List, +Robert Marty I must concur that this is a serious analysis of cosmology. Yet what are we talking about when we talk cosmology for Peirce? It’s a normative science and metaphysical discourse, a physical metaphysics, a bridge between general metaphysics and psychical metaphysics, and in the 1898 lecture 8 (p. 267), “mathematical metaphysics.”
His cosmology is construed as an “evolutionary” metaphysics; Peirce will invoke the categories to render that bridge explicit. Cf. Lectures 2-3 in Turrisi’s Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, which I often consider my leading resource of explication. See her initial commentary, Peirce’s 3 drafts of Lecture 2 published there, and 1 full complete Lecture 3. Turrisi well observes that there were 5 extant manuscripts for Lecture 2, and 3 printed in her book. Let me drop this a moment. Lecture 3, which I call the Kempe lecture, for me is mostly about mathematical form. Peirce writes, in the course of examining Kempe’s system; “…I found the three Categories copiously illustrated in the system. But what was still more interesting, a certain fault in the system, by no means of the fatal kind but still a vexatious inelegance which I had often remarked but could see no way of remedying, now when looked upon from the point of view of the categories, appeared in a new and stronger light than ever before, showing me not only how to remedy the defect that I had seen, but opening my eyes to *new* *possibilities of perfectionment* that I had never dreamed of. I wish I could *present all this to you,* for it is very beautiful and interesting as well as very instructive, but it would require several lectures and lead me quite away from Pragmatism.” (Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking, 1997, SUNY, p.186). Now we are left on our heels by Peirce, “it would require several lectures and lead me quite a way from Pragmatism.” Thus no explication from Peirce that I know of since. It thwarted me, perhaps as if one were in that lecture room with Peirce, how would we react? Now my point (for another time) is that lecture 2 left me unsatisfied about 1ns. It seemed the most defective and inadequate of the categories, dangling apart from 3ns; perhaps a kind of quantum logic might render it more intelligible. Notice that Hartshorne and Weiss themselves, back to the 1940s-50s, noted that Peirce didn’t have the advantage of quantum mechanics (which Edwina hints as well). Particularly, Hartshorne found there were some matters of inconsistency in Peirce on continuity, and others have perhaps noted. Not sure we want to go there yet. I just want to raise consciousness at this stage, something rather imperfect here, yet fascinating. I will pick this up further in a reply to Robert Marty’s earlier and noteworthy post, which is overdue, in which I take up quantum logic and lattices. Atila On Tue, Oct 7, 2025 at 1:02 AM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > > Before we plunge (hopefully) into exploring Peircean cosmology in relation > to contemporary cosmological views (and vice versa), I would like to make th > ree general remarks about Peirce's late cosmology which, whatever yet is > unresolved in our different views (although his most recent post answers > the most important questions I've put to him), I believe both Jon and I > agree upon the following points, principally because they come with > *considerable > textual support*. > > 1. Peirce's cosmology does *not* concern the fundamental laws of physics. > Rather, he is offering a hypothesis as to how those very laws came about in > the first place. That is metaphysics, not physics. As I earlier noted, Jeff > has already pointed to this *essential *point near the end of his post > introducing this thread. > > 2. Peirce explicitly makes clear that 3ns does *not *result from 1ns and > 2ns. In fact he argues that this is* impossible*, that 3ns cannot be > built up from 1ns and 2ns. Quotations to that effect have been > repeatedly offered on the List. Rather, as has been noted here (again, > repeatedly for decades), 3ns *involves* 2ns and 1ns. Peirce's category > theory is (*wherever* it may be applied including, of course, to > metaphysics) top-down, not bottom-up. > > 3. Peirce makes clear that continuity is "original" and "inherent in > potentiality" (his words), i.e., generality (3ns) precedes both possibility > (1ns) and actuality (2ns) -- cf. 2. above. Again, many quotations have been > offered in support of this principle. > > I would also encourage those interested in Peirce's late cosmology to read > the concluding lecture in the *Cambridge Conference Lectures* of 1898 > published in paperback as* Reasoning and the Logic of Things. *The > blackboard diagram discussion begins on the bottom of page 261 (I don't > believe an online version of this lecture is available). > > In my view, nowhere is Peirce's extraordinary creative genius revealed > more fully than in this lecture series, and especially the concluding > lecture wherein I see him anticipating any number of 20th century > scientific advances. