JAS, list 1] Of course I disagree with your outline since it rejects the semiotic triad as an actual phenomenological entity and demotes it to only an intellectual construct by an observer. Where does Peirce say this?
As I see it- a molecule is a ‘real object’ [ and as Peirce wrote, real objects are such, despite what we may think of them]- and as that ‘real object, it is itself, a semiotic triad - made up of a S/R correlate as its sign vehicle, and in interaction with its environmental objects via its Object correlate and interpreting these interactions via its Interpretant correlate. …That is,I understand that these triads, these ’semiotic Signs [ and remember, he wrote that the whole universe is composed of Signs] are themselves real entities, existent as a triad, in constant interaction with other triads.. 2] I disagree as well that the sequential Sign/Object/Interpretant is, as you see it, merely an intellectual construct, but it is, instead, the actual process of the semiosic interaction. See Peirce’s outline of this process in 8,314 on the weather. Here, the sign-vehicle [ itself a triad] interacts with an external Object, and interprets it. And this functional movement differs from the informational process, where the data moves from the Object via the mediate Sign to the Interpetants. 3] I also don’t see, from Peirce, where you derive your view that ‘ I maintain that every sign in itself is a symbolic type that stands in a genuine triadic relation with its dynamical object and its final interpretant, Apart from the fact that as far as I know, Peirce never set his semiosis up with such a notion of original holism, so to speak,…I find such a view of the universe goes against the Peircean concepts of evolution and adaptation, since these ‘pure or genuine types’ dont’ engage in such actions. Edwina > On Oct 23, 2025, at 1:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Gary R., List: > > GR: All semiosis arises through this irreducible triadic form. > > Another quibble--in my view, semiosis does not arise (bottom-up) through this > irreducible triadic form, it manifests (top-down) in this irreducible triadic > form whenever we prescind an individual sign from the real and continuous > process, artificially marking it off from other signs that remain indefinite, > and then identify its twofold object and its threefold interpretant. As I see > it, our "extraction" of those distinct correlates as artifacts of analysis is > the only sense in which sign/object/interpretant are sequentially > first/second/third--not within semiosis itself, nor in arranging the > different correlate trichotomies for sign classification, since the temporal > and logical sequence in those cases (respectively) is always > object-sign-interpretant. Others will no doubt persist in disagreeing with > all this. > > Today I came across another relevant quotation from Peirce that I thought > would be worth mentioning here--"A fact concerning two subjects is a dual > character or relation; but a relation which is a mere combination of two > independent facts concerning the two subjects may be called degenerate, just > as two lines are called a degenerate conic. In like manner a plural character > or conjoint relation is to be called degenerate if it is a mere compound of > dual characters" (CP 3.359, 1885). He immediately proceeds to discuss signs > as a paradigmatic example--a symbol (here called a "token") is in a genuine > triadic relation (here "triple relation") with its object and interpretant > (here "a mind"), an index is in a degenerate triadic relation where its > dyadic relation (here "dual relation") with its object is genuine, and an > icon is in a degenerate triadic relation where its dyadic relation with its > object is also degenerate (3.360-2). > > Peirce presents essentially the same analysis 16 years later (EP 2:305-8, > 1901), still discussing only the dyadic sign-object relation. However, over > the ensuing years, he expands his speculative grammar with two more > trichotomies, for the sign itself and the sign's dyadic relation with its > interpretant (1903); and then seven more trichotomies, for the two objects, > three interpretants, and two additional external relations (1904-8). > Accordingly, although Peirce never puts it this way, I maintain that every > sign in itself is a symbolic type that stands in a genuine triadic relation > with its dynamical object and its final interpretant, which is not reducible > to its constituent dyadic relations; while every instance of a sign is an > indexical token that stands in a degenerate triadic relation with its > dynamical object and some dynamical interpretant, which is so reducible. > Again, I acknowledge that others disagree. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Mon, Oct 20, 2025 at 3:43 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> List, >> >> Since there has been some discussion regarding genuine triadic relations, I >> quickly looked up a few (of the many) Peirce references to that relation. >> For Peirce, a genuine triadic relation is the logical and metaphysical mark >> or stamp of meaning. It is the structure through which 3ns -- mediation, >> generality, continuity -- acts in the universe. All semiosis arises through >> this irreducible triadic form. >> >> Here are some places where Peirce discusses the genuine triadic relation and >> and a couple referencing the degenerate triadic relation (I checked some but >> not all of the sources); all but one concern semiosis as such; the other is >> the famous quotation in which Peirce notes that "The relation of giving is a >> genuine triadic relation:" >> >> (1903, Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic) >> >> “A genuine triadic relation cannot be resolved into any combination of >> dyadic relations. For example, the relation of sign to its object and its >> interpretant is genuinely triadic, since if you take away any one of the >> three, the relation ceases to exist.” 1.345 >> >> “The relation of giving is a genuine triadic relation, for it involves a >> giver, a gift, and a receiver. Take away any one of the three and the >> relation is destroyed.”1.346 >> >> “A degenerate triadic relation is one which is not genuinely triadic, but >> may be reduced to a mere aggregate of dyadic relations.” 1.347 >> >> (ca. 1897–1902, “Logic as Semiotic”) >> >> “A sign is a tri-relative entity. It brings together a sign, its object, and >> its interpretant. This triadic relation is genuine; it cannot be reduced to >> dyadic relations without losing its essential character.” CP 5.484 >> >> (1906, “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism”) >> >> “Thought is a species of genuine triadic relation. It involves a sign, its >> object, and its interpretant. The same may be said of communication in >> general, and indeed of law. Every genuine triadic relation involves a sign.” >> CP 3.456 >> >> (1903, Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism) >> >> “Every genuine triadic relation involves a sign, whether it be a sign of >> word or deed, or any other sort; for every triadic relation implies >> mediation, and mediation is of the nature of a sign.” >> and >> “A mere dyadic relation, like action and reaction, is not a sign, because it >> involves no mediation. But where there is mediation there is a sign, and >> where there is a sign, there is mediation.” EP 2:389–390 >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> > . 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