)

Nasr went on, “The Saudis have considerable financial means, and have deep
relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis”—Sunni extremists
who view Shiites as apostates. “The last time Iran was a threat, the
Saudis were able to mobilize the worst kinds of Islamic radicals. Once you
get them out of the box, you can’t put them back.”

The Saudi royal family has been, by turns, both a sponsor and a target of
Sunni extremists, who object to the corruption and decadence among the
family’s myriad princes. The princes are gambling that they will not be
overthrown as long as they continue to support religious schools and
charities linked to the extremists. The Administration’s new strategy is
heavily dependent on this bargain.

Nasr compared the current situation to the period in which Al Qaeda first
emerged. In the nineteen-eighties and the early nineties, the Saudi
government offered to subsidize the covert American C.I.A. proxy war
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Hundreds of young Saudis were
sent into the border areas of Pakistan, where they set up religious
schools, training bases, and recruiting facilities. Then, as now, many of
the operatives who were paid with Saudi money were Salafis. Among them, of
course, were Osama bin Laden and his associates, who founded Al Qaeda, in
1988.

This time, the U.S. government consultant told me, Bandar and other Saudis
have assured the White House that “they will keep a very close eye on the
religious fundamentalists. Their message to us was ‘We’ve created this
movement, and we can control it.’ It’s not that we don’t want the Salafis
to throw bombs; it’s who they throw them at—Hezbollah, Moqtada al-Sadr,
Iran, and at the Syrians, if they continue to work with Hezbollah and
Iran.”

The Saudi said that, in his country’s view, it was taking a political risk
by joining the U.S. in challenging Iran: Bandar is already seen in the
Arab world as being too close to the Bush Administration. “We have two
nightmares,” the former diplomat told me. “For Iran to acquire the bomb
and for the United States to attack Iran. I’d rather the Israelis bomb the
Iranians, so we can blame them. If America does it, we will be blamed.”



In the past year, the Saudis, the Israelis, and the Bush Administration
have developed a series of informal understandings about their new
strategic direction. At least four main elements were involved, the U.S.
government consultant told me. First, Israel would be assured that its
security was paramount and that Washington and Saudi Arabia and other
Sunni states shared its concern about Iran.

Second, the Saudis would urge Hamas, the Islamist Palestinian party that
has received support from Iran, to curtail its anti-Israeli aggression and
to begin serious talks about sharing leadership with Fatah, the more
secular Palestinian group. (In February, the Saudis brokered a deal at
Mecca between the two factions. However, Israel and the U.S. have
expressed dissatisfaction with the terms.)

The third component was that the Bush Administration would work directly
with Sunni nations to counteract Shiite ascendance in the region.

Fourth, the Saudi government, with Washington’s approval, would provide
funds and logistical aid to weaken the government of President Bashir
Assad, of Syria. The Israelis believe that putting such pressure on the
Assad government will make it more conciliatory and open to negotiations.
Syria is a major conduit of arms to Hezbollah. The Saudi government is
also at odds with the Syrians over the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the
former Lebanese Prime Minister, in Beirut in 2005, for which it believes
the Assad government was responsible. Hariri, a billionaire Sunni, was
closely associated with the Saudi regime and with Prince Bandar. (A U.N.
inquiry strongly suggested that the Syrians were involved, but offered no
direct evidence; there are plans for another investigation, by an
international tribunal.)

Patrick Clawson, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
depicted the Saudis’ coöperation with the White House as a significant
breakthrough. “The Saudis understand that if they want the Administration
to make a more generous political offer to the Palestinians they have to
persuade the Arab states to make a more generous offer to the Israelis,”
Clawson told me. The new diplomatic approach, he added, “shows a real
degree of effort and sophistication as well as a deftness of touch not
always associated with this Administration. Who’s running the greater
risk—we or the Saudis? At a time when America’s standing in the Middle
East is extremely low, the Saudis are actually embracing us. We should
count our blessings.”

The Pentagon consultant had a different view. He said that the
Administration had turned to Bandar as a “fallback,” because it had
realized that the failing war in Iraq could leave the Middle East “up for
grabs.”

JIHADIS IN LEBANON



The focus of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, after Iran, is Lebanon, where
the Saudis have been deeply involved in efforts by the Administration to
support the Lebanese government. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora is
struggling to stay in power against a persistent opposition led by
Hezbollah, the Shiite organization, and its leader, Sheikh Hassan
Nasrallah. Hezbollah has an extensive infrastructure, an estimated two to
three thousand active fighters, and thousands of additional members.

