Dear Gary F, Thank you so much. I will enjoy reading the text.
With all the best. Sung > As per Sung's request, here's the defining text on Dicisigns, from > EP2:275-83. The usual warnings about taking a text out of context apply > here > too: the reader who hasn't read the whole of selection 20 in EP2, "Sundry > Logical Conceptions", is unlikely to fully understand this; and the > Dicisign > concept is further developed, not only in the rest of EP2 selection 20, > but > also in the next two selections. Also, I've omitted Peirce's footnotes to > this passage. But I'm posting this transcription to facilitate intensive > study of, and reference to, the text. > > > > gary f. > > > > > > The second trichotomy of representamens is into: first, simple signs, > substitutive signs, or Sumisigns; second, double signs, informational > signs, > quasi-propositions, or Dicisigns; third, triple signs, rationally > persuasive > signs, arguments, or Suadisigns. > > > > Of these three classes, the one whose nature is, by all odds, the easiest > to > comprehend, is the second, that of quasi-propositions, despite the fact > that > the question of the essential nature of the "judgment" is today quite the > most vexed of all questions of logic. The truth is that all these classes > are of very intricate natures; but the problem of the day is needlessly > complicated by the attention of most logicians, instead of extending to > propositions in general, being confined to "judgments," or acts of mental > acceptance of propositions, which not only involve characters additional > to > those of propositions in general,-characters required to differentiate > them > as propositions of a particular kind,-but which further involve, beside > the > mental proposition itself, the peculiar act of assent. The problem is > difficult enough, when we merely seek to analyze the essential nature of > the > Dicisign, in general, that is, the kind of sign that conveys information, > in > contradistinction to a sign from which information may be derived. > > > > The readiest characteristic test showing whether a sign is a Dicisign or > not, is that a Dicisign is either true or false, but does not directly > furnish reasons for its being so. This shows that a Dicisign must profess > to > refer or relate to something as having a real being independently of the > representation of it as such, and further that this reference or relation > must not be shown as rational, but must appear as a blind Secondness. But > the only kind of sign whose object is necessarily existent is the genuine > Index. This Index might, indeed, be a part of a Symbol; but in that case > the > relation would appear as rational. Consequently a Dicisign necessarily > represents itself to be a genuine Index, and to be nothing more. At this > point let us discard all other considerations, and see what sort of sign a > sign must be that in any way represents itself to be a genuine Index of > its > Object, and nothing more. Substituting for "represents _______ to be" a > clearer interpretation, the statement is that the Dicisign's Interpretant > represents an identity of the Dicisign with a genuine Index of the > Dicisign's real Object. That is, the Interpretant represents a real > existential relation or genuine Secondness, as subsisting between the > Dicisign and its real Object. But the Interpretant of a Sign can represent > no other Object than that of the Sign itself. Hence this same existential > relation must be an Object of the Dicisign, if the latter have any real > Object. This represented existential relation, in being an Object of the > Dicisign, makes that real Object, which is correlate of this relation, > also > an Object of the Dicisign. This latter Object may be distinguished as the > Primary Object, the other being termed the Secondary Object. The Dicisign, > in so far as it is the relate of the existential relation which is the > Secondary Object of the Dicisign, can evidently not be the entire > Dicisign. > It is at once a part of the Object and a part of the Interpretant of the > Dicisign. Since the Dicisign is represented in its Interpretant to be an > Index of a complexus as such, it must be represented in that same > Interpretant to be composed of two parts, corresponding respectively to > its > Object and to itself [the Dicisign]. That is to say, in order to > understand > the Dicisign, it must be regarded as composed of two such parts whether it > be in itself so composed or not. It is difficult to see how this can be, > unless it really have two such parts; but perhaps this may be possible. > Let > us consider these two represented parts separately. The part which is > represented to represent the Primary Object, since the Dicisign is > represented to be an Index of its Object, must be represented as an Index, > or some representamen of an Index, of the Primary Object. The part which > is > represented to represent a part of the Dicisign is represented as at once > part of the Interpretant and part of the Object. It must, therefore, be > represented as such a sort of Representamen (or to represent such a sort) > as > can have