Edwina, it seems to me that for purposes of discussing Natural
Propositions,
we should use the Peircean definitions of "symbol", "argument" and
"Dicisign", because that's what Frederik is doing in NP. Peirce's
definitions can be found in EP2:272 ff. His definition of "symbol" in
Baldwin's Dictionary also applies here: "(1) A SIGN (q.v.) which is
constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and
understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and
without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection."
If you want other definitions that better suit your own purposes, you're
welcome to supply them, but we certainly don't need them for a discussion
of
NP.
gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 31-Oct-14 10:35 AM
To: [email protected]; Peirce list
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter
four
I agree with much of what Tyler is arguing. A few points and these are
about definitions.
1) I think we need a clear definition of 'symbol'. To me, it is a
Relation
(that between the Representamen and the Object, whether Dynamic or
Immediate) that is arbitrary, is consciously assigned by the species or
Representamen-Agent, is in the conscious control of the
species/Representamen-Agent; and thus, can be changed. As such an
unconnected sign, it must be assigned by a collective with the conscious
intentionality to so assign it. So, the collective will assign the sound
of
'cat' to an animal. Or assign the meaning of STOP to a red light. As
such,
I consider that the symbol is confined to the human species.
2) As for the definition of the term 'argument', I think that it doesn't
refer necessarily to the Sign of that term (Argument Symbolic Legisign)
but
to the syllogistic process of reasoning. All Peircean Signs are, as
triads,
also syllogisms. Therefore, all Peircean Signs operate as 'arguments'.
(lower case). That is, they have a minor premiss (the Object relation); a
Major Premiss (the Representamen) and a Conclusion (the Interpretant
relation).
3) What is the Dicisign? To my view, at the moment, it is a powerful
physical argument - an argument in the full semiosic or syllogistic
framework, where Mind is obviously at work (the Major Premiss) to
transform
one form of physical /biologicalexistentiality into another form of
physical/biological existentiality. What removes this interaction from
the
mechanical cause-effect interaction and puts it into a syllogistic
argument
(semiosis) is that insertion of 'thought' or Mind into the interaction.
There is no mechanical reason for the E. Coli to swim to sugar, but there
certainly is a mental reason. And yes, it would be deductive because of
the
necessary relation - within the 'mind' of the E. Coli morphology.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Tyler Bennett <mailto:[email protected]>
To: biosemiotics list <mailto:[email protected]> ; Peirce list
<mailto:[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 10:01 AM
Subject: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter four
Gary F, list,
Thank you for your detailed comments and I apologize for the gap in
communication.
Gary F. wrote: "You suggest that an "alternative solution" to the problem
you raise "would be to cede symbols to all instances of semiosis (or at
least to some non-humans)". Do you mean that at least some semiosis other
than human varieties should be regarded as symbolic? If so, I don't get
what
problem it's supposed to solve, or how it's relevant to the idea that
inference is implicit in all cognitive semiosis. This is part of the
Dicisign doctrine, and symbols are not essential to the functioning of
Dicisigns in the way that icons and indices are; so what difference does
it
make whether we "cede symbols" to instances of non-human semiosis?"
The problem has to do with associating the highest types of sign use to
all
instances of semiosis, as Frederik does with NP. When we do this, we lose
the ability to meaningfully class different types of sign use. I proposed
that either symbols should be reserved for higher sign types than at
least
the E. coli bacteria (Edwina's stated preference), or we should cleave to
the later Peirce where there are twenty types of legisign, in which case
there is plenty of room to both describe the symbol use of non-humans as
well as retain some sign types for the description of verbal language
(There
are plenty of scholars who believe the taxonomic application of sign
types
is an inappropriate use of Peirce. I am not one of them).
To clarify, when I speak of the taxonomic approach I think mainly of
Deacon's use in Symbolic Species of the icon-index-symbol trichotomy for
distinguishing verbal language semiosis from other kinds. As you know
this
approach is somewhat maligned in for example The Symbolic Species
Evolved,
where Frederik has an article that says the bare use of the object
dimension
(icon-index-symbol) is insufficient for this task (He does not say that
such
a classificatory approach is not possible. He only says Deacon's attempt
is
an oversimplification). I also think of Kalevi Kull's use of the object
dimension to classify vegetative animal and cultural forms of semiosis.
