Jack, List: Peirce presents the maxim, "Do not block the way of inquiry," as a corollary that follows from "this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must desire to learn and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think" (CP 1.135, EP 2:48, 1898). He immediately elaborates on that *methodological *principle as follows.
CSP: Although it is better to be methodical in our investigations, and to consider the Economics of Research, yet there is no positive sin against logic in *trying *any theory which may come into our heads, so long as it is adopted in such a sense as to permit the investigation to go on unimpeded and undiscouraged. On the other hand, to set up a philosophy which barricades the road of further advance toward the truth is the one unpardonable offense in reasoning, as it is also the one to which metaphysicians have in all ages shown themselves the most addicted. (CP 1.136, EP 2:48) Something that is true cannot possibly *block *the way of inquiry because it is the very *goal *of inquiry. By contrast, Peirce goes on to identify four specific barriers that people routinely erect--"absolute assertion"; "maintaining that this, that, and the other never can be known"; "maintaining that this, that, or the other element of science is basic, ultimate, independent of aught else, and utterly inexplicable"; and "holding that this or that law or truth has found its last and perfect formulation" (CP 1.137-40, EP 2:49). Positing an incognizable thing-in-itself is a straightforward example of the second of these, and perhaps also the third. It is critical not to confuse the *possibility *of anything real being known *eventually*--another methodological principle, as well as a regulative hope--with the *actuality *of someone knowing it at some future *assignable *date. Obviously, no individual mind or finite group of minds can ever know, within a finite lifetime, all that an infinite mind (i.e., God) knows in eternity; and indeed, there is likely much in reality that no human being will *ever *know. Even so, "the opinion which *would *finally result from investigation does not depend on how anybody may *actually *think. But the reality of that which is real does depend on the real fact that investigation is destined to lead, at last, *if continued long enough*, to a belief in it" (CP 5.408, EP 1:139, 1878; emphases mine). That includes knowing how to kill someone, as well as knowing that various people were killed by someone--those are realities. I suppose that I need to clarify the definition of "experience" in this (Peircean) context. "[E]xperience can only mean the total cognitive result of living, and includes interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense" (CP 7.538, 1899). "What is experience? It is the resultant ideas that have been forced upon us" (CP 4.318, 1902). "Experience generally is what the course of life has *compelled *me to think" (CP 8.330, 1904). "For me *experience *is what life has forced upon us" (NEM 3:834, 1905). "[T]he concept of *experience *is broader than that of *perception*, and includes much that is not, strictly speaking, an object of perception. It is the compulsion, the absolute constraint upon us to think otherwise than we have been thinking that constitutes experience" (CP 1.336; 1906). In short, as I said before, all experience (as defined here) is cognitive; specifically, it is the *compulsive *aspect of cognition, 2ns of 3ns. Moreover, according to Peirce ... CSP: Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another name for *semiotic*, the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs. By describing the doctrine as "quasi-necessary," or formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what *must be* the characters of all signs used by a "scientific" intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience. (CP 2.227, 1902). The upshot is that an infinite community after infinite inquiry would have *infinite experience*, which is *how *it would come to know/represent all of reality. Again, as Gary R. also emphasized in his post last night, this is conceived as an *asymptotic *limit that will never *actually *be reached--a methodological principle and a regulative hope. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Aug 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > There's a lot there, Jon, but I find much of it highly inconsistent. > > I mean, are you standing with Peirce or without him? I'm being serious. > You say you did not invent the idea that it blocks inquiry if someone > supposes something is real but that this real cannot be known. If that is > actually true, and thus would have an immense bearing on basically > everything people can claim in "objective" terms regarding all possible > ontology (if they purport to be objective), then it does not block inquiry. > And if something is true and it blocks inquiry then the blocking of inquiry > would have to take the "hit" as what is true, in the big T sense of truth > is far more important than secondary ideological concerns. > > I have your other post to also consider which I am preparing a short essay > for (which is what you basically require anyway and that's fine). Whenever > that's done, and I'll stick with it this time as I think it will be > enlightening as a short word-file properly presented, then I can await > replies and respond better/more in-depth. Until then I'll be list-absent. > Reading, for however long, but not posting. > > I'll just note, though: do you think you can know, hypothetically, what > God knows? Or what an omniscient being would know (if you do not believe in > God?). I don't think that's possible (I'm certain it isn't) but I do > consider it rather truthful and real and I infer you do, too, considering > your own self-description and your prior posts including on the nature of > the universe. Well, that is a reality, which is the highest, you might > argue, benchmark of truth, and it is beyond any but God (or God-like being > if one is being more philosophical). Certainly in this life. > > So, yes, I believe -- but that will not be the example I use in depth -- > that there is much "real" (truth as it actually is) which we will never > know in any temporal lifetime. Indeed, if one were to assume that truth > were fundamentally atemporal, as thought-experiment, and I tend to think it > is anyway, then so much time-contingent (or spatiotemporal contingency) > would be fundamentally degenerate. Moreover, knowing how to kill someone, > or killing/being killed by someone is not "real" to me though it obviously > happens. That is, I consider such things false -- but if you go further, > there are infinitely many experiences, truthful or not, which no one person > will ever know/experience (that's simple common sense). As to what Peirce > would say to that? I don't think he'd find it problematic and therefore I > assume you don't? > > It's best I stop here as I think you deserve a much more in-depth response > and analysis. Your other post, in all honesty, is much more > thought-provoking than this one as I think it allows for a great > exploration of Peirce as foreshadowing Godel and Tarski (when properly > contextualized and understood). > > Cheers, > Jack >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