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Mon, Oct 6, 2025 at 4:25 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jeff, List, >> >> It will take me some time to mentally assimilate your post, but it is >> most impressive, and I believe that it contributes mightily to the >> discussion of cosmology we've been having. I sincerely hope that everyone >> here interested in Peirce's cosmology in relation to contemporary versions >> reads it closely and critically. >> >> One thing I will say for now is it is helpful that you make the >> distinction between Peirce's *metaphysics* and the *physics* of current >> cosmological models. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> On Mon, Oct 6, 2025 at 2:21 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> List, >>> >>> I am interested in exploring the various ways Peirce might offer >>> fruitful strategies for framing questions and hypotheses about the >>> evolution of the cosmos. Given the shift in focus from interpreting Peirce >>> to developing the ideas in the context of contemporary lines of inquiry, I >>> have given a new name for this thread. Here is a short overview of how the >>> issues might be framed: >>> >>> I. What the Competing Hypotheses Seek to Explain >>> The first second of cosmic history is the most intensively modeled and >>> least directly observed interval in all of physics. Every cosmological >>> hypothesis—standard or alternative—attempts to answer the same deep >>> question: how did stable, law-governed order emerge from the primal >>> condition of the early universe? >>> Empirically, we can observe the cosmic microwave background and infer >>> conditions back to roughly 10⁻³⁶ s after the putative “beginning.” But >>> beyond that frontier, our equations lose coherence. When we attempt to wind >>> the clock backward, general relativity (GR) predicts an initial >>> singularity—an infinitesimal point of infinite density—while quantum >>> mechanics (QM) insists that such a point cannot exist, because uncertainty >>> forbids precise localization of both energy and position. The result is a >>> conceptual fissure at the very threshold of time. >>> The challenge is twofold. First, to reconcile the gravitational >>> curvature of spacetime (the language of GR) with the probabilistic field >>> dynamics of quantum theory (the language of QM). Second, to explain the >>> apparent emergence of regularities—space, time, fields, and forces from the >>> initial conditions—whatever those are presumed to be. >>> The standard cosmological model assumes a hot, dense quantum vacuum that >>> undergoes rapid inflation, cooling into particles, forces, and atomic >>> matter through a series of symmetry-breaking transitions. Our family of >>> hypotheses, following C. S. Peirce’s metaphysical principle of >>> “habit-taking,” interprets these same transitions not as the enforcement of >>> pre-existing laws but as the evolutionary crystallization of *habits*—stable >>> relational patterns that become laws through repetition and >>> self-reinforcement. The contrast, therefore, is not merely physical but >>> ontological: one treats laws as *given*, the other as *grown*. >>> My general strategy is to question the assumption that so much happened, >>> so fast, from what was initially a very small space. Instead of supposing >>> the cosmos was initially very small and then, in a “Big Bang” dramatically >>> inflated in a very short amount of time, I'd like to explore the hypothesis >>> that the timeframe and size of the universe was, in the very, very early >>> period, indeterminate. >>> II. The Standard Cosmological Account of the Very, Very Early Universe: >>> The Six Early Epochs within the First Second >>> >>> 1. Planck Era (0 – 10⁻⁴³ s) >>> Physics as we know it breaks down. The universe’s density exceeds >>> 10⁹⁴ g cm⁻³ and the temperature surpasses 10³² K. GR predicts a curvature >>> singularity, but quantum gravitational effects should dominate. No >>> consistent theory yet unites them. >>> 2. Grand-Unification Era (10⁻⁴³ – 10⁻³⁶ s) >>> Gravity decouples from the other fundamental interactions. The >>> strong, weak, and electromagnetic forces remain unified under speculative >>> grand-unified theories (GUTs). Vacuum fluctuations drive exponential >>> inflation. >>> 3. Inflationary Epoch (≈10⁻³⁶ – 10⁻³² s) >>> The universe expands by a factor of ~10⁵⁰ in a tiny fraction of a >>> second, smoothing out inhomogeneities. Quantum fluctuations are stretched >>> to cosmic scales, seeding later galaxy formation. When inflation ends, >>> latent vacuum energy converts into matter and radiation—a process called >>> “reheating.” >>> 4. Electroweak Epoch (10⁻¹² – 10⁻⁶ s) >>> The strong force separates from the electroweak. The Higgs field >>> acquires a nonzero vacuum expectation value, giving mass to particles. W >>> and Z bosons and