its Object and its Interpretant the same. Now, a Symbol cannot > even > have itself as its Object; for it is a law governing its Object. For > example, if I say, "This proposition conveys information about itself," or > "Let the term 'sphinx' be a general term to denote anything of the nature > of > a symbol that is applicable to every 'sphinx' and to nothing else," I > shall > talk unadulterated nonsense. But a Representamen mediates between its > Interpretant and its Object, and that which cannot be the object of the > Representamen cannot be the Object of the Interpretant. Hence, a fortiori, > it is impossible that a Symbol should have its Object as its Interpretant. > An Index can very well represent itself. Thus, every number has a double; > and thus the entire collection of even numbers is an Index of the entire > collection of numbers, and so this collection of even numbers contains an > Index of itself. But it is impossible for an Index to be its own > Interpretant, since an Index is nothing but an individual existence in a > Secondness with something; and it only becomes an Index by being capable > of > being represented by some Representamen as being in that relation. Could > this Interpretant be itself there would be no difference between an Index > and a Second. An Icon, however, is strictly a possibility, involving a > possibility, and thus the possibility of its being represented as a > possibility is the possibility of the involved possibility. In this kind > of > Representamen alone, then, the Interpretant may be the Object. > Consequently, > that constituent of the Dicisign, which is represented in the Interpretant > as being a part of the Object, must be represented by an Icon or by a > Representamen of an Icon. The Dicisign, as it must be understood in order > to > be understood at all, must contain those two parts. But the Dicisign is > represented to be an Index of the Object, in that the latter involves > something corresponding to these parts; and it is this Secondness that the > Dicisign is represented to be the Index of. Hence the Dicisign must > exhibit > a connection between these parts of itself, and must represent this > connection to correspond to a connection in the object between the > Secundal > Primary Object and the Firstness indicated by the part corresponding to > the > Dicisign. > > > > We conclude, then, that, if we have succeeded in threading our way through > the maze of these abstractions, a Dicisign, defined as a Representamen > whose > Interpretant represents it as an Index of its Object, must have the > following characters: > > > > First, it must, in order to be understood, be considered as containing two > parts. Of these, the one, which may be called the Subject, is or > represents > an Index of a Second existing independently of its being represented, > while > the other, which may be called the Predicate, is or represents an Icon of > a > Firstness. > > Second, these two parts must be represented as connected; and that in such > a > way that if the Dicisign has any Object, it must be an Index of a > Secondness > subsisting between the Real Object represented in one represented part of > the Dicisign to be indicated and a Firstness represented in the other > represented part of the Dicisign to be Iconized. > > > > Let us now examine whether these conclusions, together with the assumption > from which they proceed, hold good of all signs which profess to convey > information without furnishing any rational persuasion of it; and whether > they fail alike for all signs which do not convey information as well as > for > all those which furnish evidence of the truth of their information, or > reasons for believing it. If our analysis sustains these tests, we may > infer > that the definition of the Dicisign on which they are founded, holding, at > least, within the sphere of signs, is presumably sound beyond that sphere. > > > > Our definition forbids an Icon to be a Dicisign, since the proper > Interpretant of an Icon cannot represent it to be an Index, the Index > being > essentially more complicated than the Icon. There ought, therefore, to be > no > informational signs among Icons. We find that, in fact, Icons may be of > the > greatest service in obtaining information,-in geometry, for example;-but > still, it is true that an Icon cannot, of itself, convey information, > since > its Object is whatever there may be which is like the Icon, and is its > Object in the measure in which it is like the Icon. > > > > All propositions are informational Symbols. Our conclusions do not prevent > Dicisigns from being Symbols; but let us begin by examining whether or not > our definition and conclusions apply to ordinary propositions. To fix our > ideas let us set down the proposition "Tully has a wart on his nose." That > is a proposition, whether it be true or not, whether anybody asserts it or > not, and whether anybody assents to it or not. For an act of assertion > supposes that, a proposition being formulated, a person performs an act > which renders him liable to the penalties of the social law (or, at any > rate, those of the