Thank you for the informative commentary on my post, sir. Really enjoyed reading it.
On Wed, 2 Apr 2025, 6:46 am Jon Alan Schmidt, <[email protected]> wrote: > Suteerth, List: > > I apologize for the delayed response, but my attention has been elsewhere > for the last few weeks. Here are a few comments on your post. > > SV: Consider what effects on your practice the object of your conception > entails. The sum of all these practical effects is your entire conception > of its meaning. > > > This is your own paraphrase of Peirce's famous maxim, "Consider what > effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the > object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is > the whole of our conception of the object" (CP 5.402, EP 1:132, 1878). > Notice the repetition in the original statement--"conceivably," "conceive," > and "conception" (three times)--which you have largely omitted from your > version. The relevant effects are not those *on your practice* that the > object of your conception *entails*, they are those that we *conceive *that > object to have which might *conceivably *have practical bearings of any > kind; and it is not the *sum *of *practical *effects that constitutes > your entire conception of its *meaning*, but your *conception *of *conceivable > *effects that constitutes your entire *conception* of the object. See the > differences? You might be interested in reading my paper on the maxim, > which presents 13 variants along with 47 restatements and elaborations that > Peirce formulated after William James began popularizing pragmatism in > 1898, followed by my own analysis and commentary ( > https://philpapers.org/go.pl?aid=SCHPMO-8). > > SV: There are three modes of thought corresponding to the three different > things that exist in the universe: qualities, relations and representations. > > > For Peirce, these are not three different *things *that *exist *in the > universe, they are three different *modes of being* that we prescind from > whatever is or could be present to the mind in any way (the *phaneron*); > and he ultimately preferred to designate them as "quality, reaction, and > mediation" because these are respectively "the purest conceptions" of his > three universal categories--1ns, 2ns, and 3ns (CP 1.530, 1903). They > correspond to *three *different universes that together encompass > whatever is capable of serving as the dynamical object of a sign--"Of the > three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first comprises all > mere Ideas ... The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things > and facts ... The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists > in active power to establish connections between different objects, > especially between objects in different Universes" (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, > 1908). > > SV: Our ideas are in our heads while the real world to which they apply is > outside. > > > I suspect that Peirce would disagree with this statement. "A psychologist > cuts out a lobe of my brain ... and then, when I find I cannot express > myself, he says, 'You see your faculty of language was localized in that > lobe.' No doubt it was; and so, if he had filched my inkstand, I should not > have been able to continue my discussion until I had got another. Yea, the > very thoughts would not come to me. So my faculty of discussion is equally > localized in my inkstand. It is localization in a sense in which a thing > may be in two places at once" (CP 7.366, 1902). "Accordingly, just as we > say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body we ought to > say that we are in thought and not that thoughts are in us" (CP 5.289n, EP > 1:42n, 1878). > > SV: Do you think that pragmatism has a future or do you think (like the > philosopher nicholas rescher) that pragmatism as a criterion of meaning > must give way to pragmatism as a methodological postulate? > > > This strikes me as a false dichotomy. In Peirce's architectonic > classification of the sciences, pragmatism falls within the third branch of > the normative science of logic as semeiotic, which he sometimes calls > *methodeutic*. The maxim itself as "a criterion of meaning" leads to "a > methodological postulate," namely, the three stages of inquiry in their > proper sequence--abduction/retroduction for formulating hypotheses, > deduction for explicating those hypotheses, and induction for testing those > hypotheses. That is my suggestion of "why Peirce considered pragmatism a > maxim of logic and called it the logic of abduction." As for the proof of > pragmatism, many scholars have offered attempts to reconstruct it since > Peirce never quite managed to spell it out himself. In my opinion, the best > of them is Nathan Houser's "proof from Peirce's theory of signs" (EP > 2:xxxv-xxxvi) as gleaned from his various drafts for an article simply > entitled "Pragmatism" (R 318-322&324, 1907). