Dear Sung Prigogine can be said to deliver a physical support to Peirce's evolutionary worldview except that he does not have a theory of signification and meaning.
Best Søren -----Oprindelig meddelelse----- Fra: Sungchul Ji [mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu] Sendt: 28. april 2014 04:06 Til: Gary Richmond Cc: Stephen C. Rose; PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu Emne: [biosemiotics:5904] Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 Gary R, List, According to I. Prigogine (1917-2003), there are two types of structures in the Universe -- (i) equilibrium STRUCTURES (e.g., table, bible, ec.) that do not change with time nor require energy dissiaption for them to exist, and (ii) dissipative STRUCTURES(e.g., the flame of a candle, TV images, EEG, Belousov-Zhabotinsky reactions, action potentials) that change in time and require dissipation of energy for their existence. As is well known, Prigogine was awarded a Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1977 for having contributed to establishing the concpet of dissiaptive structures. Can philsophers and semioticians utilize the Prigoginean theory of STRUCTURES ? With all the best. Sung __________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > Stephen, Michael, Gene, List, > > It seems to me that in sum the argumentation so far has been that > Michael maintains that Peirce should be seen as a structuralist, Gene > has countered that Peirce is best seen as a thorough-going process > philosopher, and Michael responded to this by saying that to refer to > his philosophy as processual is redundant since a properly understood > structuralism includes the ideas of process and growth, and I have > suggested that structuralism is generally not understood as such (that > is, as involving change and growth), and that many Peircean > philosophers see Peirce as a process thinker, but not as a > structuralist. > > Now you may be suggesting--but I'm not exactly sure what your intended > meaning was, Stephen--that Michael may well be proven correct and that > there is good reason to see Peirce as a structuralist when that theory > is "properly understood" to include the notions of history, change, > and growth. > > But currently--and although I'm not a big fan of post-structuralism > and deconstruction, etc.--structuralism tends to connote to many > certain ideas which are not processual. Thus, at the conclusion of a > the overview of structuralism in the Wikipedia article one is give > these tenets "common to the various forms of structuralism" as > formulated by the feminist theorist, Alison Assiter: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structuralism > > *First, that a structure determines the position of each element of a > whole. Second, that every system has a structure. Third, structural > laws deal with co-existence rather than change. Fourth, structures are > the "real things" that lie beneath the surface or the appearance of > meaning.* > > > Now I would imagine that Michael would say that Assiter does not > properly understand structuralism. Still, and again, structuralism > does indeed connote these ideas to many. And especially for this > discussion note that the third tenet is that "structural laws deal > with co-existence rather than change." > > So, until structuralism is "properly understood" (and I have no doubt > that Michael has things of considerable importance to say about this, > especially in the realms of linguistics and semiotics), it's a heavy > load at present to suggest that Peirce is more structuralist than > processual (or, rather, that that the idea of structure properly > understood includes process, as Michael is saying). > > I'll be eager to learn more about this proper understanding of > structuralism, and in that sense I agree with you, Stephen, that we > should reserved judgment. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 7:53 PM, Stephen C. Rose > <stever...@gmail.com>wrote: > >> I think it is much too early in the course of things to exclude >> Michael's conjectures which I assume are intended to widen in a >> radical and original manner the scope of Peirce's influence. It has >> after all taken 2000 years to arrive at the start of an appropriate >> revision of Aristotle, again based in part on Peirce's growing >> influence. It is somewhat a problem for the dead, who cannot respond, >> to have exclusive interpretations attached to aspects of their >> thought. Particularly if, like Peirce, they were inclined to favor >> the growth of communities of discourse and partial to abduction which >> means, I assume, guessing. >> >> *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* >> >> >> On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 5:50 PM, Gary Richmond >> <gary.richm...@gmail.com>wrote: >> >>> Gene, Michael, List, >>> >>> I would tend to agree with Gene here, especially given the situation >>> that Structuralism is not generally "properly understood" in the >>> sense in which you are suggesting, Michael. >>> >>> Meanwhile, a number of Peircean scholars use 'processual' in this >>> context much as Gene does, and these include Andre de Tienne, Floyd >>> Merrell, Kelly Parker, Cathy Legg, and, perhaps, and especially, >>> Nicholas Rescher. >>> >>> Even in a group of papers you edited, Michael, as *Peirce Seminar >>> Papers: Essays in Semiotic Analysis*, Nils B. Thelin in >>> "Biopragmatism, Space/Time Cognition, and the Sense of Language," >>> finds what he calls a "hierarchical-processual understanding" >>> implicit in Peirce's treatment of abduction-deduction-induction in >>> inquiryh. Thelin's extension of this--involving a model of >>> "hierarchical-processual-feedback"--appears >>> to >>> me to be an attempt at developing further what is implicit in this >>> regard in Peirce. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 5:15 PM, Eugene Halton >>> <eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu>wrote: >>> >>>> Dear Michael, >>>> >>>> Sorry, but it is not in the least redundant to >>>> characterize Peirce’s philosophy as processual. It clarifies what >>>> pervades his thinking. >>>> Calling Peirce a structuralist, on the other hand, does not, in my >>>> opinion. >>>> >>>> Gene >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *From:* Michael Shapiro [mailto:poo...