Yogi, Gary, list(s), I'm not on the biosemiotics list, so I can't send my reply there. If someone wants to forward it for me, that would be nice; or if I should join that list-serv, please me know that I should do so and how.
On the subject of the pragmatic maxim, Yogi says: "A sign’s immediate meaning is the “sum of all the obvious logical implications of that sign,” while the dynamic meaning of the same sign is “inferable from the context of the utterance,” and the final meaning of that sign “compris[es] all implications of it in the state of knowledge” at its ideal limit” (p. 295). Stjernfelt is right to stress Peirce’s “important tension” between the given incomplete current regarding of a sign, and the sign understood from a place of perfect knowledge (p. 296)." In Frederik's text, it seems to me that he identifies the pragmatic maxim and a sign's immediate meaning as one and the same. He writes: "As a meaning theory, it may be compared to the mature Peirce's idea that the immediate meaning of a sign is the sum of all the obvious logical implications of that sign (to be distinguished from the dynamic meaning of the sign, inferable from the context of utterance, on the one hand, and the final meaning of the sign, on the other, comprising all implications of it in the state of knowledge in the limit)" (p.295). This suggests that Frederik does identify the two as one and the same. But in various places in his writings, Peirce distinguishes logical analysis from pragmatic analysis; logical analysis has to do with analyzing the implications of a definition. Also, I'm not so sure the immediate interpretant of a sign is its obvious logical implications; after all, Peirce did introduce the idea of the logical interpretant, not as an alternative to the immediate interpretant, but as associated with the final meaning of the sign. And besides that, I'm not so sure that the pragmatic maxim has to do with logical implications, or at least not all of them; I would suppose the pragmatic maxim limited to logical implications involving subjunctive conditionals or counter-factuals, given what Peirce says in his later writings. So I have some concerns with Frederik's depiction of the pragmatic maxim from the standpoint of semiotic. Overall the chapter seems fine to me in showing how the maxims inter-relate and work together. What I don't really understand is the preoccupation with the Enlightenment, and trying to talk about it as something that predates humanity; that strikes me as a bit bizarre. "Before man, this implies that the process of Enlightenment was already brewing in organic nature" (p.304). And earlier, a statement is made which I'm not sure how to make sense of: "The growth of symbols, then, is the Enlightenment process of self-evolving semiotic systems approaching reality in the limit" (p.297). Why is this an Enlightenment process? Doesn't this seem to be stretching what was a particular historical period in Western history into a cosmic process? Why is this necessary to do? -- Franklin On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 10:10 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > List, > > I'm certain Yogi meant to send this post to peirce-l as well as to the > biosemiotics list. > > Best, > > Gary > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: yogi hendlin <hend...@philsem.uni-kiel.de> > Date: Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 6:04 PM > Subject: [biosemiotics:8132] Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 > Strategies of Research: Peirces Enlightenment Maxims > To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > > > Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 “Strategies of Research: Peirce’s > Enlightenment Maxims” > > > > Dear List, returning to the final part of Natural Propositions, we can > finish the discussion of the book. In Stjernfelt’s closing chapters, he > assembles what he calls Peirce’s three Enlightenment maxims. > > According to “The Pragmatic Maxim,” which states that “all sorts of > metaphysical ideals which do not have any ‘practical bearings’ or ‘effects’ > (1878), any ensuing ‘imperative practical maxims’ (1903), are null and > void” (p. 295). For biosemiotics, this puts hypostatic abstraction in an > interesting position of only being “real” insofar as such abstractions make > “marks on bodies” in the world (to take Karen Barad’s (2007) quote of Niels > Bohr as the reference point of Bateson’s “differences that make a > difference”). This concretization of the ideational creation of hypostatic > abstraction means that such abstractions are only graspable to the extent > they are translated into something in the world observable to and having > effects on others. A sign’s *immediate* meaning is the “sum of all the > obvious logical implications of that sign,” while the *dynamic* meaning > of the same sign is “inferable from the context of the utterance,” and the > *final* meaning of that sign “compris[es] all implications of it in the > state of knowledge” at its ideal limit” (p. 295). Stjernfelt is right to > stress Peirce’s “important tension” between the given incomplete current > regarding of a sign, and the sign understood from a place of perfect > knowledge (p. 296). Pragmaticism, however, requires not eliding this > tension and alleging perfect knowledge (metaphysics) when all one has is > incomplete knowledge. > > Although Stjernfelt accepts the scientific optimism of Peirce, Tejera > (1996) points out that this optimism is far from a foregone conclusion, and > may in fact be in part a misreading of Peirce, at least as far as the > discourse ethicists Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas are concerned. > > According to Peirce’s second maxim, “Symbols Grow,” Stjernfelt can be seen > as extending the commentaries of Heidegger regarding the world, > Wittgenstein vis-à-vis language games, and Habermas in terms of the > lifeworld. What I mean is that this maxim acknowledges