Edwina, I agree with Peirce that we think in signs.
Since I am now, at this very moment, thinking about "icon", "rheme" and "legisign" as components or aspects of the triadic sign, "rhematic iconic legisign", "icon", "rheme" and "legisign" are (must be) signs. It is that simple. Also, you have not yet answered my simple question: Since Peirce used "qualisign", "sinsign", "legisign" and dicisign" in the 3x3 table of his 9 types of signs, did Peirce make a mistake ? According to your "theory" of signs, none of these 9 types of signs should be called "signs" at all. If your answer is YES, I would conclude that your theory of sign (not Peirces') is wrong. If your answer is NO, then your theory of sign must be judged wrong. In either case your theory of signs seems to be wrong. Is this perhaps one reason that you have not been able to answer my simple question ? With all the best. Sung On Thu, Jan 15, 2015 at 7:49 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > I'll reply briefly - and that's it. > > Yes, I consider that Peirce is the only important scholar of signs and > semiosis. But when you, Sung, tell us that your analysis is based on Peirce > - and don't refer to these other unnamed semiosic scholars (apart from > Saussure) - then, I think we have every right to critique your misuse and > misunderstanding of Peirce. Furthermore, your claim that you use other > sources such as 'molecular sign processes in living cells' - has > absolutely nothing to do with your claim that your analysis is, > semiotically, based on Peirce. After all, there are on these lists, many > biologists, molecular biologists, bioengineers, physicists, chemists, AI > people etc, who are exploring Peircean semiosis within their fields. > > Your assertion that the definition of a sign as 'something that stands for > something else' may be ancient but it's not Peircean. And it's certainly > not common sense. Yet, you constantly inform us that your analysis is based > on Peirce. > > No, repeating, endlessly, that the nine 'tails, lines of identity, > correlates' are each, in themselves, 'signs' is incorrect. They are NOT > 'nine types of signs'. See Peirce's discussion in "Division of Signs' and > Division of Triadic Relations, 2.233-and on. Note the ff. where it > says 'the representamen in itself, in relation to its object, and as > interpreted'....which are the first, second and third correlates > respectively". These are NOT signs. A sign is a triad, and your 'elementary > signs' are not triads. Trying to justify your assertion as 'common sense' > is unscientific and irrational. [Note: Are you switching your terms and now > no longer using the term 'elementary signs' and instead call them 'aspects' > of a compound sign??? ] > > Remember: 1.541, "A Representamen is the subject of a triadic relation to > a second, called its Object, for a third, called its Interpretant"... > > Who the heck is calling these 'tails, lines of identity, correlates, > relations' (all of these are Peircean terms for the same thing)...as 'three > dyadic relations'? You, Sung, are the only person I know who calls them > 'dyads'. > > Your introduction of 'commutativity' has nothing to do with Peirce, for > his semiosis is, unlike the 'necessary' results of the commutative > triangle, open, flexible and adaptive. That's why there is both the Dynamic > Object (DO) AND the Immediate Object - which already means that the data > from the DO has been transformed within the ground of the Representamen. > And that's why there are THREE Interpretants (Immediate, Dynamic and > Final). And that's why the Representamen - and all the other nodes - have > three modalities. A commutative triangle doesn't have the flexible adaptive > and networking capacities of the Peircean Sign. > > No, I do NOT denote the 'tails, lines of identity, correlates, relations' > as signs (lower case). Never. I told you instead that Peirce, in his > writings, often referred to the above (tails, lines of identity, > correlates, relations) as such, but *he did not mean that term as a > semiosic Sign, which is always a triad and never, ever, singular. * > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> > *To:* biosemiotics <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee> ; PEIRCE-L > <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Thursday, January 15, 2015 6:40 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy - Meta and Index > > Edwina, lists, > > > Ew: 3) Your assertion that Peirce is 'not the only scholar of signs' > is yet another empty and specious argument, > > Sung: So am I right to assume then that you think Peirce is the only > important scholar of signs and hence reading him is all you need to > understand what a sign is ? > > EW: . . . because you, yourself, insist that your analysis is based on > Peirce. > > Sung: No. My analysis of signs is based not only on Peirce but also on > other sources as well that Peirce's semiotic writings do not deal with, > e.g., the molecular sign processes in living cells. > > EW: 4) First, let's get the quarks out of the way. You wrote: > You have missed the key point of the quark model of the Peircean sign > expressed in (011515-4) where no "hadrons" appears. Mesons are baryons > consisting of 2 quarks. That is why the quark model was constructed in > terms of baryons and not hadrons." > > Sung: Pardon me. Mesons are not baryons but hadrons. > > *EW: Now wait a minute. *You are now denying what you wrote on Jan 13: > > "According to the quark model of the Peircean sign (which may or many not > turn out to be valid), there are two kinds of signs -- "elementary" signs > (analogous to quarks) and "composite" signs (analogous to hadrons)." > > Sung: Sorry. I meant to say "baryons" not "hadrons". > > EW: 5) No, a sign is NOT, as you write:: "a sign is something that > stands for something else". > > Sung: Yes. The definition that "a sign is something that stands for > something else" is correct and has been known since the ancient times when > the word first appeared, long before Peirce, Saussure, or any other > semioticians. The important point is that this primitive definition of a > sign is all you need to realize that all of the 9 types of signs that > Peirce defined on the basis of his trichotomy of trichotomies are SIGNS. > If you still think they are not, I can only conclude that you do not > understand what a sign is. > > EW: That's Saussure and you constantly confuse the two (Saussure and > Peirce). That's a dyad and Peircean semiosis is triadic. > > Sung: No. That is not Saussure or nor Peirce. Rather that is a common > sense that Saussure and Peirce elaboratated on further in their respective > theories of signs, which has noting to do with recognizing "icon" as a sign > constituting an aspect of "rhematic iconic sinsign", for example. > > EW: "In consequence of every representamen being thus connected with > three things, the ground, the object and the interpretant" (2.229) > > "A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for > something in some respect or capacity....That sign which it creates I call > the *interpretant* of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its > *object*. It stand for that object, not in all respects, but in reference > to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the *ground* of the > representamen" (2.228). > > Sung: I am aware of these definitions which I too cited in my posts on > many occasions. > > EW: If you would, for example, read Peirce (On a new list of categories) > and in particular, sections 1.551 and on, you would see an extensive > analysis of these three parts of the Sign: object, ground and interpretant. > > And, 1.541, "A Representamen is the subject of a triadic relation to a > second, called its Object, for a third, called its Interpretant"... > > Sung: Peirce clearly means here that a triadic relation is ONE relation > connecting THREE relata, not a set of THREE dyadic relations (that do not > form a mathematical category). > > EW: And, of course, I've frequently referred you to the actual diagramme > of Peirce, in 1.347, where he writes about 'genuine triadic relations' that > can never be built of dyadic relations"...where he draws a 'graph with > three tails' or 'lines of identity'. > > Sung: To me, a genuine triadic relation can be built from three dyadic > relations, f, g and h, if and only if they obey the commutativity > condition, f x g = h. There are many triads of dyadic relations that do not > form mathematical categories and hence do not form a genuine triadic > relation because they do not obey the commutativity condition. > > EW: Also, as a minor note, Sung, your insistence that my three relations > or 'tails' or 'lines of identity' are dyads is getting tiresome. I've > explained many times that a dyad is only possible between entities in > existential Secondness, i.e., actual 'things', and these relations (tails, > lines of identity) are not interactions between two 'things' and thus, my > analysis is not dyadic. You totally ignore this. Why? Hmm. > > Oh, and I've also referred to you, Peirce's analysis of these 'tails', in, > eg, 'In respect to their *relations* to their dynamic objects, I divide > signs into Icons, Indices and Symbols" (8.335) and "In regard to its > * relation* to a signified interpretant, a sign is either a Rheme, a > Dicent, or an Argument" (my emphasis: 8.337). Got that? Peirce himself > uses the term 'relations'. > > Sung: As I indicated above, three dyadic relations CAN constitute a > genuine triadic relation as long as they satisfy the commutativity > condition of the category theory, i.e., as long as the three dyadic > relations, f, g, and h, satisfy the condition that f x g = h. > > EW: Now - none of these 'tails, lines of identity, relations' *are dyads*. > So, it would be scholarly of you, Sung, to stop claiming that they are. > > Why not ? They are relations between two entities that form an integral > whole by satisfying the commutativity condition. What is lacking in your > concept of a triad may be the concept of the commutativity condition or > that of a commutative triangle. > > EW: 6) The point (among others) which you are missing, Sung, is that not > only is the Peircean sign a triadic generative process - which your > commutative triangle is, as a linear