@earthlink.net] >>>> *Sent:* Sunday, April 27, 2014 12:11 PM >>>> *To:* Eugene Halton; PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu >>>> >>>> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Gene, list, >>>> >>>> Structuralism properly understood does not exclude process or >>>> growth, just the opposite, so calling Peirce's doctrine >>>> "processualism" is both redundant and terminologically inadvisable, >>>> given the latter's unusualness. >>>> Cf. my 1991 book's title >>>> >>>> *The Sense of Change: Language as History. *Michael >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: Eugene Halton >>>> Sent: Apr 27, 2014 12:02 PM >>>> To: "PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu" >>>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 >>>> >>>> >>>> Response to Michael Shapiro’s post that Peirce should be seen as >>>> a structuralist. Shapiro: “The use by Peirce of the form >>>> "rationalized" >>>> (rather than "rational") as a modifier of "variety" in the >>>> quotation above should be taken advisedly. This use of the >>>> participial form, with its adversion to process, should serve as a >>>> caveat that when Peirce talks about >>>> "*objective* idealism," what he ought to have said is >>>> "*objectified*idealism." >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Peirce: “The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of >>>> objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits >>>> becoming physical laws†Peirce, CP 6.25. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Note “becoming.†And even those physical laws are still subject >>>> to evolution. A habit is a process, semiosis is an inferential >>>> process, “rationalized variety†is a kind of habituated variety >>>> yet still in process. I see no reason for calling Peirce a >>>> structuralist, since even a structure, in Peirce, is a >>>> habit-process, however slow or even seemingly invariant that >>>> inveterate habit may be: it remains potentially subject to growth. >>>> Why not simply acknowledge Peirce’s thoroughgoing processualism? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Gene Halton >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *From:* Michael Shapiro >>>> [mailto:poo...@earthlink.net<poo...@earthlink.net>] >>>> >>>> *Sent:* Sunday, April 27, 2014 7:51 AM >>>> *To:* PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu >>>> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapters 7 & 8 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Dear Fellow-Listers, >>>> >>>> I'd like to offer up the following as a take on ch. 7 and an >>>> anticipation of ch. 8, from the perspective of a non-philosopher >>>> interested in developing a Peircean theory of language for the >>>> twenty-first >>>> century: >>>> >>>> >>>> Because he was a practicing scientist in the modern >>>> sense, Peirce is *the* one great philosopher who escapes my >>>> definition of a philosopher as someone who only solves problems of his own >>>> devising. >>>> This >>>> makes him also a proto-structuralist (a structuralist *avant la >>>> lettre* >>>> ). >>>> >>>> The essential concept of structuralism, whether applied >>>> to physics or linguistics or anthropology, is that of invariance >>>> under transformation. This makes theory, following Peirce's whole >>>> philosophy and his pragmaticism in particular, the rationalized >>>> explication of >>>> variety: "[U]nderlying all other laws is the only tendency which >>>> can grow by its own virtue, the tendency of all things to take habits .... >>>> In >>>> so far as evolution follows a law, the law or habit, instead of >>>> being a movement from homogeneity to heterogeneity, is growth from >>>> difformity to uniformity. But the chance divergences from laws are >>>> perpetually acting to increase the variety of the world, and are >>>> checked by a sort of natural selection and otherwise ... , so that >>>> the general result may be described as 'organized heterogeneity,' >>>> or, better, rationalized variety'' (CP 6.101). Or, translating law >>>> and habit into the appropriate phenomenological category: >>>> "Thirdness ... is an essential ingredient of reality" (EP 2:345). >>>> >>>> Once we properly understand structuralism not as the >>>> putatively debunked epistemology that originated in Geneva with >>>> Saussure, but rather as the revised, essentially correct version >>>> originating with Jakobson in Prague and Hjelmslev in Copenhagen, we >>>> can recognize the patterning of Thirdness and Secondness in >>>> language––the so-called "passkey semiotic"––for what it is. >>>> Consequently, the fundamental notion of alternation between basic >>>> form and contextual variant becomes understandable as immanent in >>>> theory, and not merely a construct or an artifact of description. >>>> The importance of this notion cannot be overestimated. >>>> >>>> A child learning its native language, for instance, >>>> is exactly in the same position as an analyst. It has to determine >>>> which linguistic form is basic, and which is a contextual variant. >>>> Take a simple example from English, that of the voiceless stops >>>> >>>> English voiceless (actually, tense) stops are >>>> aspirated when they are word-initial or begin a stressed syllable, >>>> as in *pen*, *ten*, *Ken*. They are unaspirated when immediately >>>> following word-initial s, as in *spun*, *stun*, *skunk*. After an >>>> *s* elsewhere in a word they are normally unaspirated as well, >>>> except when the cluster is heteromorphemic and the stop belongs to >>>> an unbound morpheme; compare dis[t]end vs. dis[tÊ°]aste. Word-final >>>> voiceless stops are optionally aspirate. >>>> >>>> This variation makes aspiration non-distinctive >>>> (non-phonemic) in English, unlike, say, in Ancient Greek or Hindi, >>>> where aspirated stops change the meaning of words by comparison >>>> with items that have their unaspirated counterparts *ceteris >>>> paribus*. >>>> >>>> I think it is only by taking such variation for what >>>> it is, i. e., the working out of Thirdness in the context of >>>> Secondness, that we can we understand what Peirce had in mind with >>>> his version of Pragmatism. >>>> >>>> Best regards, >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> P. S. The use by Peirce of the form "rationalized" (rather than >>>> "rational") as a modifier of "variety" in the quotation above >>>> should be taken advisedly. This use of the participial form, with >>>> its adversion to process, should serve as a caveat that when Peirce >>>> talks about " >>>> *objective* idealism," what he ought to have said is >>>> "*objectified*idealism." This slight grammatical change puts the >>>> meaning of the phrase (and the doctrine!) in a whole new––and >>>> completely acceptable––light. >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >>>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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