moral law) in case it should not be true, unless he has > a > definite and sufficient excuse; and an act of assent is an act of the mind > by which one endeavors to impress the meanings of the proposition upon his > disposition, so that it shall govern his conduct, including thought under > conduct, this habit being ready to be broken in case reasons should appear > for breaking it. Now in performing either of these acts, the proposition > is > recognized as being a proposition whether the act be performed or not. Nor > can a sound objection be grounded on the fact that a proposition is always > understood as something that might be assented to and asserted. For our > definition of the Dicisign more than recognizes the truth of that in > stating > that (supposing the proposition to be a Dicisign) the Interpretant of it > (that is, the mental representation, or thought, which it tends to > determine) represents the proposition to be a genuine Index of a Real > Object, independent of the representation. For an Index involves the > existence of its Object. The definition adds that this Object is a > Secondness, or real Fact. That this is true of ordinary "ampliative" > propositions, namely, that what they mean to represent is a fact, is > beyond > question. But as regards explicative propositions, and especially > definitions, it may be doubted. If a definition is to be understood as > introducing the definitum, so that it means "Let so and so,-the > definitum,-mean so and so,-the definition," then it is a proposition in > the > imperative mood, and consequently, not a proposition; for a proposition is > equivalent to a sentence in the indicative mood. The definition is thus > only > a proposition if the definitum be already known to the interpreter. But in > that case it clearly conveys information as to the character of this > definitum, which is matter of fact. But take an "analytical," i.e., an > explicative proposition; and to begin with, take the formula "A is A." If > this be intended to state anything about real things, it is quite > unintelligible. It must be understood to mean something about symbols; no > doubt, that the substantive verb "is" expresses one of those relations > that > everything bears to itself, like "loves whatever may be loved by." So > understood, it conveys information about a symbol. A symbol is not an > individual, it is true. But any information about a symbol is information > about every replica of it; and a replica is strictly an individual. What > information, then, does the proposition "A is A" furnish concerning this > replica? The information is that if the replica be modified so as to bring > the same name before it and after it, then the result will be a replica of > a > proposition which will never be in conflict with any fact. To say that > something never will be is not to state any real fact, and until some > experience occurs,-whether outward experience, or experience of > fancies,-which might be an occasion for a conflict with the proposition in > question, it does not, to our knowledge, represent any actual Secondness. > But as soon as such an occasion does arise, the proposition relates to the > single replica that then occurs and to the single experience, and > describes > the relation between them. Similar remarks apply to every explicative > proposition. The proposition "Every phoenix, in rising from its ashes, > sings > 'Yankee Doodle,'" will be, we may be confident, not in conflict with any > experience. If so, it is perfectly true. "Every four-sided triangle is > deep > blue," is necessarily true, since it is impossible that any experience > should conflict with it. But both propositions are meaningless. Equally > meaningless is any explicative proposition that is true, unless it be > regarded as a proposition about a certain kind of symbol of which a > replica > actually occurs. If "Man is a biped" be allowed to be an explicative > proposition, it means nothing unless there be an occasion in which the > name > "man" may be applied. If there be such an occasion, in regard to that > existential individual event, it is said that the term "biped" may be > applied to it. That is, on an occasion on which the word "biped" is > applied, > the result will never be in conflict with any experience, real or > imaginary. > Thus every kind of proposition is either meaningless or has a real > Secondness as its object. This is a fact that every reader of philosophy > should constantly bear in mind, translating every abstractly expressed > proposition into its precise meaning in reference to an individual > experience. The system of existential graphs, which is capable of > expressing > every proposition as analytically as may be desired, expresses an > assertion > by actually attaching an individual replica to the individual sheet, and > such possible attachment is precisely what the Interpretant of a > proposition > represents before the proposition is asserted. > > > > Let us now proceed to compare the conclusions from the abstract definition > of a Dicisign with the facts about propositions. The first conclusion is > that every proposition