Hezbollah has been on the State Department’s terrorist list since 1997.
The organization has been implicated in the 1983 bombing of a Marine
barracks in Beirut that killed two hundred and forty-one military men. It
has also been accused of complicity in the kidnapping of Americans,
including the C.I.A. station chief in Lebanon, who died in captivity, and
a Marine colonel serving on a U.N. peacekeeping mission, who was killed.
(Nasrallah has denied that the group was involved in these incidents.)
Nasrallah is seen by many as a staunch terrorist, who has said that he
regards Israel as a state that has no right to exist. Many in the Arab
world, however, especially Shiites, view him as a resistance leader who
withstood Israel in last summer’s thirty-three-day war, and Siniora as a
weak politician who relies on America’s support but was unable to persuade
President Bush to call for an end to the Israeli bombing of Lebanon.
(Photographs of Siniora kissing Condoleezza Rice on the cheek when she
visited during the war were prominently displayed during street protests
in Beirut.)

The Bush Administration has publicly pledged the Siniora government a
billion dollars in aid since last summer. A donors’ conference in Paris,
in January, which the U.S. helped organize, yielded pledges of almost
eight billion more, including a promise of more than a billion from the
Saudis. The American pledge includes more than two hundred million dollars
in military aid, and forty million dollars for internal security.

The United States has also given clandestine support to the Siniora
government, according to the former senior intelligence official and the
U.S. government consultant. “We are in a program to enhance the Sunni
capability to resist Shiite influence, and we’re spreading the money
around as much as we can,” the former senior intelligence official said.
The problem was that such money “always gets in more pockets than you
think it will,” he said. “In this process, we’re financing a lot of bad
guys with some serious potential unintended consequences. We don’t have
the ability to determine and get pay vouchers signed by the people we like
and avoid the people we don’t like. It’s a very high-risk venture.”

American, European, and Arab officials I spoke to told me that the Siniora
government and its allies had allowed some aid to end up in the hands of
emerging Sunni radical groups in northern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and
around Palestinian refugee camps in the south. These groups, though small,
are seen as a buffer to Hezbollah; at the same time, their ideological
ties are with Al Qaeda.

During a conversation with me, the former Saudi diplomat accused Nasrallah
of attempting “to hijack the state,” but he also objected to the Lebanese
and Saudi sponsorship of Sunni jihadists in Lebanon. “Salafis are sick and
hateful, and I’m very much against the idea of flirting with them,” he
said. “They hate the Shiites, but they hate Americans more. If you try to
outsmart them, they will outsmart us. It will be ugly.”

Alastair Crooke, who spent nearly thirty years in MI6, the British
intelligence service, and now works for Conflicts Forum, a think tank in
Beirut, told me, “The Lebanese government is opening space for these
people to come in. It could be very dangerous.” Crooke said that one Sunni
extremist group, Fatah al-Islam, had splintered from its pro-Syrian parent
group, Fatah al-Intifada, in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, in northern
Lebanon. Its membership at the time was less than two hundred. “I was told
that within twenty-four hours they were being offered weapons and money by
people presenting themselves as representatives of the Lebanese
government’s interests—presumably to take on Hezbollah,” Crooke said.

The largest of the groups, Asbat al-Ansar, is situated in the Ain
al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp. Asbat al-Ansar has received arms and
supplies from Lebanese internal-security forces and militias associated
with the Siniora government.

In 2005, according to a report by the U.S.-based International Crisis
Group, Saad Hariri, the Sunni majority leader of the Lebanese parliament
and the son of the slain former Prime Minister—Saad inherited more than
four billion dollars after his father’s assassination—paid forty-eight
thousand dollars in bail for four members of an Islamic militant group
from Dinniyeh. The men had been arrested while trying to establish an
Islamic mini-state in northern Lebanon. The Crisis Group noted that many
of the militants “had trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.”

According to the Crisis Group report, Saad Hariri later used his
parliamentary majority to obtain amnesty for twenty-two of the Dinniyeh
Islamists, as well as for seven militants suspected of plotting to bomb
the Italian and Ukrainian embassies in Beirut, the previous year. (He also
arranged a pardon for Samir Geagea, a Maronite Christian militia leader,
who had been convicted of four political murders, including the
assassination, in 1987, of Prime Minister Rashid Karami.) Hariri described
his actions to reporters as humanitarian.