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Mar 7, 2025 at 10:02 AM suteerth vajpeyi < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> What is pragmatism ? Is it a method of clarifying the meaning of >> conceptions or a criterion for deciding if a statement is meaningful or not >> ? It serves both purposes. As a method of clarifying the meaning of >> conceptions, it can be stated as follows:- >> >> Consider what effects on your practice the object of your conception >> entails. The sum of all these practical effects is your entire conception >> of its meaning. Here the word 'conception' means any idea introduced to >> reduce the plurality of qualities and relations we are aware of into a >> harmonious unity. For example we reduce all the various sensations we >> perceive to one concept in the proposition "The stove is black". The stove >> is a bundle of qualities and relations which is unified under the general >> idea of 'a black object'. Thus 'black' is a conception here. All this is >> from peirce's article "On a new list of categories". >> >> What is meant by the phrase, 'the conception of meaning of a term'? The >> job of a conception is to unify. So when we have unified all the qualities >> and relations we are referring to into one representation using one term we >> will have grasped its entire meaning. Take the term 'Justice'. It is a >> representation of a quality prevailing in the relations between men when >> they strive to achieve their common good, the good of the unlimited >> community. >> >> So far we have only enumerated some examples to the effect that the real >> world outside us is made up of qualities and relations which can be >> confirmed by a multitude of observers from the same perspective or >> standpoint. We have seen that all propositions and words are a species of >> signs or representations and that the function of all representations is to >> unify a set of different qualities and relations into one. >> >> There are three modes of thought corresponding to the three different >> things that exist in the universe: qualities, relations and >> representations. They have been called by alfred north whitehead as the >> mode of presentational immediacy which grasps qualities, the mode of causal >> efficacy which grasps relations and the mixed mode of sign reference which >> grasps representations. Now we can also begin to understand how a >> representation that has no effect on our practice is meaningless. >> >> This is because by the term meaning, peirce referred to what is today >> called the conventional intension of a term. Not all the objective >> attributes possessed by a thing nor all the whimsical beliefs about that >> thing are what is referred to here. What is referred to here is the use to >> which a representation is put by a community of users. >> >> Why does a representation need to have an influence upon our actions in >> order to be meaningful ? Our ideas are in our heads while the real world to >> which they apply is outside. Now other observers or inquirers only share >> with us the external world in which we live. Our only contact with reality >> is via the two processes of observation and action. But why not simply say >> that the sum of all effects upon our observations is the entire meaning of >> a term. Why choose action over observation ? Indeed the logical positivists >> preferred to speak of the observational effects that trace their origin to >> the object denoted by a representation. Peirce on the other hand preferred >> to speak of action. Choosing action as a criterion of meaning has marked >> advantages over choosing observation. >> >> The reason for these advantages is simple. Action is the only point of >> contact between our external and our internal worlds. When we act, we >> modify reality and also observe the effects of that modification. Also, we >> have no clue about the thoughts of others. Only the actions that express >> those thoughts are what can be grasped by us. Thus, to know the >> conventional intension of a term or statement, we have to take stock of how >> it modifies the actions of ourselves and others. Meaning, in the sense of >> the conventional intension of a term must be user and observer independent. >> That is why, in order to make observation more objective and reproducible, >> peirce preferred to speak of an idea's influence over our actions. This >> also had the added advantage of making normative ideas more tractable and >> meaningful. With an observational criterion of meaning, one just cannot >> explicate the meaning of normative conceptions around which most of our >> time, interest and energies are spent. Normative conceptions by definition >> refer not to what exists but what ought to exist, not to our present state >> of affairs but to our future actions. This makes normative terms like >> justice and goodness clearer and more precise something that could not be >> accomplished by all the formidable tools of the mathematical logic of the >> positivists. >> >> References: Peirce- how to make our ideas clear, on a new list of >> categories. >> A.N. whitehead- modes of thought >> >> Do let me know your thoughts on this defence of pragmatism. Inform me of >> the mistakes and shortcomings of this exposition. >> >> Do you think that pragmatism has a future or do you think (like the >> philosopher nicholas rescher) that pragmatism as a criterion of meaning >> must give way to pragmatism as a methodological postulate ? >> >> Do you think that pragmatism can be proved from more fundamental >> assumptions or that a proof is un-necessary or impossible ? >> >> Could someone supply the complete proof of pragmatism from more basic >> assumptions (something which peirce was prevented from doing by his >> circumstances and ultimately his death) ? >> >> Finally let me know your thoughts on why peirce considered pragmatism a >> maxim of logic and called it the logic of abduction. >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . 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