(oops, ok, not klick answer, but fill in peirce list adress)
So would it be better not to say, the name of the object is "green", but: "Green is a quality things can have"? This would be a memory content, and I assume, that memory contents are parts of the form of a human (possible objects): They have their limited space somewhere (in the cortex), but are permanent in time. Behaviour parts (possible representamens) are limited in time (like an impulse), but have no spatial limits in the system of interpretance: Like the sighting of a green frog.
Phyllis Chiasson <ath...@olympus.net> wrote:
Can a quality be an object? Or is an object a relationship between a quality (or qualities) and a thing?
Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
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Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Dear Peircers,
I think, there is one assumption that hinders the understanding of semiotics: The triad of representamen-object-interpretant suggests, that there be only one object implied. I think that this is not so. In one semiosis, there are most likely more than one objects involved. Example: Representamen being the sighting of a green frog. You being a young child, who knows a frog from a black-and-white sketch in a fairy tale book. Also you know colours. One object is "frog", the other is "green", the third is the concept you already have about relations between attitude and entity, namely: "A sighted trait might be typical for the sighted thing". This third object is also called by the representamen, because the representamen is carrying with it a trait (green) and a frog. Now the representamen fits to these three objects, and in an abductive process of your mind, a new object is created: "possibly all frogs are green". This object is (by induction) strenghened by the subsequent sighting of some more green frogs. But then you spot a red frog, and you have a deduction: The object is inverted: "possibly all frogs are green" is deleted and replaced by: "Not all frogs are green". The object "A sighted trait might be typical for the sighted thing" is slightly weakened. Well, thats how I assume, thinking works, dont you think so? A reflexive process always implies abduction, induction and deduction, and at least abduction requires more than one object. Now dont say, that the green frog is the one object: He is long gone, diven into the water, as you are still thinking about it, dont you? Best, Helmut
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