In an interview in Beirut, a senior official in the Siniora government
acknowledged that there were Sunni jihadists operating inside Lebanon. “We
have a liberal attitude that allows Al Qaeda types to have a presence
here,” he said. He related this to concerns that Iran or Syria might
decide to turn Lebanon into a “theatre of conflict.”

The official said that his government was in a no-win situation. Without a
political settlement with Hezbollah, he said, Lebanon could “slide into a
conflict,” in which Hezbollah fought openly with Sunni forces, with
potentially horrific consequences. But if Hezbollah agreed to a settlement
yet still maintained a separate army, allied with Iran and Syria, “Lebanon
could become a target. In both cases, we become a target.”

The Bush Administration has portrayed its support of the Siniora
government as an example of the President’s belief in democracy, and his
desire to prevent other powers from interfering in Lebanon. When Hezbollah
led street demonstrations in Beirut in December, John Bolton, who was then
the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., called them “part of the
Iran-Syria-inspired coup.”

Leslie H. Gelb, a past president of the Council on Foreign Relations, said
that the Administration’s policy was less pro democracy than “pro American
national security. The fact is that it would be terribly dangerous if
Hezbollah ran Lebanon.” The fall of the Siniora government would be seen,
Gelb said, “as a signal in the Middle East of the decline of the United
States and the ascendancy of the terrorism threat. And so any change in
the distribution of political power in Lebanon has to be opposed by the
United States—and we’re justified in helping any non-Shiite parties resist
that change. We should say this publicly, instead of talking about
democracy.”

Martin Indyk, of the Saban Center, said, however, that the United States
“does not have enough pull to stop the moderates in Lebanon from dealing
with the extremists.” He added, “The President sees the region as divided
between moderates and extremists, but our regional friends see it as
divided between Sunnis and Shia. The Sunnis that we view as extremists are
regarded by our Sunni allies simply as Sunnis.”



In January, after an outburst of street violence in Beirut involving
supporters of both the Siniora government and Hezbollah, Prince Bandar
flew to Tehran to discuss the political impasse in Lebanon and to meet
with Ali Larijani, the Iranians’ negotiator on nuclear issues. According
to a Middle Eastern ambassador, Bandar’s mission—which the ambassador said
was endorsed by the White House—also aimed “to create problems between the
Iranians and Syria.” There had been tensions between the two countries
about Syrian talks with Israel, and the Saudis’ goal was to encourage a
breach. However, the ambassador said, “It did not work. Syria and Iran are
not going to betray each other. Bandar’s approach is very unlikely to
succeed.”

Walid Jumblatt, who is the leader of the Druze minority in Lebanon and a
strong Siniora supporter, has attacked Nasrallah as an agent of Syria, and
has repeatedly told foreign journalists that Hezbollah is under the direct
control of the religious leadership in Iran. In a conversation with me
last December, he depicted Bashir Assad, the Syrian President, as a
“serial killer.” Nasrallah, he said, was “morally guilty” of the
assassination of Rafik Hariri and the murder, last November, of Pierre
Gemayel, a member of the Siniora Cabinet, because of his support for the
Syrians.

Jumblatt then told me that he had met with Vice-President Cheney in
Washington last fall to discuss, among other issues, the possibility of
undermining Assad. He and his colleagues advised Cheney that, if the
United States does try to move against Syria, members of the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood would be “the ones to talk to,” Jumblatt said.

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, a branch of a radical Sunni movement
founded in Egypt in 1928, engaged in more than a decade of violent
opposition to the regime of Hafez Assad, Bashir’s father. In 1982, the
Brotherhood took control of the city of Hama; Assad bombarded the city for
a week, killing between six thousand and twenty thousand people.
Membership in the Brotherhood is punishable by death in Syria. The
Brotherhood is also an avowed enemy of the U.S. and of Israel.
Nevertheless, Jumblatt said, “We told Cheney that the basic link between
Iran and Lebanon is Syria—and to weaken Iran you need to open the door to
effective Syrian opposition.”

There is evidence that the Administration’s redirection strategy has
already benefitted the Brotherhood. The Syrian National Salvation Front is
a coalition of opposition groups whose principal members are a faction led
by Abdul Halim Khaddam, a former Syrian Vice-President who defected in
2005, and the Brotherhood. A former high-ranking C.I.A. officer told me,
“The Americans have provided both political and financial support. The
Saudis are taking the lead with financial support, but there is American
involvement.” He said that Khaddam, who now lives in Paris, was getting
money from Saudi Arabia, with the knowledge of the White House. (In 2005,
a delegation of the Front’s members met with officials from the National
Security Council, according to press reports.) A former White House
official told me that the Saudis had provided members of the Front with
travel documents.

