Hi Gary F., What is the difference between saying that every dicisign involves an intention, and saying that every dicisign involves (or is somehow related to) a purpose? My untutored assumption is that 'purpose' is the more general term, and the word 'intention' refers to a species of purpose. T.L. Short and others have tried to clarify these two concepts, but I must admit that I'm not entirely clear on the relation between the two.
Perhaps we should distinguish between different ways that the word 'intention' is used in Peirce's texts. There is the common meaning that is expressed when I say, for instance, that my intention in writing the sentences above is to engage in a discussion with colleagues in the hopes of improving our shared understanding of these questions. There is also the more technical meaning of the term that is involved in the distinction between first and second intentions in the theory of logic. I assume that, when you are talking about the intentions of the interpreter, that you are drawing on the common meaning of the word. If you meant it in the more technical sense of a first or second intention, that would be good to spell out. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Gary Fuhrman [g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: Friday, October 03, 2014 8:48 AM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List' Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.5 Section 3.5 of NP takes up “The Indexical Side of Dicisigns” by first showing the importance of (and the more recent terminology for) Peirce’s advances in the algebra of logic which made it possible to separate the subject and predicate parts of the proposition, and thus the indexical and iconic parts of the Dicisign. Even the Dicent Symbol (i.e. the proposition) must involve an index, but often we have to look for the index not among the words expressing the proposition, but in “the circumstances of the enunciation” (NP p. 61, quoting Peirce). The index is whatever directs our attention to the object which the Dicisign informs us about, and as such is part of the sign even when it is not included in the sentence representing the proposition. For example, consider Gun Country by Michael Murphy, http://www.artprize.org/michael-murphy/2014/gun-country which Evgenii Rudnyi mentioned on the Peirce list. As existing physical installation, it’s a Dicent Indexical Sinsign; but it’s the Dicent Indexical Legisign, the general thought (of the USA as “Gun Country”) represented by the Sinsign, which directs our attention to the object of the sign, which is an aspect of American culture. The indexical part of it is in the circumstances of its creation, not in the iconic components of the work (the guns and the outline of the continental U.S.) Its creator combined those iconic components and presented the Sinsign in public in order to direct the viewer’s attention to the relation between the cultural phenomena represented by those icons. So the index involves those icons (not the other way round). That’s not an exhaustive analysis, and maybe others can give better examples, but I think it illustrates the point that Dicisigns always involve some kind of intention (which may or may not be conscious), and their indexical parts carry out the intention of directing our attention. This is the mirror image, as it were, of the causal relation between the parts of a ‘natural’ Dicisign such as the weathervane, which is effectively forced by the wind itself to be an icon of the direction of the wind, and thus to convey information. It will actually convey this information only if it is intentionally interpreted as doing so; but whether the information is true or false depends not on the interpreter’s intention, but on whether the weathervane is in good working order or not. (In Peirce’s example, if it sticks, its reader can be misinformed about the wind direction). But then I could be wrong about the Dicisign always involving some kind of intention. I’d be grateful if someone could suggest a counter-example that would refute this hypothesis. gary f.
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
