Jon, List, It is false to assert this:
JAS: Phaneroscopic analysis of the *genuine *triadic relation of representing/mediating reveals that every one sign has two objects and three interpretants, for a total of six correlates. Phaneroscopic analysis of a genuine triadic relation reveals nothing of this. This can be seen from the first appearance of the six correlates in 1906: *33 - 1906 - S.S. 196 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) dated "1906 March 9".* I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication. The Form, (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting Truths, it is indispensible to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. The same form of distinction extends to the interpretant. Still, as applied to the interpretant, it is complicated by the circumstance that the sign not only determines the interpretant to represent (or to take the form of) the object, but also determines the interpretant to represent the sign. Indeed in what we may, from one point of view, regard as the principal kind of signs, there is one distinct part appropriated to representing the object, and another to representing how this very sign itself represents that object. The class of signs I refer to are the dicisigns. In "John is in love with Helen" the object signified is the pair, John and Helen. But the "is in love with" signifies the form this sign represents itself to represent John and Helen's Form to be. That this is so is shown by the precise equivalence between any verb in the indicative and the same made the object of "I tell you". "Jesus wept" = "I tell you that Jesus wept". As you can see, the reasons given by Peirce do not mention the phaneroscopy of the triadic sign *at any point. *He describes the six stages of the journey of a form that would be in the object of the sign into the mind through six successive determinations. He arrives at a more complicated sign, a new definition by expansion. We can still see this in CP 4.536 et 4.539, then in 1908 (47 bis – 1908 - Letter to Lady Welby in CP 8.343), CP 8.314 [March 14, 1909], and in CP 8.183 (undated). It seems to me that Jon is attempting to dissolve the triadic sign into the hexadic sign (a more detailed hypostatic abstraction of the semiotic phenomenon according to Peirce) in order to ultimately promote an idiosyncratic pentadic sign with 21 classes in which he engraves his ideology (if not something else ?) by placing the If wherever it suits him. I promised myself I would keep my time to myself and stop fact-checking, but this was too much. Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* Le mer. 22 oct. 2025 à 09:01, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> a écrit : > Jon, List, > > This is a kind of addendum to my last post. I hope to take up your 2nd, > 3rd, and 4th points later, but for now I like to comment on just your first > point, namely, that semiosic synechism is *your own* hypothesis. I agree. > > The concept *semiosic synechism* captures something essential in the > mature development of Peirce's philosophical project: that his ongoing work > in semeiotic along with his analysis of* topical continuity* is where the > *logic > of signs* and the *metaphysics of continuity* merge (no doubt that could > be stated better). > > I think you'd agree that Peirce had been developing the idea of synechism > and the reality of continuity since at least the 1880s. Still, it is not > until his later writings, such as those on the topical conception of > continuity, that he begins to see continuity as not just as an intriguing > mathematical idea (as he and most other mathematicians who took it > seriously did) but, shall we say, he comes to see it as the operative(?) > principle of 3ns itself, the "vital principle" by which habit, mediation, > and law grow throughout the universe. "Symbols grow." Hopefully this idea > of semiosic synechism will someday become not only intelligible through > science, philosophy, art and all manner of humane disciplines, but > *effective* in our lives. Thank you, Jon, for your ongoing contribution > to what is certainly at least *my* *summum bonum*. > > Perhaps someday humanity will come to see that *the universe’s way of > being and its way of meaning are one and the same*: namely, *the > continuous flow of signs interpreting -- and developing -- signs.* > > Gary R > > > > On Wed, Oct 22, 2025 at 12:26 AM Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> Thanks for your comments, with which I am almost entirely in agreement. >> Let me just offer a few important clarifications. >> >> First, as I have acknowledged previously, semiosic synechism is *my own* >> hypothesis--recognizably *Peircean *as a direct application of his late >> topical conception of continuity, but not something that Peirce *himself >> *ever explicitly formulated. >> >> Second, as I have said over and over, I understand the *continuous *process >> of semiosis to be *real*--it is as it is regardless of what anyone >> thinks about it, not in any way observer-dependent. However, distinguishing >> any one *individual *sign is in my view an act of prescission, >> deliberately introducing artificial "boundaries" to mark it off from other >> signs *within *the semiosic continuum that are otherwise indefinite. >> Only *after *we have done this can we go on to identify *that *sign's >> dynamical >> object and *that *sign's final interpretant, with which it is in a >> *genuine *triadic relation, as well as any dynamical interpretants >> produced by its instances in *actual *events of semiosis. >> >> Third, accordingly, I would *not *say that semiosis *tends toward* the >> general and the continuous--that would be a bottom-up conception. Instead, >> I maintain that semiosis *always already is *general and >> continuous--this is a top-down conception. A *discrete *event where a >> dynamical object determines a sign token to determine a dynamical >> interpretant is a *degenerate *manifestation of it, just as those three >> correlates are in a *degenerate *triadic relation--one that is