contains a Subject and a Predicate, the former > representing (or being) an Index of the Primary Object, or Correlate of > the > relation represented, the latter representing (or being) an Icon of the > Dicisign in some respect. Before inquiring whether every proposition has > such parts, let us see whether the descriptions given of them are > accurate, > when there are such parts. The proposition "Cain kills Abel" has two > subjects "Cain" and "Abel" and relates as much to the real Objects of one > of > these as to that of the other. But it may be regarded as primarily > relating > to the Dyad composed of Cain, as first, and of Abel, as second member. > This > Pair is a single individual object having this relation to Cain and to > Abel, > that its existence consists in the existence of Cain and in the existence > of > Abel and in nothing more. The Pair, though its existence thus depends on > Cain's existence and on Abel's, is, nevertheless, just as truly existent > as > they severally are. The Dyad is not precisely the Pair. The Dyad is a > mental > Diagram consisting of two images of two objects, one existentially > connected > with one member of the pair, the other with the other; the one having > attached to it, as representing it, a Symbol whose meaning is "First," and > the other a Symbol whose meaning is "Second." Thus, this diagram, the > Dyad, > represents Indices of Cain and Abel, respectively; and thus the subject > conforms to our conclusion. Next consider the subject of this proposition, > "Every man is the son of two parents." This supposes a mental diagram of a > pair labelled "First" and "Second," as before (or rather by symbols > equivalent to these for the special purpose) but instead of the two units > of > the Diagram being directly considered as Indices of two existent > individuals, the Interpretant of the diagram represents, that if the > interpreter of the whole proposition by an act of the mind actually > attaches > one of the units of the diagram to any individual man, there will be an > existent relation attaching the other unit to a certain pair of > individuals > of which, if the interpreter of the whole proposition attaches one of them > specially to that unit, then the predicate will be true of that individual > Dyad in the order of its members. Of course, it is not meant that the > person > who sufficiently understands the diagram actually goes through this > elaborate process of thought, but only that this is substantially what has > to be done, completely and accurately to understand the proposition. The > graph of the proposition will afford help in seeing that this is so. Here, > as before, the Subject represents the individual Dyad, of which the > proposition is the Symbol, to be represented by an Index. If the > proposition > has an abstract subject, as "Redness" or "Justice," it may either be > treated, after the style of the scholastics, as an exponible, that is, as > a > proposition whose real construction is disguised by a grammatical trope; > or, > if this does not afford the true interpretation, the proposition > discourses > of a universe comprising one replica each of a collection of possible > symbols, somewhat indefinite, but embracing all that need be considered. > We > cannot say "all that are pertinent," since no collection could exhaust the > possible pertinent symbols. In the case of a conditional proposition, "If > it > freezes tonight, your roses will be killed," the meaning is that any > replica > of the proposition "It will freeze tonight" which may be true, coexists > with > a true replica of the proposition "your roses will be killed." This > involves > a representation of an Index just as much as does the subject of the > proposition "Every rose will be killed." Passing now to the consideration > of > the predicate, it is plain enough that the last proposition, or any at all > like it, only conveys its signification by exciting in the mind some image > or, as it were, a composite photograph of images, like the Firstness > meant. > This, however, does not squarely meet the question, which is not what our > mental constitution causes to happen, but how the predicate represents the > Firstness that it signifies. The predicate is necessarily an Iconic > Sumisign > (which is not always true of the subject) and as such, as we should find > by > a full analysis of the Sumisign, essentially signifies what it does by > representing itself to represent an Icon of it. Without an analysis of the > Sumisign this point must remain a little obscure. > > > > We next come to the question whether every proposition has a Subject and a > Predicate. It has been shown above that this is true of a Conditional; and > it is easily seen that it is equally so of any Disjunctive. Only, an > ordinary Disjunctive has such a construction that one mode of analysis of > it > is as good as another. That is, to say, "Either A or B is true," may > equally > be regarded as saying, "A replica of a Symbol is true which is not true if > no replica of A is true and no replica of B is true," or as saying, "If a > replica of A is not true, a replica