List, I won't comment for now on what I think is the critical matter that Gary F takes up in this latest post, although I may have a few things to say. But I'd like to read Jon's response to Gary F's remarks before I add any of my own.
For those without a copy of EP2 at hand, or who'd prefer not to mill through the longer excerpt Gary F linked to, here is a short excerpt that gets at the heart of Peirce's point that "Mill’s usage of the word “cause” deprived *that* word of all utility." I have broken the passage into two paragraphs and boldfaced an essential snippet in the 2nd paragraph. GF: All I’m trying to say is that for those purposes, your idea of “signs all the way down” deprives the word “sign” of all utility, just as Mill’s usage of the word “cause” deprived *that* word of all utility, according to Peirce (EP2:315 <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#Millcause>). What is a law, then? It is a formula to which real events truly conform. By "conform," I mean that, taking the formula as a general principle, if experience shows that the formula applies to a given event, then the result will be confirmed by experience. But that such a general formula is a symbol, and more particularly, an asserted symbolical proposition, is evident. Whether or not this symbol is a reality, even if not recognized by you or me or any generations of men, and whether, if so, it implies an Utterer, are metaphysical questions into which I will not now enter. One distinguished writer seems to hold that, although events conform to the formula, or rather, although /the formula/ conforms to the Truth of facts, yet it does not influence the facts.This comes perilously near to being pure verbiage; for, seeing that nobody pretends that the formula exerts a compulsive force on the events, what definite meaning can attach to this emphatic denial of the law's "influencing" the facts? The law had such mode of being as it ever has before all the facts had come into existence, for it might already be experientially known; and then the law existing, when the facts happen there is agreement between them and the law. What is it, then, that this writer has in mind? If it were not for the extraordinary misconception of the word "cause" by Mill, I should say that the idea of metaphysical sequence implied in that word, in "influence," and in other similar words, was perfectly clear. *Mill's singularity is that he speaks of the cause of a singular event. Everybody else speaks of the cause of a "fact," which is an element of the event. But, with Mill, it is the event in its entirety which is caused. The consequence is that Mill is obliged to define the cause as the totality of all the circumstances attending the event. This is, strictly speaking, the Universe of being in its totality. But any event, just as it exists, in its entirety, is nothing else but the same Universe of being in its totality. It strictly follows, therefore, from Mill's use of the words, that the only causatum is the entire Universe of being and that its only cause is itself. He thus deprives the word of all utility.* As everybody else but Mill and his school more or less clearly understands the word, it is a highly useful one. That which is caused, the causatum, is, not the entire event, but such abstracted element of an event as is expressible in a proposition, or what we call a "fact." The cause is another "fact." Namely, it is, in the first place, a fact which could, within the range of possibility, have its being without the being of the causatum; but, secondly, it could not be a real fact while a certain third complementary fact, expressed or understood, was realized, without the being of the causatum; and thirdly, although the actually realized causatum might perhaps be realized by other causes or by accident, yet the existence of the entire possible causatum could not be realized without the cause in question. It may be added that a part of a cause, if a part in that respect in which the cause is a cause, is also called a cause. In other respects, too, the scope of the word will be somewhat widened in the sequel. EP2:314-5 Best, Gary R On Tue, Jul 22, 2025 at 1:34 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, I have been following your argument that “the entire universe is a > vast semiosic continuum, signs all the way down.” My comment was not > intended to challenge the exegesis that leads you to that conclusion from > your selection of Peirce’s texts. Correct me if I’m wrong, but I’ve been > assuming that your “entire universe” includes not only all universes of > discourse but also the physical and psychical universes. In other words, > your argument virtually erases all distinctions between signs and anything > else, or between semiosis and the flow of time. The only distinctions left > are between degrees of degeneracy. > > I have no objection to pansemiotic or theosemiotic language games; they > are instructive on some level. I’m just saying that they are irrelevant to > investigations of the reality of biosemiosis (including anthroposemiosis) > as we experience it every day and hour. I don’t see how we in our time can > carry forward Peirce’s inquiry into actual semiosis if we don’t apply what > has been learned since his time about complex systems and how they work. > Peirce could not think in those terms because they were simply not > available then; it’s up to us (those of us who are interested in how > “quasi-minds” actually get determined) to go beyond Peirce, as he himself > said more than once. > > All I’m trying to say is that for those purposes, your idea of “signs all > the way down” deprives the word “sign” of all utility, just as Mill’s usage > of the word “cause” deprived *that* word of all utility, according to > Peirce (EP2:315 <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#Millcause>). > > Love, gary f. > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > > > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> *On > Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* 21-Jul-25 17:22 > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Ontology (was Spencer-Brown's concept > of 'reentry') > > > > Gary F., Jack, Helmut, Ivar, List: > > Gary F. and Jack seem to have missed the point of my first two posts in > this