reducible >> to the dyadic relations that it involves. In this case, the dynamical >> object *determines *the sign token, which *determines *the dynamical >> interpretant. >> >> Fourth, nevertheless, a top-down conception is *not *in any way >> *deterministic*--it is primarily a matter of *final *causation, not >> *efficient >> *(or mechanical) causation. "Efficient causation is that kind of >> causation whereby the parts compose the whole; final causation is that kind >> of causation whereby the whole calls out its parts" (CP 1.220, >> 1902). Moreover, "Rationality is being governed by final causes" (CP 2.66, >> 1902), and "Continuity is of a Rational nature" (LF 3/1:249n6, 1906). >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2025 at 7:13 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, List, >>> >>> I found your 'bullet point' post of considerable interest and personal >>> value as it virtually outlines the main points of Peirce's ideas regarding >>> triadic relations which, in our different ways, we have I think both been >>> trying to 'get across' by offering many Peirce quotations on the subject >>> which, in my view, clearly and consistently express Peirce's viewpoint >>> (this is unlike some other issues in his philosophy which are not >>> relatively so 'cut and dry'). Besides quoting Peirce, both of us >>> paraphrased and commented on his thoughts and words on what I consider the >>> very bedrock of his philosophy:* categorially triadic relations*. >>> >>> Recalling that Peirce's *as philosophy as cenoscopic * -- the >>> philosophic trichotomy of phenomenology; the regulative sciences of >>> esthetics, ethics, and logic as semeiotic; and metaphysics -- all these >>> branches of philosophy are considered science by Peirce: along with >>> mathematics,* pure research science.* >>> >>> In any event, your post was personally helpful to me as being both a >>> succinct outline not only of those points we both covered but, along with >>> the additional points you included, hint at a possible argumentation which >>> simultaneously invites dialogue. I'm interested! >>> >>> For this post I've copied your bullet points and added a short comment >>> of my own. >>> >>> JAS: We prescind each sign with its object and its interpretant from the >>> real and continuous process of semiosis, such that these are artifacts of >>> analysis. >>> GR: And that is virtually *all* that they are: potentially useful >>> artifacts which might aid us in our understanding of some semeiotic matter >>> or another. >>> >>> JAS: According to Peirce, any genuine triadic relation is not reducible >>> to the three dyadic relations that it involves, while any degenerate >>> triadic relation is so reducible. >>> GR: My favorite example of a degenerate triad relation is the one that >>> Peirce offers just after offering the 'giving/receiving a gift' is a >>> triadic relationship. The degenerate form of that gift giving and receiving >>> is as follows: (1st dyad), a person lays a package next to him on a bench, >>> later forgets about it and walks off; (2nd dyad); another person, a >>> stranger, passes by, sees it, and picks it up. >>> >>> JAS: The trichotomy for the sign's dyadic relation with its >>> interpretant in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy is identical to the one for the >>> sign's dyadic relation with its final interpretant in his later taxonomies. >>> GR: This seems to be a significant point of contention between you and >>> Robert. >>> >>> JAS:The final interpretant is the ideal effect of the sign (would-be, >>> genuine 3ns), while a dynamical interpretant is any actual effect of the >>> sign (2ns of 3ns), and the immediate interpretant is its range of possible >>> effects (may-be, 1ns of 3ns). >>> GR: Perhaps a trikonic diagram of this would facilitate understanding of >>> this. >>> >>> *Interpretant* (3ns) >>> >>> 1ns: immediate interpretant, "range of possible effects of the sign," >>> may-be (1ns of 3ns) >>> |> 3ns: final interpretant, "the ideal effect of the sign," would-be >>> *if*. . . (3ns quasi-completed*) >>> 2ns: dynamical interpretant, "actual effect of the sign," is (exists) >>> (2ns of 3ns) >>> *Since "the ideal effect of the sign" would-be only asymptotically so >>> (acting as a regulative principle) >>> >>> >>> JAS: The final interpretant is "final" in the sense of a final cause >>> (telos), not the temporally last member of a series; we aim to conform all >>> our dynamical interpretants of signs to their final interpretants, which is >>> why logic as semeiotic is a normative science. >>> GR: 3ns in the sense of reality *in futuro -- *"towards the future" >>> seems to me to be a prominent character of 3ns. Simply stated: All of a >>> day's "would-bes', *if* realized, *would be *realized in the future. >>> >>> JAS: Any individual event of semiosis consists in an individual >>> dynamical object determining an individual sign token to determine an >>> individual dynamical interpretant, and these are the three correlates of a >>> degenerate triadic relation. >>> GR: This suggests that genuine semiosis is not essentially about any >>> individual semiosis, that it tends towards the general, the continuous, >>> community, etc. Is that what you're saying? >>> >>> JAS: Such events are governed (not deterministically dictated) by the >>> genuine triadic relation whose three correlates are the sign itself (not >>> any one instance thereof), its dynamical object, and its final interpretant. >>> >>> GR: When semiotic models, ostensibly 'inspired' by Peirce, exclude the >>> interpretant’s mediating function, or reduce semiosis to mechanical >>> causation, in my view they cease to be authentically Peircean. Peirce’s >>> semiotic universe is one of open, triadic mediation, where meaning evolves >>> through interpretation, habit, and the continuity of thought which is a >>> process far richer than any deterministic or purely structural account can >>> capture. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >> email account, then go to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