construct, most definitely NOT - but > each part of it cannot exist 'per se'. > > Sung: First, my commutative triangle is not a linear construct as you say > but a non-linear one. Please look up the meaning of "linearity". > > Second, I agree that each part of a triadic sign cannot exists 'per se', > because it is an ASPECT of the triadic sign, just as the "blackness" cannot > exist apart from a black object. > > EW: The 'parts of the Peircean triad are unique parts of a whole SIGN - > There's no such thing as an 'elementary sign' for the parts exist as such > only within ROLES within the *whole triadic interaction*. > > Sung: We are talking about the same thing, only with different terms. It > may be that mine is a hypostatic abstraction of yours. > > EW: . . . Your quarks aren't doing that. And of course, your quarks > have no modality (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness). > > Sung: Again you are focusing on a wrong part of the quark model of the > Peircean sign, thereby missing the essential point of the analogy: > > "Three elementary signs are to a triadic sign what three quarks are to a > baryon." (011515-30) > > The validity of the quark model of the Peircesn sign is limited to the > analogy of (011515-30), and nothing else. > > EW: 7) On another point, you misunderstand that Peirce uses the term > 'sign' both to refer to each of the nodal sites in the > relations/tails/lines of identity/correlates - and to the whole triad. This > can be confusing but once you realize that the Sign (which I capitalize, as > does, sometimes, Peirce) to refer to the triad, is not the same as the > singular aspects of it (the object, ground, interpretant)...then..it is > clear. > > Sung: Now we seem to agree that there are two kinds of signs: What you > denote as a "Sign" is what I call "a composite sign", and what you denote > as a "sign" is what I call "an elementary sign': > > Sign = composite sign > > (011515-31) > > sign = elementary sign > > > EW: 8) Again, by all means, develop your own outline of semiosis, but > please don't tell us that it is Peircean, based on Peirce or..when you > clearly misuse and misunderstand that model. > > Sung: As I said before, my model of semiosis is not based only on Peirce > but also on many other sources. I do not, nor wish, to call my model of > semiosis Peircean, although I have tried to incorporate as many aspects of > Peircean semiotics into my model. I am hopeful that my model of semiosis, > which is largely based on molecular cell biology, sheds new light on the > 19th and the early 20th century semiotics of Peirce. > > With all the best. > > Sung > > > > > On Thu, Jan 15, 2015 at 8:49 AM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> I send posts here. I assume when nothing shows up in my inbox it is >> because there has been no response. Which is not a problem. I mention it >> merely to ascertain that this is why I do not see responses. This would be >> as it should be as this is a tiny stream next to what has been a veritable >> river of consideration and attention to serious matters. There is also the >> matter of veering from Peirce.I can only infer that some veers are >> respectable and others not so much though the not so much seem to receive >> the bulk of content in the main discussion. >> >> One thing that strikes me is the notion that a sign embraces an entire >> triad. To this I say fine. But for purposes of conscious consideration I >> find myself operating on the premise that a sign is a foundational reality >> that is in fact the trigger or first element in thought. This is followed >> by an index which may be seen as an opposition or at least a barrier or as >> I sometimes suggest a colander through which the original consideration >> (sign) passes, en route to becoming the third step in the process which I >> take to be an expression, an action, or both. In other words, index is >> something that is either spontaneously present as a barrier or which is the >> product of decision, a voluntary interposition of conditions which may >> modify and influence signs as they pass through the triadic process. >> >> It seems to me also that the tendency of the present discussion is to >> flirt with the possibility that there might be, to this thinking process, a >> practical result. I have always assumed so, or why have pragmatism in the >> first place? But apparently, to get the sign Peirce through the colander of >> philosophy, it may be apposite to marshal resources, what Kenneth Burke >> called a viaticum, for the journey to acts that manifest beauty and truth >> as unity itself. That I take to be the subject of the book under discussion. >> >> Now if any of this is puzzling, I am in receipt of a clarification made >> possible via the Socratic operation of Twitter. It leads to my confession >> that puzzling is what I do. I never admitted that before, because I never >> heard it in such candid terms. I would not dare to suggest what it means, >> though I have an idea whose key word is, as has been suggested, fallibility. >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net
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