thread, so perhaps I was insufficiently clear in them. Again, what I > am proposing is that the entire universe is a vast semiosic continuum, > signs all the way down. After all, "There is a science of semeiotics > whose results no more afford room for differences of opinion than do those > of mathematics, and one of its theorems … is that if any signs are > connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign … > and the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be > more or less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2], 1904). However, I do not mean > this in the *reductionist *sense, where the whole is an assemblage of > discrete parts; on the contrary, in accordance with Peirce's late topical > conception of continuity, the whole is ontologically primordial and "every > part has itself parts of the same kind" (CP 6.168, c. 1903-4). As I said > before, the upshot is that discrete things and their dyadic reactions are > *degenerate > *manifestations of continuous and triadic semiosis. > > I am not sure that I agree about Peirce not being "a systems thinker," but > in any case, I doubt that he would accept the substitution of "system" for > "person" as that upon which "a Sign ... determines an effect" (EP 2:478, > 1908 Dec 23). Instead, as Helmut noted, he sometimes substitutes > "quasi-mind" for "person," presumably in an effort toward "making [his] own > broader conception understood." For example ... > > CSP: [E]very sign,--or, at any rate, nearly every one,--is a determination > of something of the general nature of a mind, which we may call the > 'quasi-mind.'" ... > > A sign ... is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes > to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more > perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon > that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself > had acted upon it. ... > > It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for if > we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human > mind, that mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only > after that consider it in its significance; and the like must happen if the > sign addresses itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a > determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding > that determination as the sign. (EP 2:389-92, 1906) > > CSP: Now as every thinking requires a mind, so every sign even if external > to all minds must be a determination of a quasi-mind. This quasi-mind is > itself a sign, a determinable sign. (SS 195, 1906 Mar 9) > > CSP: [A] Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that > which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by > determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which > determination is the Interpretant. ... > > For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two of them > can have one interpretant, must be Determinations of one Sign which is a > *Quasi-mind*. > > Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be > declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at > least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and > although these two are at one (*i.e.*, are one mind) in the sign itself, > they must nevertheless be distinct. (CP 4.536&551, 1906) > > Some signs are external to all *individual *minds, but every sign and its > interpretant are determinations of quasi-minds. Accordingly, I maintain > that the entire universe satisfies Peirce's definition of a "perfect sign," > and is thus itself a "quasi-mind." > > CSP: Consider then the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which > its occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be a sign; and > we may call it a *perfect *sign, in the sense that it involves the > present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of > itself. ... > > Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. ... > > This quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be > examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of > susceptibility to determination. Moreover, the determinations come as > events each one once for all and never again. Furthermore, it must have its > rules or laws, the more special ones variable, others invariable. (EP > 2:545n25, 1906) > > As a quasi-mind, the entire universe *involves *possible qualities (1ns), > actual events (2ns), and real laws (3ns). While I agree that my billiard > ball example is "a case of purely dyadic efficient causality," again, > Peirce himself says that "the dyadic action is not the whole action; and > the whole action is, in a way, triadic" (CP 6.331, 1907)--it is *governed > *by a real law as a *final *cause, i.e., a final interpretant. "[I]nstead > of being a purely negative critic, like Hume, seeking to annul a > fundamental conception generally admitted, I am a positive critic, pleading > for the admission to a place in our scheme of the universe for an idea > generally rejected. ... All that Hume attacked I defend, namely, law as a > reality" (CP 6.605, 1893). Peirce thus *denies *that "final causality is > [only] about needs of an organism"; on the contrary, "It is ... a > widespread error to think that a 'final cause' is necessarily a purpose. A > purpose is merely that form of final cause which is most familiar to our > experience" (CP 1.211, EP 2:120, 1902). Instead, "Efficient causation is > that kind of causation whereby the parts compose the whole; final causation > is that kind of causation whereby the whole calls out its parts. Final > causation without efficient causation is helpless ... Efficient causation > without final causation, however, is worse than helpless, by far; ... it is > blank nothing" (CP 1.220, 1902). > > Ivar has posed some specific questions that I would prefer to address in a > separate post, but I will comply with the moderator's current limit of one > per day per thread. I will also not effectively circumvent that rule by > making this post even longer than it already is, especially since I hope > that what I have written above can at least serve as a start toward > providing my answers. Please let me know what (if anything) remains unclear > or otherwise warrants further discussion. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