Jumblatt said he understood that the issue was a sensitive one for the
White House. “I told Cheney that some people in the Arab world, mainly the
Egyptians”—whose moderate Sunni leadership has been fighting the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood for decades—“won’t like it if the United States helps
the Brotherhood. But if you don’t take on Syria we will be face to face in
Lebanon with Hezbollah in a long fight, and one we might not win.”

THE SHEIKH



On a warm, clear night early last December, in a bombed-out suburb a few
miles south of downtown Beirut, I got a preview of how the
Administration’s new strategy might play out in Lebanon. Sheikh Hassan
Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, who has been in hiding, had agreed to an
interview. Security arrangements for the meeting were secretive and
elaborate. I was driven, in the back seat of a darkened car, to a damaged
underground garage somewhere in Beirut, searched with a handheld scanner,
placed in a second car to be driven to yet another bomb-scarred
underground garage, and transferred again. Last summer, it was reported
that Israel was trying to kill Nasrallah, but the extraordinary
precautions were not due only to that threat. Nasrallah’s aides told me
that they believe he is a prime target of fellow-Arabs, primarily
Jordanian intelligence operatives, as well as Sunni jihadists who they
believe are affiliated with Al Qaeda. (The government consultant and a
retired four-star general said that Jordanian intelligence, with support
from the U.S. and Israel, had been trying to infiltrate Shiite groups, to
work against Hezbollah. Jordan’s King Abdullah II has warned that a Shiite
government in Iraq that was close to Iran would lead to the emergence of a
Shiite crescent.) This is something of an ironic turn: Nasrallah’s battle
with Israel last summer turned him—a Shiite—into the most popular and
influential figure among Sunnis and Shiites throughout the region. In
recent months, however, he has increasingly been seen by many Sunnis not
as a symbol of Arab unity but as a participant in a sectarian war.

Nasrallah, dressed, as usual, in religious garb, was waiting for me in an
unremarkable apartment. One of his advisers said that he was not likely to
remain there overnight; he has been on the move since his decision, last
July, to order the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border
raid set off the thirty-three-day war. Nasrallah has since said
publicly—and repeated to me—that he misjudged the Israeli response. “We
just wanted to capture prisoners for exchange purposes,” he told me. “We
never wanted to drag the region into war.”

Nasrallah accused the Bush Administration of working with Israel to
deliberately instigate fitna, an Arabic word that is used to mean
“insurrection and fragmentation within Islam.” “In my opinion, there is a
huge campaign through the media throughout the world to put each side up
against the other,” he said. “I believe that all this is being run by
American and Israeli intelligence.” (He did not provide any specific
evidence for this.) He said that the U.S. war in Iraq had increased
sectarian tensions, but argued that Hezbollah had tried to prevent them
from spreading into Lebanon. (Sunni-Shiite confrontations increased, along
with violence, in the weeks after we talked.)

Nasrallah said he believed that President Bush’s goal was “the drawing of
a new map for the region. They want the partition of Iraq. Iraq is not on
the edge of a civil war—there is a civil war. There is ethnic and
sectarian cleansing. The daily killing and displacement which is taking
place in Iraq aims at achieving three Iraqi parts, which will be sectarian
and ethnically pure as a prelude to the partition of Iraq. Within one or
two years at the most, there will be total Sunni areas, total Shiite
areas, and total Kurdish areas. Even in Baghdad, there is a fear that it
might be divided into two areas, one Sunni and one Shiite.”

He went on, “I can say that President Bush is lying when he says he does
not want Iraq to be partitioned. All the facts occurring now on the ground
make you swear he is dragging Iraq to partition. And a day will come when
he will say, ‘I cannot do anything, since the Iraqis want the partition of
their country and I honor the wishes of the people of Iraq.’ ”

Nasrallah said he believed that America also wanted to bring about the
partition of Lebanon and of Syria. In Syria, he said, the result would be
to push the country “into chaos and internal battles like in Iraq.” In
Lebanon, “There will be a Sunni state, an Alawi state, a Christian state,
and a Druze state.” But, he said, “I do not know if there will be a Shiite
state.” Nasrallah told me that he suspected that one aim of the Israeli
bombing of Lebanon last summer was “the destruction of Shiite areas and
the displacement of Shiites from Lebanon. The idea was to have the Shiites
of Lebanon and Syria flee to southern Iraq,” which is dominated by
Shiites. “I am not sure, but I smell this,” he told me.

