Lists,
Before we move on (next week) to Chapter 5 of NP, I'd like to draw attention
to one of the Peirce "rarities" found in Frederik's book, one which
clarifies the relations between habit-taking and consciousness, and does so
in connection with pragmatism.
This brief passage is from MS 318 (1907), which is partially published in
EP2 (398-433) under the title "Pragmatism"; but neither EP2 nor CP contains
this particular passage, which as far as I know has been previously
published only in NEM III/I, 493-4, which Frederik cites as his source (NP
p. 120). Here Peirce says that habit is
. by no means exclusively mental. Some plants take habits; and so do some
things purely inorganic. The observed laws of habit follow necessarily from
a definition of habit which takes no notice of consciousness. Thus the facts
that great numbers of individuals which die and are replaced by reproduction
is favourable to a marked prominence of habit, and that highly complex
organisms of which multitudes of parts exercise interchangeable functions
are so, follow from such a definition. Nevertheless, I am far from holding
consciousness to be an "epiphenomenon", though the doctrine that it is so
has aided the development of science. To my apprehension, the function of
consciousness is to render self-control possible and efficient. For
acccording to such analysis as I can make the true definition of
consciousness is connection with an internal world; and the first
impressions of sense are not conscious, but only their modified
reproductions in the internal world.
I do not deny that a concept, or general mental sign, may be a logical
interpretant; only, it cannot be the ultimate logical interpretant,
precisely because, being a sign, it has itself a logical interpretant. It
partakes somewhat of the nature of a verbal definition, and is very inferior
to the living definition that grows up in the habit. Consequently, the most
perfect account we can give of a concept will consist in a description of
the habit that it will produce; and how otherwise can a habit be described
than by a general statement of the kind of action it will give rise to under
described circumstances?
The pragmatistic character of that last paragraph should be obvious enough.
What may not be so obvious is the definition of consciousness as "connection
with an internal world." This is rather vague on the face of it, but I think
it offers the key to a concept of "consciousness" which harmonizes very well
with contemporary neuroscience - at least among those who, like Peirce, hold
that consciousness is functional and not an epiphenomenon - and with the von
Uexkull's Innenwelt/Umwelt distinction, which is widely applied in
biosemiotics. I won't say more about it just now, but I'm hoping that as the
seminar continues we'll be able to draw on these other disciplines to spell
out more clearly what "connection with an internal world" might mean in a
pragmatistic semiotics.
gary f.
} If one falls on the ground, one rises from the ground; there is no way to
rise apart from the ground. [Dogen, "Immo" (Cleary)] {
www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics
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