JAS, List I think, since JAS has set up a new thread, that I might be allowed to post my comment.
1] No-0ne is talking about the external object as a ’third semiotic object’. That’s the point - it’s not part of the semiotic triad !!!!- but - Peirce is adamant that it is a reality of the objective world. It becomes part of the semiosic triad once the sign-vehicle ‘connects to it, so to speak’. Again - readily explained in the weather analysis. 8.314. 2] I’m not sure what a ‘real flower’ is. Again - that’s partly the point. Mike’s example makes sense to me- he is explaining that the semiosic capacities and Thirdness modes of different species differ and when a human connects with the External Object [ the flower] it produces a particular Interpretant according to the knowledge base [ interpretive capacities, Thirdness] of the human being. But a pollinator has a different semiosic interaction with that same Extneral Object, the flower, and a different knowledge base [ Thirdness] and so, comes up with a different interpretant. Now- which is the ‘truth’ about that external object, that flower?Or should they all be combined? Therefore - our human-thirdness knowledge of the flower can change as we ‘’add different sensorial capacities..to be more like those of the pollinator’. But - can anyone - human or pollinator ever know ’the fulsome external Object? I think he’s made an excellent case for the power of Thirdness as a collective process among different agents.. - to form, to morphologically form, the realities of our universe. - Edwina > On Sep 16, 2025, at 5:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > List: > > As I have pointed out previously, in the handful of places where Peirce > refers to an "external object," he is not defining a third semiotic object as > distinguished from the dynamical and immediate objects. Two such passages are > especially relevant. First, "An external object is anything that is not > affected by any cognitions, whether about it or not, of the man to whom it is > external" (CP 5.525, c. 1905). For any dynamical object of a sign, if it is > not affected by my cognitions about anything, then it is an external object > to me; but it is also possible for the dynamical object of a sign to be an > internal object to me, such as when I describe a dream that I had last night. > Second, when we invoke Peirce's maxim of pragmatism, "the real becomes that > which is such as it is regardless of what you or I or any of our folks may > think it to be. The external becomes that element which is such as it is > regardless of what somebody thinks, feels, or does, whether about that > external object or about anything else. Accordingly, the external is > necessarily real, while the real may or may not be external; nor is anything > absolutely external nor absolutely devoid of externality" (CP 8.191, c. > 1904). Every external object is a real object, and therefore a possible > dynamical object of a sign; and even an internal object is not "absolutely > devoid of externality," so it is likewise a possible dynamical object of a > sign. > > Peirce provides semiotic analyses of two different sign tokens in CP 8.314 > (EP 2:498, 1909 Mar 14) without ever employing the term "external object." > The first sign token is his wife's question, "What sort of a day is it?" Its > "Object, as expressed" is what Peirce defines earlier in the same paragraph > as "the Immediate Object--the Object as represented in the sign," namely, > "the weather at that time." Its "Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of > things, the Sign cannot express, which it can only indicate and leave the > interpreter to find out by collateral experience," is "the impression which I > have presumably derived from peeping between the window curtains." This > dynamical object is an external object to Peirce's wife but an internal > object to Peirce himself. The second sign token is his answer, "It is a > stormy day." As he goes on to explain, "Its Immediate Object is the notion of > the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine,--not the > character of it, but the identity of it," i.e., "the weather at that > time"--the same immediate object as the first sign token. However, in this > case, "The Dynamical Object is the identity of the actual and Real > meteorological conditions at the moment." This dynamical object is an > external object to both Peirce and his wife. Notice his emphasis on the fact > that the immediate and dynamical objects both have to do with the identity of > what the sign is about. > > Moving on to Mike's example, a real flower is an external object to everyone > because it is not affected by anyone's cognitions about anything. We directly > perceive and experience the real flower itself when we encounter it--it is > the dynamical object of our perceptual judgments and subsequent inferences > about the flower, independent