John, It is possible to read the 4-node network as you do, but I do not agree with that. The reason is as follows:
If I omit S (sign) from the 4-node network, I end up with a tripod with the hub un-named. Then why not use a triangle instead of a tripod ? A triangle has places for three terms, either S, O (object) and I (interpretant) or R (reprsentamen), O and I. In other words, if you choose to use a triangle to represent the Peircean sign, you have to treat S and R as synonymous or redundant. As I said earlier, one advantage of the 4-node network representation of the Peircena sign is to give unique places for S and R, which you cannot do with a triangle. To me S embodies a triadic relation (since it has three edges connected to it) and R embodies a monadic relation (since it has only one edge connected to it). I am so convinced of my way of representing the Peircean sign that I am tempted to predict that some semioticans in the futrue may discover from Peirce's vast opus some writings that attribute fundamentally different semiotic roles to R and S. If you have any question about what I mean, please let me know. With all the best. Sung > Sung, > > "Sign" is the name of the triadic structure, not something in > addition. There is no separate S. The S in you diagram is redundant > adn misleading. > > John > > At 11:12 PM 2014-03-25, Sung wrote: >>(For the undistorted Figure 1, see the PDF file attached.) >> >>Ulysses wrote: >> >>"In Peirce's terminology both "symbol" and "index" (5622-1) >>describe the relationship a sign vehicle has to its >>object, not the sign vehicle itself. The respective >>terms for sign vehicles are "legisign" and "sinsign". >>Sinsigns are by definition material, legisigns are >>generals that operate through material tokens. Indexical >>relations are relations of spatio-temporal contiguity. >>Symbolic relations are not material; they are real in >>virtue of a rule, often a conventional one." >> >>Thanks for the nice summary. It seems to me that the description you >> give >>of the Peircean sign in (5622-1) is consistent with the diagrammatic >>representation of the Peircean sign shown in Figure 1. I have been using >>this diagram since about a year ago, despite the objections from some >>members of this list which was not convincing to me. One of the merits >> of >>the diagram seems be its ability to clearly distinguish between "sign" >> and >>"representamen". The former has a triadic relation (as evident in the >>three edges connected to it), while the latter has a monadic relation >>since it has only one edge connecting it to the sign. Please note that I >>am defining the "adicity of a relation" in terms of the number of >> "edges", >>not "nodes". The difference may be akin to the difference between >>"morphisms" (i.e., the mapping between nodes) and "functors" (i.e, the >>mapping between edges). To those who do not distinguish between these >> two >>types of relations (e.g., John C and Edwina), each of the three edges in >>Figure 1 would represent a "dyadic relation" (it implicates two nodes). >> >> >> Representamen >> | >> | (1) >> | >> Sign >> / \ >> (2) / \ (3) >> / \ >> Object Interpretant >> >>(1) Qualisign, sinsign, legisign >>(2) Icon, index, symbol >>(3) Rheme, dicisign, argument >> >>Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of the "doubly trichotic" >>structure (or the triadicity) of the Peircean sign. >> >> >>If you detect any deficiency in the ability of the 4-node network diagram >>to represent the Peircean sign, please let me know. >> >>With all the best. >> >>Sung >>___________________________________________________ >>Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >>Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >>Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >>Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >>Rutgers University >>Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >>732-445-4701 >> >>www.conformon.net >> >> >> > Howard, list >> > >> > In Perice's terminology both "symbol" and "index" describe the >> > relationship >> > a sign vehicle has to its object, not the >> > sign vehicle itself. The respective terms for sign vehicles are >> > "legisign" >> > and "sinsign". Sinsigns are by definition material, legisigns are >> generals >> > that operate through material tokens. Indexical relations are >> relations of >> > spatio-temporal contiguity. Symbolic relations are not material; they >> are >> > real in virtue of a rule, often a conventional one. >> > >> > ---Ulysses >> > >> > On Tuesday, March 25, 2014, Howard Pattee <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> > >> >> At 08:11 AM 3/24/2014,Vinicius wrote: >> >> >> >> By itself, the symbol is useless. To function, a symbol needs indices >> >> attached to it. Indices are quantifiers. Frege and Peirce >> independently >> >> developed the theory of quantification in logic. When indices are >> >> attached >> >> to a symbol, it becomes a cognition, a "know-how" and only then it >> can >> >> do >> >> its job. >> >> >> >> >> >> HP: I have explained why isolated symbols are useless. I say symbols >> >> must >> >> be part of a "symbol system" I call a language. In the context of a >> >> cell, I >> >> do not understand the necessity of *indices*. In my view, a symbol >> >> requires only a *material symbol vehicle*, like a molecule (the >> molecule >> >> and an *interpreting mechanism *such as the cell's translation >> >> machinery). >> >> >> >> Does the* index* have an *index vehicle*? Or is it a non-material >> >> relation? Is the index a part of the DNA base sequence-to-protein >> >> translation machinery? >> >> >> >> Howard >> >> >> >> >> > >> > -- >> > Ulysses >> > >> > > > ---------- > Professor John Collier > [email protected] > Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South > Africa > T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 > Http://web.ncf.ca/collier > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