Partition would leave Israel surrounded by “small tranquil states,” he
said. “I can assure you that the Saudi kingdom will also be divided, and
the issue will reach to North African states. There will be small ethnic
and confessional states,” he said. “In other words, Israel will be the
most important and the strongest state in a region that has been
partitioned into ethnic and confessional states that are in agreement with
each other. This is the new Middle East.”

In fact, the Bush Administration has adamantly resisted talk of
partitioning Iraq, and its public stances suggest that the White House
sees a future Lebanon that is intact, with a weak, disarmed Hezbollah
playing, at most, a minor political role. There is also no evidence to
support Nasrallah’s belief that the Israelis were seeking to drive the
Shiites into southern Iraq. Nevertheless, Nasrallah’s vision of a larger
sectarian conflict in which the United States is implicated suggests a
possible consequence of the White House’s new strategy.

In the interview, Nasrallah made mollifying gestures and promises that
would likely be met with skepticism by his opponents. “If the United
States says that discussions with the likes of us can be useful and
influential in determining American policy in the region, we have no
objection to talks or meetings,” he said. “But, if their aim through this
meeting is to impose their policy on us, it will be a waste of time.” He
said that the Hezbollah militia, unless attacked, would operate only
within the borders of Lebanon, and pledged to disarm it when the Lebanese
Army was able to stand up. Nasrallah said that he had no interest in
initiating another war with Israel. However, he added that he was
anticipating, and preparing for, another Israeli attack, later this year.

Nasrallah further insisted that the street demonstrations in Beirut would
continue until the Siniora government fell or met his coalition’s
political demands. “Practically speaking, this government cannot rule,” he
told me. “It might issue orders, but the majority of the Lebanese people
will not abide and will not recognize the legitimacy of this government.
Siniora remains in office because of international support, but this does
not mean that Siniora can rule Lebanon.”

President Bush’s repeated praise of the Siniora government, Nasrallah
said, “is the best service to the Lebanese opposition he can give, because
it weakens their position vis-à-vis the Lebanese people and the Arab and
Islamic populations. They are betting on us getting tired. We did not get
tired during the war, so how could we get tired in a demonstration?”



There is sharp division inside and outside the Bush Administration about
how best to deal with Nasrallah, and whether he could, in fact, be a
partner in a political settlement. The outgoing director of National
Intelligence, John Negroponte, in a farewell briefing to the Senate
Intelligence Committee, in January, said that Hezbollah “lies at the
center of Iran’s terrorist strategy. . . . It could decide to conduct
attacks against U.S. interests in the event it feels its survival or that
of Iran is threatened. . . . Lebanese Hezbollah sees itself as Tehran’s
partner.”

In 2002, Richard Armitage, then the Deputy Secretary of State, called
Hezbollah “the A-team” of terrorists. In a recent interview, however,
Armitage acknowledged that the issue has become somewhat more complicated.
Nasrallah, Armitage told me, has emerged as “a political force of some
note, with a political role to play inside Lebanon if he chooses to do
so.” In terms of public relations and political gamesmanship, Armitage
said, Nasrallah “is the smartest man in the Middle East.” But, he added,
Nasrallah “has got to make it clear that he wants to play an appropriate
role as the loyal opposition. For me, there’s still a blood debt to pay”—a
reference to the murdered colonel and the Marine barracks bombing.

Robert Baer, a former longtime C.I.A. agent in Lebanon, has been a severe
critic of Hezbollah and has warned of its links to Iranian-sponsored
terrorism. But now, he told me, “we’ve got Sunni Arabs preparing for
cataclysmic conflict, and we will need somebody to protect the Christians
in Lebanon. It used to be the French and the United States who would do
it, and now it’s going to be Nasrallah and the Shiites.

“The most important story in the Middle East is the growth of Nasrallah
from a street guy to a leader—from a terrorist to a statesman,” Baer
added. “The dog that didn’t bark this summer”—during the war with
Israel—“is Shiite terrorism.” Baer was referring to fears that Nasrallah,
in addition to firing rockets into Israel and kidnapping its soldiers,
might set in motion a wave of terror attacks on Israeli and American
targets around the world. “He could have pulled the trigger, but he did
not,” Baer said.