that there is a > world of signs that all beings are born into, and that in becoming, they > too become signs that will influence others in ways that persist after they > are gone. This evolution of signs is, according to Hoffmeyer (2008) > (following Sebeok), at least, coextensive with the evolution of > life. Hence, this biosemiotic extension from the creative way in which > signs disclose themselves dynamically in relation to their objects and > interpretants brings us to a more relational, less serial, semiotics. > > Building on the notion that “indicatives are concealed conditional > imperatives” (p. 296), the dynamic movement of signs links the advent of > signs with the advent of thought (“as soon as you have signs giving rise to > other signs, however simple, you have thought” p. 297). But the dynamism of > thought/signs transcends the agental approach of willful subject/passive > object, and instead, signs themselves become part of the natural selection > process of the survival of the fittest signs, and the evolution of signs > into highly diverse and differentiated interacting (and growing) > manifestations. Despite the diversity of thought and signs, the ideal state > for Peirce then acts as an “attractor” that shepherds signs and though to > certain ends despite path dependency (p.299). This flow towards > perfectionist ends or teleologies, however, is not entirely automatic, and > indeed can be thwarted by pernicious prejudices (such as dualisms of all > sorts, see Plumwood 2002), or otherwise obstructed (at least for certain > periods of time) by human impertinence. (I must admit, this Peirce sounds > very much like a Kantian notion of not blocking Reason, as if Reason had > but one telos, however; and I’m not sure if Peirce was so a Kantian > perfectionist as he is here made to sound). > > The third maxim, “Do Not Block the Way of Inquiry,” shows up as a > portfolio of eliding: (1) overconfidence in the supremacy of one’s models > (i.e. Non-Euclidean geometries exist and function just as elegantly (and > sometimes more so) as Euclid’s 2,000 monopoly on the subject); (2) the > mystic’s “it’s all a mystery” conclusions that quell an otherwise > developable curiosity (the classic philosophical source of inquiry is > wonder, *thaumadzein*; but one must not stop with mouth agape, rather one > must active engage in doing one’s best to figure out those things one > wonders about); (3) calls of the “end of science” (or, “the end of > history”) where one dusts one’s hands and declares the work of inquiry > over, and; (4) the conceit of having achieved perfect knowledge, which for > Peirce always remains asymptotal, no matter how far along we believe we are. > > Summing up Peirce’s Enlightenment maxims, Stjernfelt interprets them to be: > > “do not assume absolute starting points, do not accept separated > ontological realms, do not accept fields definitely closed to any > investigation, never take questions to be completely settled, do not > believe in absolute doubt, do not refuse the existence of universals, do > not believe in the wholesale reduction of one field to another, do not > accept the erroneous hypostatization of limit cases into independent > objects, prefer bundles of inferences over single counterexamples” (303). > > Interestingly, Stjernfelt confronts us with the remark, “Before man, this > implies that the process of Enlightenment was already brewing in organic > nature… and continues indefinitely” (304). Ultimately, it is the > “increasing self-control of reasoners” that escorts the realization of > reason (in a sort of Hegelian way?) (305). > > Just as Peirce’s Enlightenment notions may be better characterized as > radical than moderate, Stjernfelt’s rereading of Peirce is revolutionary > not least of all because of the potential repercussions it has on the many > philosophers take Peirce’s work to be central to their own. Philosophers on > the cusp of overcoming symbolocentrism, such as Jordan Zatlev and Peter > Gärtenfors have much to benefit from this re-analysis. > > Against Deacon’s hierarchical model of signs, separating iconic and > indexical “forms” of signs from the putatively uniquely human realm of > symbolic communication, Stjernfelt’s reading of Peircean semiotics allows > us to eschew such theoretically and biologically unhelpful and blinkered > obsessions with affixing a *differencia specifica *between humans and > nonhuman life. Philosophers such as Habermas that use certain > anthropocentric versions of Peirce’s semiotics to bolster their own > projects on such speciesist bases must rethink some of the core tenets of > their theory based on propositionality (qua diagrams, as one of several > possible examples) rather than language, since it is propositionality (and > signs that act as (proto-)arguments) rather than language per se that does > the heavy semiotic lifting. The sociality of organisms beyond just human > ones depend on shared symbolic as well as iconic and indexical > communication in ways that are inseparable. Stjernfelt gives us a middle > path between exaggerating the symbolicity of nonhuman capabilities and > denying it altogether. > > > > Barad, Karen. 2007. *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and > the Entangelement of Matter and Meaning*. Durham: Duke University Press. > > Plumwood, Val. 2002. *Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of > Reason*. Environmental Philosophies Series. London and New York: > Routledge. > > Tejera, Victorino. 1996. “Has Habermas Understood Peirce?” *Transactions > of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 32 (1): 107–25. > > > > > *Yogi Hale Hendlin* > Philosophie und Ethik der Umwelt > Philosophisches Seminar > Christian Albrechts Universität zu Kiel > Leibnizstr. 6 > 24118 Kiel, Germany > > Tel. +49 431 880 2815 > hend...@philsem.uni-kiel.de > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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