leptons acquire distinct identities. >>> 5. Quark Epoch (10⁻⁶ – 10⁻⁴ s) >>> The universe is a hot plasma of quarks, antiquarks, and gluons. As >>> it cools below ~10¹² K, quarks begin to bind into hadrons (protons and >>> neutrons). >>> 6. Hadron and Lepton Epochs (10⁻⁴ – 1 s) >>> Matter–antimatter annihilation occurs, leaving a slight excess of >>> baryons. Neutrinos decouple. By ~1 s, the universe is filled with >>> photons, >>> neutrinos, electrons, protons, and neutrons in near-thermal equilibrium. >>> >>> 2. The Theoretical Foundations >>> The standard model of cosmology (ΛCDM + inflation) joins: >>> >>> - General Relativity, governing the dynamics of spacetime and cosmic >>> expansion (via Einstein’s field equations). >>> - The Standard Model of Particle Physics, governing matter and >>> fields via quantum gauge theories. >>> >>> Each works remarkably well in its proper domain. GR predicts large-scale >>> structure and gravitational lensing; quantum field theory predicts particle >>> behaviors confirmed to 1 part in 10¹¹. Yet their conceptual languages >>> conflict. >>> 3. The Central Tension: GR vs QM >>> >>> - Background independence vs. fixed background: >>> GR treats spacetime geometry as dynamic; quantum theory presupposes >>> a fixed spacetime background. >>> - Deterministic vs. probabilistic law: >>> GR evolves smoothly and deterministically; quantum evolution is >>> probabilistic and discontinuous upon measurement. >>> - Continuum vs. discreteness: >>> GR’s continuum manifolds clash with QM’s quantized fields and >>> operators. >>> >>> Attempting to merge them yields contradictions. Quantizing gravity by >>> standard techniques leads to non-renormalizable infinities. String theory >>> replaces point particles with one-dimensional objects to tame those >>> divergences, while loop quantum gravity discretizes space itself into spin >>> networks. Both remain mathematically elegant yet empirically unconfirmed. >>> The deeper problem is conceptual: both assume laws are fixed and >>> pre-existent. Time, in both frameworks, is treated as a parameter that >>> orders events, not as something that itself *evolves*. When we >>> extrapolate back to t → 0, these assumptions collapse. The singularity is >>> not a physical object but a signal that the framework itself has reached >>> its limit. >>> Thus, the standard model offers a magnificent but incomplete chronicle. >>> It describes *how* the cosmos evolves from 10⁻³⁶ s onward, but not *why* >>> laws themselves appear, why symmetries break as they do, or why certain >>> constants take the values that make structure possible. >>> III. The Peircean Family of Hypotheses >>> 1. Philosophical Premise: Law as Evolving Habit >>> C. S. Peirce proposed in his 1891 essay “The Architecture of Theories” >>> that “the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature and for >>> uniformity in general is to suppose them results of evolution.” The >>> universe, on this view, begins not in order but in pure spontaneity, a >>> chaos of ungoverned possibilities. Through repetition and reinforcement of >>> relations that persist, habits form; habits stabilize into laws. >>> 2. Ontological Ingredients: >>> >>> 1. Firstness — Pure Potentiality as Quality: The primordial >>> condition is a field of highly vague, undifferentiated potential having a >>> continuum of qualities, comparable to a pre-metric manifold. Temporal >>> relations are not well ordered. Spatial relations have very high degrees >>> of >>> freedom, approximating an infinitude of vague topological dimensions. >>> 2. Secondness — Reaction: Initially, there are no actual objects >>> having a substantial character of individuals that perdue over time. >>> Rather, highly random encounters among continuous potentials yield >>> constraints—proto-events analogous to quantum fluctuations. >>> 3. Thirdness — Mediation/Habit: Stable patterns emerge that mediate >>> between possibilities and facts; these are the early ordered habits that >>> evolve into laws having symmetries. >>> >>> This triadic cycle repeats iteratively, giving rise to more complex, >>> self-referential systems of law. Order grows as natural habits. In time, >>> these natural habits take the character of natural laws having nested >>> levels of necessity and contingency, woven together into an evolving system >>> of regularities. >>> 3. Cosmological Reformulation >>> In mathematical terms, the Peircean hypothesis treats the evolution of >>> order as a process of constraint accumulation in an initially unconstrained >>> relational manifold. Instead of assuming pre-existing spacetime, we posit >>> networks of relations—logical and topological—whose persistent interactions >>> generate the effective metric structure. >>> >>> - Temporal Order: Time is not a fixed metrical parameter but an >>> emergent order parameter expressing the persistence of relation. >>> - Metric Emergence: As habits of relation stabilize, equivalence >>> classes of relational