Most members of the intelligence and diplomatic communities acknowledge
Hezbollah’s ongoing ties to Iran. But there is disagreement about the
extent to which Nasrallah would put aside Hezbollah’s interests in favor
of Iran’s. A former C.I.A. officer who also served in Lebanon called
Nasrallah “a Lebanese phenomenon,” adding, “Yes, he’s aided by Iran and
Syria, but Hezbollah’s gone beyond that.” He told me that there was a
period in the late eighties and early nineties when the C.I.A. station in
Beirut was able to clandestinely monitor Nasrallah’s conversations. He
described Nasrallah as “a gang leader who was able to make deals with the
other gangs. He had contacts with everybody.”

TELLING CONGRESS



The Bush Administration’s reliance on clandestine operations that have not
been reported to Congress and its dealings with intermediaries with
questionable agendas have recalled, for some in Washington, an earlier
chapter in history. Two decades ago, the Reagan Administration attempted
to fund the Nicaraguan contras illegally, with the help of secret arms
sales to Iran. Saudi money was involved in what became known as the
Iran-Contra scandal, and a few of the players back then—notably Prince
Bandar and Elliott Abrams—are involved in today’s dealings.

Iran-Contra was the subject of an informal “lessons learned” discussion
two years ago among veterans of the scandal. Abrams led the discussion.
One conclusion was that even though the program was eventually exposed, it
had been possible to execute it without telling Congress. As to what the
experience taught them, in terms of future covert operations, the
participants found: “One, you can’t trust our friends. Two, the C.I.A. has
got to be totally out of it. Three, you can’t trust the uniformed
military, and four, it’s got to be run out of the Vice-President’s
office”—a reference to Cheney’s role, the former senior intelligence
official said.

I was subsequently told by the two government consultants and the former
senior intelligence official that the echoes of Iran-Contra were a factor
in Negroponte’s decision to resign from the National Intelligence
directorship and accept a sub-Cabinet position of Deputy Secretary of
State. (Negroponte declined to comment.)

The former senior intelligence official also told me that Negroponte did
not want a repeat of his experience in the Reagan Administration, when he
served as Ambassador to Honduras. “Negroponte said, ‘No way. I’m not going
down that road again, with the N.S.C. running operations off the books,
with no finding.’ ” (In the case of covert C.I.A. operations, the
President must issue a written finding and inform Congress.) Negroponte
stayed on as Deputy Secretary of State, he added, because “he believes he
can influence the government in a positive way.”

The government consultant said that Negroponte shared the White House’s
policy goals but “wanted to do it by the book.” The Pentagon consultant
also told me that “there was a sense at the senior-ranks level that he
wasn’t fully on board with the more adventurous clandestine initiatives.”
It was also true, he said, that Negroponte “had problems with this Rube
Goldberg policy contraption for fixing the Middle East.”

The Pentagon consultant added that one difficulty, in terms of oversight,
was accounting for covert funds. “There are many, many pots of black
money, scattered in many places and used all over the world on a variety
of missions,” he said. The budgetary chaos in Iraq, where billions of
dollars are unaccounted for, has made it a vehicle for such transactions,
according to the former senior intelligence official and the retired
four-star general.

“This goes back to Iran-Contra,” a former National Security Council aide
told me. “And much of what they’re doing is to keep the agency out of it.”
He said that Congress was not being briefed on the full extent of the
U.S.-Saudi operations. And, he said, “The C.I.A. is asking, ‘What’s going
on?’ They’re concerned, because they think it’s amateur hour.”

The issue of oversight is beginning to get more attention from Congress.
Last November, the Congressional Research Service issued a report for
Congress on what it depicted as the Administration’s blurring of the line
between C.I.A. activities and strictly military ones, which do not have
the same reporting requirements. And the Senate Intelligence Committee,
headed by Senator Jay Rockefeller, has scheduled a hearing for March 8th
on Defense Department intelligence activities.

Senator Ron Wyden, of Oregon, a Democrat who is a member of the
Intelligence Committee, told me, “The Bush Administration has frequently
failed to meet its legal obligation to keep the Intelligence Committee
fully and currently informed. Time and again, the answer has been ‘Trust
us.’ ” Wyden said, “It is hard for me to trust the Administration.”
_____________________________

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