List, Helmut, It would appear that the discussion on linguistic matters has come to a close, so I'd like to introduce another topic.
Helmut wrote: " I think meaning and syntax are a matter of co-evolution." To me that makes perfect sense and, as far as I'm concerned, it puts the linguistic matter of origins we've been discussing to rest (for me, at least, for now). Thank you, Helmut! I'd like to consider taking the inquiry into origins beyond the acquisition of language (as profound a semiotic advance as that must have been), even beyond the advent of life itself (as unlikely, miraculous, and stupendous a semiotic leap as the universe has ever seen). In any event, this discussion of the nature and structure of language at its origin got me thinking again on origins *most *generally. Not coincidentally, I've also been reading Jim Holt’s *Why** Does the World Exist?: An Existential Detective Story*. https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/8854815-why-does-the-world-exist While it's more a 'popular' than a scholarly text, Holt has a solid grasp of a great deal of contemporary science and philosophy as well as facets of their histories. One example to support that remark: Holt makes brief reference to Peirce twice in the book, at one place referring to him as "the great nineteenth-century pragmatist philosopher" (170). Holt approaches the recurrent existential question through a kind of “cosmological travel narrative” built around conversations with a number of prominent scientists and other scholars of cosmology, philosophy, religion, and the arts. He writes as an insightful amateur naturalistic philosopher who treats theological, scientific, metaphysical, and axiarchic explanations as hypotheses and other abductions rather than settled doctrines. The book never arrives at a single solution; instead, Holt surveys and compares multiple explanatory frameworks, ultimately highlighting both the depth and limits of any one perspective. These are the thoughts of *individuals*, so there is no way to fully grasp the logic or, really, anything of the character of any of the 'answers' given in a brief post. Perhaps the representative examples offered below hint at facets of several of the major answers that have been posited to the question of why there's something and not nothing. Of course there are myriad more possible answers to the question which don't fall into these selected categories. *Axiarchic explanations* (the idea that the universe exists because it is good that it does): This position is represented in the book principally by the philosopher, John Leslie, who proposes that reality exists because it is in some sense valuable or ethically required that it should. Leslie comments that "if nothing at all existed, there would still be all sorts of logical possibilities" (198), a rather Peircean idea, I think. Among that infinite number of possibilities he valorizes one: goodness. "I don't think of goodness as just another quality slapped onto things. . . Goodness is required existence". . . in the absence of a nihilistic force fighting the existence of things [. . .] any valid reason for their existence would tend to bring about their realization" (203-4). Holt situates this axiarchic view in an intellectual succession extending from Leibniz’s formulation of the problem to modern debates about whether *intelligi**bility* or *goodness* ought serve as ultimate explanatory principles. *Scientific explanations*: These are explored especially through conversations with several physicists including Steven Weinberg,David Deutsch, and Roger Penrose. Here Holt looks at whether cosmological models (such as inflationary models, multiverse, and quantum theories) can make the emergence of a universe intelligible. Penrose, for example, has a kind of trichotomic theory of his own. "Each of the three worlds -- the physical world, the world of consciousness, and the Platonic world [of mathematics, and of possible qualities] -- emerges out of a tiny bit of one of the others . . . [T]his is perhaps the greatest mystery of all: how the Platonic world 'controls' the physical world" (198-9). Again, one might point to similar ideas in Peirce. *Theological explanations*: Holt's discussion of the theological approach involves thinkers like Richard Swinburne. Swinburne explains the universe by positing a necessary divine creator who grounds contingent reality and makes the orderliness of nature intelligible. Holt treats this view as a serious but debatable 'closure' (because the doctrines and dogmas of the churches insist that the answer has already been given). He sees it as a kind of 'metaphysical regress' since it raises further questions about divine necessity, simplicity, and the existence of disorder (and much more). So while it functions as an alternative to scientific and axiarchic explanations, in Holt's view it yet adds additional, unwarranted metaphysical commitments. It might be quite interesting to read (and *not* yet critique, since who can say for sure?) what forum members consider to be the best answer to the question proposed by Holt's book. It might be interesting to see some further explicantion of these proposed 'answers' to the question.. Of course there are many possible answers not even suggested by the three types adumbrated above which might be interesting to consider. Indeed, I hope that this positing of possible answers might be taken up in the spirit of a kind of philosophical game where every post contributes to the discussion in the sense of getting folk thinking about such *ultimate questions *in fresh ways. Best, Gary R On Thu, May 7, 2026 at 1:42 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Thank you, Gary! List, > > On the website of TU Berlin I haven´t seen the name "Peirce". They are > mostly concerned with Robert Posner, who, at least, has written a book > together with Sebeok. When I want to study semiotics, I guess I have to go > to Brazil or USA. Then, when I will have retired, Trump will be no longer > president, so I won´t have to spill the data of everybody I know, and my > social media content, which is suspiciously zero. I think, meaning and > syntax are a matter of co-evolution. First a syntax was created to express > some existing meaning, then, with syntax, it was possible to create > meanings, that haven´t been there before. Then, when the meanings became > more complex, they had to improve the syntax. Like tools: First people > wanted to cut down trees for a raft, instead to wait for beavers doing > that, invented the stone axe, then they saw that they could make logs and > planks, and fit them together to make ships, roof trusses, and so on with > the axe. Then they saw that they also needed stone drills for bores for > dowels and sewing ropes for the ships and trusses to not fall apart again. > > Best, Helmut > 6. Mai 2026 um 22:18 > "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > Helmut, List, > > I very much appreciate the spirit of collegiality and collaboration you > convey. Peirce believed it was of the greatest value for the advancement > of science and, really, for the advancement of society generally. Still, > although of obvious community value, that spirit has sometimes been > severely lacking and, as I've observed it over the years, especially in > the 'soft' sciences, the social sciences. > > >
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