Suteerth, List: Almost a year ago, you introduced yourself to the List by asking why Peirce sought to prove the truth of his maxim of pragmatism, and a few of us offered some answers. I take it that you have come to understand his motivation, since you are now looking for such a proof yourself. What you outline below is not the answer because it is primarily based on one of his earliest published works, and he was still trying to formulate his own proof more than four decades later.
As a reminder, Nathan Houser provides a helpful summary of Peirce's various attempts in his introduction to volume 2 of *The Essential Peirce* (EP 2:xxxiii-xxxviii), including what in my opinion is his most successful one, based on his theory of signs. Again, pragmatism is not about the *sole *interpretant of *any* sign, but only the *final logical* interpretant (*ultimate *meaning) of "intellectual concepts," which are "those upon the structure of which arguments concerning objective fact may hinge" (EP 2:401, 1907). Here is Houser's "much abbreviated" reconstruction (EP 2:xxxv-xxxvi). 1. "Every concept and every thought beyond immediate perception is a sign." 2. The object of a sign is necessarily unexpressed in the sign. 3. The interpretant is the "total proper effect of the sign" and this effect may be emotional, energetic, or logical, but it is the logical interpretant alone that constitutes "the intellectual apprehension of the meaning of a sign." 4. "A sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this 'sign.'" 5. The logical interpretant does not correspond to any kind of object, but is essentially in a relatively future tense, what Peirce calls a "would-be." Thus the logical interpretant must be "general in its possibilities of reference." 6. Therefore, the logical interpretant is of the nature of habit. 7. A concept, proposition, or argument may be a logical interpretant, but not a final logical interpretant. The habit alone, though it may be a sign in some other way, does not call for further interpretation. It calls for action. 8. "The deliberately formed, self-analyzing habit ... is the *living definition*, the veritable and final logical interpretant." 9. "*Consequently*, the most perfect account of a concept that words can convey will consist in a description of that habit which that concept is calculated to produce. But how otherwise can a habit be described than by a description of the kind of action to which it gives rise, with the specification of the conditions and of the motive?" A few months ago, I posted my own speculative sketch of what Peirce might have had in mind for a proof based on his Existential Graphs ( https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-04/msg00009.html). I also have the following comments on your remarks below. SV: Now terms are mostly signs of firstness, propositions are signs of secondness and arguments sign of thirdness. This is loosely correct, but it is more accurate to say that a term (generalized to rheme in 1903 and seme in 1906) is a sign whose relation with its final interpretant is *possible*, corresponding to 1ns; a proposition (dicisign, pheme) is a sign whose relation with its final interpretant is *existent*, corresponding to 2ns; and an argument (delome) is a sign whose relation with its final interpretant is *necessitant*, corresponding to 3ns. SV: Now for some reason that I do not understand fully, Peirce associates secondness with volition and action. Peirce's assignments of his three categories (1ns/2ns/3ns) to various phenomena are often context-dependent, not absolute, reflecting their relations *with each other*. As discovered in phaneroscopy, they are quality/reaction/mediation. The three normative sciences of esthetics/ethics/logic correspond to feeling/action/thought. In Peirce's 1903 speculative grammar, besides term/proposition/argument for the sign's relation with its final interpretant, there are qualisign/sinsign/legisign (later tone/token/type or potisign/actisign/famisign) for the sign itself and icon/index/symbol for the sign's relation with its dynamical object; and in his later taxonomies, there are seven additional trichotomies. In metaphysics, we find possibility/actuality/necessity and chance/law/habit-taking. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Oct 2, 2025 at 5:41 AM suteerth vajpeyi <[email protected]> wrote: > The best that I have managed to do is to quote in agreement with Peirce in > his paper "on a new list of categories" that the work of any conception is > to reduce the manifold of sensuous experience to unity. If it is proved > that this function cannot be performed except by considering practical > effects then we will have a proof of the pragmatic maxim, without of > course, proving Peirce's entire system of philosophy which this pragmatism > implies. Now Peirce immediately after making the assertion that the > function of conceptions is the unification of experience says that this > unity is the unity of a proposition e.g. "this stove is black" reduces the > confused tangle of qualities and relations that we call the stove to a > conceptual unity by using black as a unifying conception. Now terms are > mostly signs of firstness, propositions are signs of secondness and > arguments sign of thirdness. So the unification of experience requires an > apeal to secondness because propositions are signs of secondness. Now for > some reason that I do not understand fully, Peirce associates secondness > with volition and action. If we can know why then we have a common point of > resemblance between an action and the object of a proposition. I personally > think that Peirce classifies both of them as species of secondness because > a proposition states relations and action or volition alters relations in > the real world. Thus relations are key in our grasp of mind-independent > reality. Let us try to formulate this more properly in words. 1. > Conceptions are required for unification of experience. 2. Propositions are > the signs that carry out this unification. 3. Propositions state relations. > 4. Actions alter relations in the real world. 5. We cannot know one > relation without changing some other relations. This has only been begun to > be understood by modern science for example in the special case of the > Heisenberg uncertainty principle which states that the momentum and > position of an electron cannot be measured simultaneously. For bombarding > an electron with light lays bare its position but changes its momentum > while on calculating its momentum, we lose track of its exact instantaneous > position. Position and momentum are both relations. This principle is > applicable not only to the position and momentum of electrons but to all > relations. Thus actions or operations upon the world or physical/mental > models of it are our primary method for getting in touch with reality. 6. > Therefore, the sole function of a concept, which is the unification of a > domain of experience is impossible without action. All definitions must be > ultimately reduced to operational definitions. Thus it is proved. > Had it been that easy, I think Peirce himself would have come up with it > in his teens. I may be missing something in my proof. I would be highly > obliged to the person who points it out. > > On Thu, 2 Oct 2025, 3:24 pm suteerth vajpeyi, <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Respected members, I know that this question is a tough one but it really >> needs answering. As per C.S. Peirce, the meaning of any conception is >> exhaustively elaborated by the pragmatic maxim. I want to see a >> demonstration or proof of this fact for it is not self evident, at least >> not to me. It has been decades since interest in the work of Peirce has >> risen. Many members of this group are illustrious and have written books of >> their own. I do not think that zero people have worked on this question and >> if there is no definitive answer already found, atleast we could have a >> blueprint of the present state of inquiry regarding this question. So with >> that, I invite you all to share your thoughts on the matter. >> >
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