of B is true," or as saying, "If a > replica of B is not true, a replica of A is true." These come to the same > thing, just as "Some X is Y," "Some Y is X," and "Something is both X and > Y" > come to the same thing. The most perfectly thorough analysis throws the > whole substance of the Dicisign into the Predicate. A copulative > proposition > even more obviously has a Subject and Predicate. It predicates the > genuinely > Triadic relation of tricoexistence, "P and Q and R coexist." For to say > that > both A and B is true is to say that something exists which tricoexists > with > true replicas of A and B. Some logical writers are so remarkably biased or > dense as to adduce the Latin sentences fulget and lucet as propositions > without any subject. But who cannot see that these words convey no > information at all without a reference (which will usually be Indexical, > the > Index being the common environment of the interlocutors) to the > circumstances under which the Firstnesses they signify are asserted to > take > place? > > > > Finally, our conclusions require that the proposition should have an > actual > Syntax, which is represented to be the Index of those elements of the fact > represented that correspond to the Subject and Predicate. This is apparent > in all propositions. Since Abelard it has been usual to make this Syntax a > third part of the proposition, under the name of the Copula. The > historical > cause of the emergence of this conception in the twelfth century was, of > course, that the Latin of that day did not permit the omission of the verb > est, which was familiarly, though not invariably, omitted in Greek, and > not > very uncommonly in classical Latin. In most languages there is no such > verb. > But it is plain that one does not escape the need of a Syntax by regarding > the Copula as a third part of the proposition; and it is simpler to say > that > it is merely the accidental form that Syntax may take. > > > > It has thus been sufficiently shown that all propositions conform to the > definition of the Dicisign and to the corollaries drawn from that > definition. A proposition is, in short, a Dicisign that is a Symbol. But > an > Index, likewise, may be a Dicisign. A man's portrait with a man's name > written under it is strictly a proposition, although its syntax is not > that > of speech, and although the portrait itself not only represents, but is a > Hypoicon. But the proper name so nearly approximates to the nature of an > Index, that this might suffice to give an idea of an informational Index. > A > better example is a photograph. The mere print does not, in itself, convey > any information. But the fact, that it is virtually a section of rays > projected from an object otherwise known, renders it a Dicisign. Every > Dicisign, as the system of Existential Graphs fully recognizes, is a > further > determination of an already known sign of the same object. It is not, > perhaps, sufficiently brought out in the present analysis. It will be > remarked that this connection of the print, which is the quasi-predicate > of > the photograph, with the section of the rays, which is the quasi-subject, > is > the Syntax of the Dicisign; and like the Syntax of the proposition, it is > a > fact concerning the Dicisign considered as a First, that is, in itself, > irrespective of its being a sign. Every informational sign thus involves a > Fact, which is its Syntax. It is quite evident, then, that Index Dicisigns > equally accord with the definition and the corollaries. > > > > It will be remarked that this accord, both for propositions and for > informational indices, is quite irrespective of their being asserted or > assented to. Now in analyses hitherto proposed, it seems to have been > thought that if assertion, or at any rate, assent, were omitted, the > proposition would be indistinguishable from a compound general term-that > "A > man is tall" would then reduce to "A tall man." It therefore becomes > important to inquire whether the definition of a Dicisign here found to be > applicable to the former (even though it be not "judged"), may not be > equally applicable to the latter. The answer, however, comes forthwith. > Fully to understand and assimilate the symbol "a tall man," it is by no > means requisite to understand it to relate, or to profess to relate, to a > real Object. Its Interpretant, therefore, does not represent it as a > genuine > Index; so that the definition of the Dicisign does not apply to it. It is > impossible here fully to go into the examination of whether the analysis > given does justice to the distinction between propositions and arguments. > But it is easy to see that the proposition purports to intend to compel > its > Interpretant to refer to its real Object, that is, represents itself as an > Index, while the argument purports to intend not compulsion, but action by > means of comprehensible generals, that is, represents its character to be > specially symbolic. > > > > The above is the best analysis the author can, at present, make of the > Dicisign. > > > > > >
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