paths become metrically consistent; curvature >>> arises >>> from deviations in those habits. >>> - Quantum Indeterminacy: Rather than randomness being primitive, >>> indeterminacy reflects ongoing openness of the habit-formation >>> process—what >>> Peirce called *tychism*. >>> >>> 4. Physical Analogues >>> In practice, these ideas correspond to several contemporary research >>> directions. Here are a few: >>> >>> - Causal-set theory, which builds spacetime from ordered relations. >>> - Process physics (Cahill, Kauffman), in which information networks >>> self-organize into geometry. >>> - Relational quantum mechanics, treating states as relations rather >>> than substances. >>> >>> The models I am developing seek to formalize these insights through >>> iterative mapping functions on networks of relations—analogous to >>> topological and projective transformations that, through self-consistency >>> constraints, converge toward a stable metric manifold. >>> 5. Epochal Reconstruction >>> In this framework, the first “second” is not a moment after a >>> singularity but a phase transition from ungoverned potential to emergent >>> order: >>> >>> 1. Pre-habit phase (Peircean Firstness): Random relation fields >>> without duration or extent. >>> 2. Formation of stable triads (Secondness → Thirdness): >>> Self-consistent relational loops persist; these become the seeds of >>> temporal and spatial continuity. >>> 3. Emergent metrics: Statistical regularities among triads define >>> curvature; gravitational attraction is a large-scale manifestation of >>> this >>> tendency of relations to cohere. >>> 4. Law consolidation: Repeated patterns establish stable >>> transformation rules—analogues of conservation laws and field equations. >>> >>> Thus, what the standard model describes as inflation and symmetry >>> breaking are interpreted as episodes of accelerated habit formation, in >>> which local relational networks reach new equilibria. >>> 6. Testable and Mathematical Implications >>> >>> - Variable constants: If laws evolve, coupling constants may vary >>> slowly over cosmic time—a testable prediction. >>> - Self-organizing field equations: Einstein’s equations appear as >>> late-stage equilibria of evolving relational space/time constraints that >>> co-evolve with the natural habits that evolve into the laws governing >>> strong, weak, and EM forces. >>> - No initial singularity: The vague highly random potential fields >>> in which space and time are not yet ordered are posited as kind of >>> limiting >>> case from which order grows as a self-limiting process. >>> >>> This metaphysical framework can be made exact by representing evolving >>> relational networks through categorical or topological formalisms, such as >>> spin networks or iterative projective geometries, providing a unified >>> schema that naturally bridges quantum discreteness and gravitational >>> continuity. >>> IV. Comparative Evaluation >>> The standard cosmological model stands as one of the great triumphs of >>> modern science. It quantitatively predicts nucleosynthesis, cosmic >>> microwave background anisotropies, and large-scale structure. Its weakness >>> lies not in what it explains, but in what it must assume: fixed laws, fixed >>> constants, and a spacetime framework that pre-exists the very universe it >>> describes. It is operationally powerful yet ontologically incomplete. When >>> traced back to the first instants, its equations give rise to tensions >>> bordering on contradictions--singularities and unexplained initial >>> conditions. >>> The Peircean family of hypotheses inverts the order of explanation. It >>> begins with chaos, not law; with relation, not substance; with habit >>> formation, not imposed rule. Its strength is conceptual coherence across >>> scales: the same logic of iterative habit formation that explains the >>> emergence of atomic stability or biological order also accounts for cosmic >>> law. It offers a genuinely evolutionary metaphysics of law, potentially >>> unifying physical and logical modes of order. >>> Yet it faces formidable challenges. It lacks a single, empirically >>> confirmed mathematical formalism equivalent to GR or quantum field theory. >>> Its language of “habits” and “relations” must be rigorously specified to >>> make testable predictions. It risks drifting toward philosophical >>> generality if not anchored in quantitative models. >>> In sum: >>> *Criterion* >>> *Standard Model* >>> *Peircean Habit Hypothesis* >>> Predictive Power >>> High (CMB, nucleosynthesis, structure) >>> Moderate (conceptual; testable via variable constants) >>> Ontological Coherence >>> Fragmented (QM vs GR) >>> Unified (laws evolve from habits) >>> Empirical Confirmation >>> Extensive >>> Emerging / indirect >>> Explanatory Depth >>> Assumes laws >>> Explains laws >>> Mathematical Formalism >>> Mature >>> Developing (categorical/topological) >>> >>> For those who, like me, would like to develop and apply Peirce's