of and unaffected by those and any other > representations of it. By contrast, "What we understand the flower to be" is > our dynamical interpretant of those thoughts, and what we would understand > the flower to be under ideal circumstances is their final interpretant. We > misunderstand the flower to the extent that our dynamical interpretants > deviate from that final interpretant, which is the truth about the flower. > Accordingly, "the nature of reality in all of its aspects" is decidedly not > "a function of all perceivers and interactors"--by Peirce's own definition as > quoted above, it is such as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it. > In my own formulation, reality is the dynamical object of every sign whose > final interpretant is the truth--not what any finite community of inquirers > actually does affirm, but what an infinite community of inquirers ultimately > would affirm. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Tue, Sep 16, 2025 at 10:55 AM Mike Bergman <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> List, >> >> In my opinion, Edwina keeps pointing to us on the list about the true nature >> of Peirce's formulation of the triadic process in semiosis. Here is another >> example. Humans can not see in the UV spectrum, but bees and butterflies do. >> When we (humans) look at the External Object of certain flowers, the Dynamic >> Object that we perceive lacks the UV clues seen by pollinators, which act >> sometimes like runway lights guiding to the nectar sources (for many >> colorful flowers). We know these UV markers are there because we have been >> able to enhance our native perceptions with UV filters on cameras and such, >> so our knowledge of the External Object is somewhat enhanced even though we >> can not directly perceive these markers. In fact, there are other markers >> including scents and pheromones that are also beyond our direct perception. >> What we understand the flower to be (the Dynamic Object) can continually >> grow and become more refined over time as we add additional sensors and >> indirect knowledge, but we can never truly know the fulsome External Object. >> The powerful insight of Peirce was that the nature of reality in all of its >> aspects is a function of all perceivers and interactors, human or not, >> individual or not, and it is the combination of all of these interpreters >> that gets us closer to the full reality of external objects. >> >> It is a lesson of humility and says much about what we may each claim to be >> the 'truth'. >> >> Best, Mike >> >> On 9/15/2025 9:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: >>> List, Jerry,Jack, >>> >>> Again, I need to define terms.- the External Object and the Dynamic Object: >>> >>> The Dynamic Object is, in my understanding, the 2nd correlate of the >>> Peircean triad [ DO-R-I] . The triadic process begins within the >>> sign-unit or sign-vehicle which holds the Representamen or knowledge base >>> of ‘mediation. The Representamen picks up data from the External Object >>> which data then becomes known as the Dynamic Object. >>> >>> See Peirce’s well known outline of the weather 8.314, where he writes; >>> >>> “This is a sign, whose Object, as expressed is the weather at the that >>> time, but whose dynamical Object is the impression which I have presumably >>> derived from peeping between the window curtains. “ [Note; In this example, >>> the sign unit or sign-vehicle is either Peirce or Mrs. Peirce and my >>> emphasis points out the External Object ]. >>> >>> And “By the way, the dynamical object does not mean something out of the >>> mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception, but including >>> more than perception reveals. It is an object of actual experience” EPII, p >>> 478 >>> >>> Note – the External Object is ‘the weather at the time’, while the DO is >>> the 2nd correlate of the semiosic triad, the ‘impression of that External >>> ‘weather at the time’. >>> >>> There” are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our >>> opinions about them; those reals affect our senses according to regular >>> laws, ….5.384. This is a definition of the External Object. >>> >>> Now- as to Ethics – I’m not sure how it fits in with my comparative >>> outline of Thirdness as ’genuine’ [pure] or degenerate[ affiliated with >>> Secondness and/or Firstness]. I would say only that Ethics is as pointed >>> out in 5.34 is a ‘normative science’ that differentiates between good and >>> bad- and, in particular, uses ” efforts of will’ – which obviously has to >>> mean that it involves Secondness or indexicality. Or- one could conclude >>> that analysis based on ethics is Thirdness-as-Secondness, because it >>> considers the pragmatic effects of the semiosic interaction. >>> >>> Edwina >>> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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