Dicisigns do indeed involve icons and indices in a more explicit way than
symbols, however the fact remains that Frederik associates symbols and
even
arguments with all instances of semiosis. For example here:
"Thus, the perceptual Dicisign of reading the active site on a
carbohydrate
molecule--a proto version of the proposition 'This is sugar'--is followed
by
the action Dicisign of swimming in that direction--to form an argument:
'If
sugar, swim in its direction. This is sugar. So, swim in its direction'.
That this forms a very primitive argument--and not merely a cause-effect
chain--can be induced from the fact that the E. coli may be fooled by
artificial sweetener whose molecules possess the same molecular surface
configuration as the active site in carbohydrates--but otherwise have a
rather different chemistry without the easily releasable covalent binding
energy of carbohydrates" (145-146)."
In the footnote there he reaffirms that this is a deductive argument. The
only distinction he offers between this and verbal language for example
is
that the E. coli behavior is a "very primitive" argument. This
distinction
is much like the distinction between proto and fully fledged
propositions.
I
asked Frederik at the Bulgaria IASS congress last month, "So, all forms
of
semiosis involve arguments?" And he said yes. This is no internal
contradiction to NP or dicisign doctrine, but it presents a serious
complication for any taxonomic use of Peirce's theory of signs. If any
sub-argument is merely the 'workings out' of a fully fledged argument,
these
workings out themselves are degenerate and supposedly not signs at all.
To
me this line of argument is a needless over complication of an otherwise
usable system.
Gary also wrote: "You argue that "NP already goes beyond the 1903
classification, even if not explicitly. It does so in 3.7 where Frederik
maintains that dicisigns have both immediate and dynamic objects." But I
don't see how that "goes beyond the 1903 classification", as NP merely
points out that the idea of the Dicisign having two objects is introduced
in
the 1903 Syllabus itself (EP2:276), which refers to them as "Primary" and
"Secondary" objects."
As a static taxonomy the table of ten signs commonly referred to as the
1903
classification does not make room for a sign to have more than one object
relation(as far as I understand it). When it comes to a taxonomy we need
a
static set of sign types that explicitly make room for all the dimensions
of
the sign. When I wrote that dicisign doctrine implies a post-1903 sign
typology, I was referring to the section where Frederik associates the
primary (index/subject) and secondary (icon/predicate) objects with the
dynamic and immediate objects (68). The way that the immediate and
dynamic
objects factor into the different types of signs is not worked out in the
1903 classification. It produces two of the ten trichotomies generally
associated with the 1908 classification. I take this reference to the
later
Peirce as an invitation to consider NP in the context of the 1908, 66
types
of sign in order to retain a taxonomic approach.
About the quote from Diagrammatology:
"...there is probably no upper bound to the complexity of symbol types
which
higher animals have access to as single signs," but
"To Peirce, explicit control is even paramount to reasoning proper --
which
is why animal reasoning despite many similarities to human reasoning only
rarely may qualify as proper reasoning." Diagrammatology
You are right, I did take it to mean higher animals not including humans.
Perhaps that is not what he meant there, however it does still seem clear
to
me that Frederik wants to maintain that all instances of semiosis entail
arguments, and that therefore there is no "upper bound" to symbol use in
non-human semiosis.
My position is simply that, if we want to use a static taxonomy of signs
of
however many types, it seems that there should be a set of signs that are
unique to human language use. Edwina Taborsky , Deacon, Kull, and others
seem to think this set is symbols in general. Dicisign doctrine clearly
contradicts this. I happen to think the book is brilliant, but I would
hope
to maintain a taxonomic approach. My thought is that the typology of 66
signs can both apply symbol use to non-humans while at the same time
retaining some types of sign to describe human language use. This would
also
allow us to clarify the difference between proto and fully fledged
propositions or, as he says it above, animal reasoning and "proper
reasoning".
That being said I definitely defer to your expertise regarding Peirce's
own
writings.
regards,
Tyler Bennett
