Sorry I don’t think I posted this improperly: One added comment – all thinking has an irreducible aspect of experimental inquiry. If real thought was formally logical and the universe (including us) was mechanical then inquiry (and learning) make no sense and the reality could not evolve.
On Apr 22, 2015, at 7:26 PM, Howard Pattee <hpat...@roadrunner.com <mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com>> wrote: HP: I wonder what motivated Peirce to spend so much effort on logic when he knew that the path of inquiry is not logical? Howard – The ‘conflict’ between the interpretation of inquiry as (1) logical and (2) revolutionary played out in the later 20th century philosophy of science. The logical – logico-mathematical – position is associated with the Logical Positivists (aka Vienna Circle). Galileo had suggested that the ‘language of the universe' is mathematical (geometrical). Assuming the completeness and consistency of mathematics – it ‘stands to reason’ that inquiry into understanding how the universe works should be systematically logico-mathematical. (Kurt Goedel, of course undermined this assumption about mathematics (and logic; see Hofstader’s book, Goedel Escher and Bach).) Similarly if you assume that the universe is completely and consistently mechanical (Newtonian cause-effect clockwork) then 'it stands to reason’ that inquiry into understanding how the universe works should be mechanical. Even Hawking suggested in his Brief History of Time that we would eventually be able to turn inquiry over to mechanical computers. (He told me later that he was embarrassed for having made such a comment.) The rebels – aside from Peirce, Dewey et al. – arose and coalesced with T.S. Kuhn’s 1962 book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn argued that advances in understanding arose in conceptually discontinuous, logic-mathematically discontinuous ways. The advances were in this sense ‘revolutionary’. Peirce’s explorations of abduction were, methinks, an earlier recognition of the same theme that Kuhn and the other rebels tried to develop (viz. Feyerabend, Lakatos, Popper et al.). One easy way to get hold of the problem – and to understand what Peirce was after – is to consider the ‘mechanism’ of invention or innovation. Plausibly these advances – innovations – are not predictable. (Darwin suggests that innovations are ‘random mutations’.) The question of how to encourage innovation in modern society has birthed a whole industry of speculation. C. Wes Churchman, a student of a student of Dewey’s, wrote a marvelous book, The Design of Inquiring Systems. Peirce followers might interpret Churchman as asking how to design a system that fosters abduction – conceptually revolutionary advances. Terry P.S. The ‘problem of induction’ (logico-mathematical, complete/consistent reasoning) arises in part because ‘scientific knowledge’ is supposed to be repeatable over changes in time and location; Galileo’s Pisa experiment is repeatable to Oregon today. This seems to force the conclusion that the overall order governing the universe must be the same everywhere and always – time-space invariant. That of course leads us back into the logic-mathematical mechanistic – and fully deterministic – quagmire. Such a universe is static (steady state) and does not ‘evolve’ in a qualitative sense – in a non-logical, non-mechanical (revolutionary) manner. Peirce (somewhere) points out that the ‘missing major premise’ that would justify the inductive inference, that would make induction deductive is ‘The Uniformity of Nature’. In other words, induction is fully justified (and the appropriate ’scientific method') if the universe is, or at least behaves, uniformly the same everywhere and always – time-space invariant. This would entail that the universe is a clockwork-like steady state system that does not evolve. Peirce’s abduction is, methinks, closely associated with his evolutionary philosophy – likewise all the pragmatists. P.P.S. Arguably ‘evolution’ – by its very nature – is logic-mathematically discontinuous. This struggle (relevant to Peirce’s abduction) continues: Lee Smolin and Roberto Unger have made a couple of attempts to meld modern physics and pragmatism (see their recent, The Singular Universe). The only really interesting part of the tomb is the chapter on where they disagree. Smolin can’t let go of the idea that even if the laws evolves, there must be a time-space invariant 9mechanical) law governing the evolution of the laws. Unger, a good pragmatist – and in the spirit of Peirce’s abduction – points out that there is not, cannot be, such a logic-mathematical mechanism. Anyway… Peirce suggested that these current laws/regularities might be better understand as like ‘habits of the evolving mind/structure of the universe’ – enabling further inquiry and development. Terry Bristol, President <http://www.isepp.org> <http://www.isepp.org/> Institute for Science, Engineering and Public Policy 3941 SE Hawthorne Blvd Portland OR 97214 503-819-8365 “Science would be ruined if it were to withdraw entirely into narrowly defined specialties. The rare scholars who are wanderers-by-choice are essential to the intellectual welfare of the settled disciplines.” Benoit Mandelbrot On Apr 23, 2015, at 6:24 AM, Howard Pattee <hpat...@roadrunner.com> wrote: At 12:57 AM 4/23/2015, Joseph Brenner wrote: > Peirce's 'lumping' of the alleged opposites of induction and abduction is, > rather the recognition that the opposition between them is not so absolute, > and indeed they have 'a common feature'. Further, if the criterion for > judgement is only the effectiveness of the arguments they yield, this is not > the difference between yes and no. This is my answer to Howard's question. Thank you, Joseph, for a very pragmatic answer with which I agree. I still prefer to think of induction and abduction as a case of complementarity -- two logically incompatible views, both irreducible one to the other, but both necessary in the search for truth.. Howard ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . Terry Bristol, President <http://www.isepp.org> <http://www.isepp.org/> Institute for Science, Engineering and Public Policy 3941 SE Hawthorne Blvd Portland OR 97214 503-819-8365 “Science would be ruined if it were to withdraw entirely into narrowly defined specialties. The rare scholars who are wanderers-by-choice are essential to the intellectual welfare of the settled disciplines.” Benoit Mandelbrot
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