Sung,

You specifically asked whether Peirce addresses the issue of belief. The
interesting answer, already given before, is YES! However, just as any
thinker, his use of the term differs in crucial ways from our everyday use
of the term. To understand how Peirce approaches the issue and defines the
concept, it's best to go straight to the source. Luckily, CSP's very short
text "The fixation of belief"
<http://www.bocc.ubi.pt/pag/peirce-charles-fixation-belief.pdf> is lucid,
with meanings that are accessible without years of specialist training.

Give yourself 45 minutes to read through its 12 pages carefully, noticing
how dependent "belief" is on the concept of "doubt". Also note how his
notion of belief bears on ideas about knowledge and fact. If you are
anything like the philosophical neophytes who read this last week at the
community college I teach at, you will find that this text opens up
interesting avenues to explore. That's the whole point, isn't it?

Mara Woods

On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 5:32 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:

> Ben,
>
> (1) I think we should distinguish two types of researchers who are
> interested in Peircean scholarship -- (i) 'Peircean experts' such as
> yourself who by necessity MUST read and study the enormous amount of
> Peirce's writings extending over decades, and (ii) 'non-Peircean experts'
> like myself who DO NOT HAVE TO READ much Peirce but CAN still USE Peirce's
> work if some of his philosophical conclusions happen to coincide with their
> own conclusions reached independently of Peirce --  a case of consilience:
>
> "In science and history, consilience (also convergence of evidence or
> concordance of evidence) refers to the principle that evidence from
> independent, unrelated sources can "converge" to strong conclusions."
>
> [
> https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=consilience]
> :
>
> (2) My impression is that for most, if not all, of the Peircean experts on
> these lists seem to live in a Peirce-centered universe, but for me, a
> natural scientist and not a Peircean philosopher, Peirce occupies only a
> small part of my intellectual space. In other words, for me, there are more
> to the Universe than the Peircean philosophy.
>
> (3) Unlike you, I disliked the Sokal prank from the beginning, mainly
> because of the deceitful tactics he employed to get his likely 'immature'
> philosophical views on Science Wars published.   You asked whether I am "a
> prank played on us by Alan Sokal http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sokal_affair 
> (whom
> I rather admire)?"  I hope the answer to this question is clear in my email
> to Jon that I wrote today in response to his "sang-froid" advise that
> inspired the formulation of a possible relation between "belief" and
> "semiosis" proposed in Figure 1 in that email.  Do you detect any sign
> of deceitfulness on my part in this figure ?   Rutgers phenomenologist, B.
> Wilshire, once told me that humans are the only animals that are smart
> enough to fool themselves. If so, perhaps I am fooling myself by believing
> that Figure 1 is free of a prank.
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 10:35 PM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>  Sung,
>>
>> I rather admire Jon's sang-froid patience with you, advising you to read
>> "The Fixation of Ideas", in order to learn about some of the things that
>> Peirce said about BELIEF.  But I don't feel like emulating Jon right now.
>>
>> You've been sending comments to PEIRCE-L  for some time now, but
>> evidently you still have read very little of Peirce and are unwilling to
>> buy either paper or electronic copy of The Essential Peirce
>> http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/advanced_search_result.php?keywords=Peirce
>> . I don't know why you won't do this, it's about as expensive as a couple
>> of drinks and a bad movie, not far, far beyond the purchasing ability of
>> the average professor.
>>
>> Not only are there numerous articles by Peirce that you can read free
>> online at Arisbe
>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/bycsp.htm , but also you
>> are located in the U.S.A., which means that you can read all of Google
>> Books' editions of Peirce's articles, pretty much all the philosophical
>> articles published under Peirce's own name during his life
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce_bibliography#Books_authored_or_edited_by_Peirce.2C_published_in_his_lifetime
>> , keep scrolling down and you'll find links to very many articles.
>>
>> Or are you a prank played on us by Alan Sokal
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sokal_affair (whom I rather admire)?
>>
>> Best, Ben
>>
>>  Sung, List,
>>
>>  I have an early flight in the morning so just two notes:
>>
>>  A precursor of Peirce's pragmatic maxim is Alexander Bain's definition
>> of belief as that upon which a person is prepared to act.
>>
>>  Also see Peirce's essay, “The Fixation of Belief”:
>>
>>  http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/fixation/fx-frame.htm
>>
>>  I'm sure other listers can supply further detail.
>>
>>  Regards,
>>
>>  Jon
>>
>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
>>
>> On Mar 31, 2015, at 8:00 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>>
>> On 3/31/2015 9:00 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>>  Jon,
>>  you wrote:
>>
>>  "Whether we view the Big Bang as a singular haecceity, a spontaneous
>> occurrence, or simply inexplicable, our current beliefs about the origin of
>> the universe have arisen through applications of the inquiry process
>> progressing through the millennia from primitive to fully scientific forms.
>> Tho
>> se beliefs may change tomorrow afternoon or a hundred years from now as
>> new evidence pops up or accumulates over time but if and when they do it
>> will be through further applications of the same tradition of inquiry."
>>  What is interesting to me is that you mentioned "belief" twice in this
>> statement.  Did Peirce ever brought up "belief" in his discussions on
>> semiosis or semiotics ?  I ask this question because in the irreducible
>> triadic diagram I use to represent the Peircean sign or semiosis, there is
>> a room for the involvement of "belief" (I believe), as indicated below (see
>> Step denoted as -h, the reverse of Step h):
>>                                  f                                      g
>>             Object ------------------------    Sign
>> ------------------   Interpretant
>>  (Origin of the Universe)        (Osbervable Universe)         (Big Bang
>> theory)
>>
>> |
>> ^
>>
>> |
>> |
>>                 |____________________________________________|
>>                                                     h
>>  Figure 1.  Is "believing" an intrinsic part/component of semiosis ?
>>                 f = natural process/feeling/'emotion' (e.g., cosmogenesis)
>>                 g = mental process/'cognition' (leading to, e.g., the Big
>> Bang theory)
>>                 h = information flow (enabling humans to know reality)
>>                -h = believing or 'credition'
>>  All the best.
>>  Sung
>>  On Tue, Mar 31, 2015 at 8:00 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>
> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
> Rutgers University
> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
> 732-445-4701
>
> www.conformon.net
>
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