RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM 1] . But, unlike Hegel's position, 3ns does not Aufheben (i.e., invalidate, annul, cancel out) the other two categories, but rather joins them in a genuine tricategorial relation. GCM: Where does Hegel say “Aufheben” absolutely “cancels out the other two categories? That would seem to go against the general tenor of his philosophy in general - but I have nothing specific to oppose it with. 2] 1º Thanks, but I don't think I'd exactly say that "reality is continuity," but, as I wrote today, "pragmatism involves 'the recognition that continuity is an indispensable element of reality' [and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives."] CSP" GR said, sometimes quoting Peirce: 2º Reality consists in regularity. Real regularity is active law. Active law is efficient reasonableness, or in other words is truly reasonable reasonableness 3º that continuity is an indispensable element of reality, and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives." GCM: If “Reality consists in regularity” and “Real regularity is active law” and “Active law is EFFICIENT reasonableness” and “continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives” and “continuity… like generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is the essence of thought” and “is an essential ingredient of reality”, especially when combined, seem to say to me “reality is continuity". However, you do say, “yet does not by itself constitute reality” (even though it is the “essential ingredient”) which, in first reflex, I agree with – except: what do you mean by “constitute” of something so culturally and conventionally defined with such terms as “regularity”, “reasonableness”, and “generality”. What is the constituent? This is all provisional on my (GCM) part. 3] GR: “I'm glad the idea of vectors has given you "much to think about." I think about them a lot, and wonder why they haven't been taken up much in the Peircean secondary literature.” GCM: All I have been able to find in Peirce about “vectors” is item (158) in “Logic of Relatives, 1870” in CE, vol. 2, pg. 414-5 which to an utterly mathematical illiterate person such as I cannot possibly begin to comprehend. Is there something English in Peirce? 4] GR: “Helmut wrote that assignment of elements of a triad to the categories depends on the observer position, and that assignment of categories to triads seem to underlie an inversion due to observer position change. I would, rather, suggest that the putative "inversion" is the result not of "observer position change" but of not considering vectorial movement through the categories…” GCM: The “brief comments below” generally elude my old mind, i.e., “the most general mode of reality… involves (vector of involution) the others (actuality, action, and possibility, feeling), this much in the way in which lawfulness (habit, 3ns) involves force (law in action 2ns [“Peirce argues repeated and persuasively that there are real generals”]).” “There are exactly six paths (vectors) through a genuine tricategorial relation, and that in matters of categorial involution (such as the one just considered) one commences at 3ns [“actuality (2ns) is clearly also real enough that some, nominalists, have stopped there”], first, which involves 2ns (and 1ns [real possibles]), next, and 2ns [there are real generals”] “ in turn involves 1ns [“real possibles“], finally. Thus, "first" in categorial vector analysis is not necessarily category 1ns [“real possibles”] (commencing at 1ns [“real possibles”] is the case for only 2 of the six paths), but may commence at 3ns [“there are real generals”] or 2ns. [““actuality (2ns) is clearly also real enough”]
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