methods >>> and explanatory strategies to contemporary questions in cosmology, our work >>> is cut out for us. How might we move from informal diagrams and toy models >>> (e.g. a spot of ink on a page, a blackboard, rolling of dice, drawing from >>> an urn, etc.) to formal models? What mathematical frameworks should we draw >>> on for the sake of developing models that will enable us to make the >>> hypotheses about the law of mind and the growth of order more exact? >>> >>> Yours, >>> >>> Jeff >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> on >>> behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >>> *Sent:* Sunday, October 5, 2025 5:55 PM >>> *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> >>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] An attempt at at dialogical integration of >>> Peirce's early and late cosmologies, was, Peirce's semeiotic holism >>> >>> Gary R., List: >>> >>> In accordance with my label of the first cosmological "layer" as the >>> constitution of *being*, you are correct that it would apply to *any >>> possible* universe. However, as I see it, there is no reason to suspect >>> that any other universes *exist* except our own; in fact, since such a >>> conception has no practical bearings, it is "meaningless gibberish" (CP >>> 5.423, EP 2:338, 1905). Put another way, the inexhaustible continuum (3ns) >>> of indefinite possibilities (1ns) indeed *transcends *our universe, but >>> those possibilities that have been actualized (2ns) *constitute *our >>> universe. After all, Peirce posits multiple "Platonic worlds" but only one >>> "actual universe of existence," which is the one "in which we happen to be" >>> (CP 6.208, 1898). >>> >>> My use of "complete chaos" to describe the initial state of things also >>> comes directly from Peirce. "The original chaos, therefore, where there was >>> no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which >>> nothing existed or really happened" (CP 1.411, EP 1:278, 1887-8). "The >>> state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness >>> of which consists in the total absence of regularity" (CP 8.317, 1891). >>> "So, that primeval chaos in which there was no regularity was mere nothing, >>> from a physical aspect" (CP 6.265, EP 1:348, 1892). "In the original chaos, >>> where there was no regularity, there was no existence. ... This we may >>> suppose was in the infinitely distant past" (CP 1.175, c. 1897). >>> >>> I agree that the entire universe cannot possibly be a complex *adaptive >>> *system without existing within an environment to which it is *adapting >>> *itself, and that 1ns encompasses not only qualities but also "Freedom, >>> or Chance, or Spontaneity" (CP 6.200, 1898). >>> >>> GR: Peirce’s grand semeiotic vision in which the universe itself is >>> conceived as a vast sign, a perfect sign, and a semiosic continuum from >>> which facts (and events?) are prescinded >>> >>> To clarify, Peirce explicitly describes the universe as "a vast >>> representamen," but he does not directly connect his remarks about a >>> "perfect sign" to the universe, and I am not aware of any writings where he >>> refers to a "semiosic continuum." That is why the subtitle of my "Semiosic >>> Synechism" paper is "A *Peircean *Argumentation," not "*Peirce's >>> *Argumentation"; >>> I believe that my synthesis is faithful to his insights, but I recognize >>> that he never spelled it out that way himself. >>> >>> As for your reference to "facts (and events?)," Peirce seems to maintain >>> that we *only *prescind facts, because he *defines *an event as "an >>> existential junction of incompossible facts ... The event is the >>> existential junction of *states *(that is, of that which in existence >>> corresponds to a *statement * about a given subject in representation) >>> whose combination in one subject would violate the logical law of >>> contradiction" (CP 1.492&494, c. 1896). This is consistent with his remark >>> a decade later, "A *fact *is so highly a prescissively abstract state >>> of things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition" (CP >>> 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). >>> >>> Peirce also takes exception with "the idea that a cause is an event of >>> such a kind as to be necessarily followed by another event which is the >>> effect" (CP 6.66, 1898). On the contrary, "So far as the conception of >>> cause has any validity ... the cause and its effect are two *facts*" >>> (CP 6.67). "Now it is the ineluctable blunder of a nominalist ... to talk >>> of the cause of an event. But it is not an existential event that has a >>> cause. It is the *fact*, which is the reference of the event to a >>> general relation, that has a *cause*" (CP 6.93, 1903). We prescind two >>> *different >>> *facts and recognize that the earlier one is a cause, the later one is >>> its effect, and the *change *from one state of things to the other is >>> an event. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Sat, Oct 4, 2025 at 11:00 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Jon, List, >>> >>> We are clearly in agreement on one matter: that while Peirce initially >>> conceived the universe as beginning with 1ns (possibility, “boundless >>> freedom”), he later came to see 3ns (generality, continuity, habit-taking) >>> as primordial. Categorial involution—that is, that 3ns involves 2ns & 1ns, >>> and 2ns involves only 1ns—adds logical support to that later view. >>> Additional support comes from your arguing the cosmological integration of >>> these three as a continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), only >>> some of which become actualized (2ns), with the sequence of events >>> unfolding as spontaneity (1ns), reaction (2ns), and habit (3ns). As you >>> argue, this reinforces an underlying evolutionary trajectory from chaos, >>> through process, toward regularity (ultimately, complete regularity in >>> Peirce’s view). >>> >>> JAS: My own attempt at integrating these two accounts or phases was to >>> suggest that the *constitution (or hierarchy) of being* is an >>> inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of >>> which are actualized (2ns); while the *sequence of events* in each case >>> when this happens consists of spontaneity (1ns) followed by reaction (2ns) >>> and then habit-taking (3ns). The resulting overall *evolution of >>> states *is from complete chaos (1ns) in the infinite past, through this >>> ongoing process (3ns) at any assignable date, toward complete regularity >>> (2ns) in the infinite future. These three "layers" conform respectively to >>> your categorial vectors of representation, order, and process. (Emphasis >>> added, GR) >>> >>> You seem to be arguing that* your* three layers (italicized above)*: >>> the constitution of being*,* the sequence of events*, and *the overall >>> evolution of states* all apply to our existing universe. I don't agree. >>> As I've been arguing, the blackboard metaphor suggests to me that your >>> first layer, the constitution of being, does not apply only to our >>> universe, but to* any possible universe* that might come into >>> existence. Indeed, in my view 'being' is not 'constituted' in the >>> proto-universe represented by the blackboard at all -- that's why I refer >>> to it as a* proto*-universe. There is, no doubt, a *reality moving >>> towards existence*; but in my reading of the lecture in which >>> the blackboard analogy appears, out of the infinite number of 'Platonic >>> ideas' any number of different ones *migh*t have been 'selected' so >>> that some other universe different from ours might have come into existence >>> (who knows? *has* come into existence). >>> >>> I would also not call the proto-world foreshadowing our existent cosmos >>> "complete chaos". The ur-continuity of the blackboard already suggests that >>> there is something in the cosmic schema that has the capacity and >>> intelligence to select just those Platonic ideas which *can be* and * >>> will be realized *in an actual, existential, evolutionary cosmos such >>> as ours. What seems at all 'chaotic' to me is that infinite number of >>> Platonic 'ideas' (characters, qualities, dimensions, categories, etc.) But >>> do those possibilities actually represent chaos? >>> >>> But to return for a moment to a different cosmological disagreement, it >>> has been pointed out before by several on the List including both of us, >>> that the universe as a whole cannot qualify as a complex adaptive system >>> because it does not exist within a larger environment to which it must >>> constantly adapt. For example, in Peirce's cosmology 1ns corresponds not >>> essentially to qualities but to pure possibility and “boundless freedom.” >>> In his 1898 blackboard analogy Peirce explicitly *does not confine >>> these categories to the spatiotemporal universe*; instead, he refers to >>> “Platonic worlds” of infinite possibilities, some of which become the >>> characters of a universe which *will come into being*. He is clear that >>> this particular universe in which we live and breathe and have our being >>> came out of one such Platonic world, which may even suggest, as I and >>> others have noted, an early multi-universe model. >>> >>> The two later developments in Peirce’s thought which you say shaped your >>> own synthesis, Jon: (1) the topical conception of continuity which sees a >>> continuum as an undivided whole of indefinite parts, and (2) Peirce’s grand >>> semeiotic vision in which the universe itself is conceived as a vast sign, >>> a perfect sign, and a semiosic continuum from which facts (and events?) are >>> prescinded—further explicates and extends Peirce’s cosmology. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . >>> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >>> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >>> email account, then go to >>> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
