Frederik, you wrote, [So here I agree with Howard (and I guess P would do so as well) that the right direction is to generalize the observer-phenomenon distinction so as to cover all biological organisms.]
I agree about the right direction, but I don’t see that Howard does, because he defines “phenomenon” not as the thing observed, or the object of attention, but as the result of the observation. In Howard’s words, “A phenomenon is information resulting from an individual subject’s detection of a physical interaction.” And this result is entirely “subjective,” as if you could have a subject of experience without an object, or a sign with an immediate object but no dynamic object, or an interpretant sign unrelated to the object of the sign it interprets. For logical purposes, the subject/object distinction is a poor substitute for the sign/object/interpretant triad, and tends to obscure the object/thing distinction, which is crucial for the logic of science. But no time to go into that now. The subject/object distinction is, as Howard says, epistemic, or epistemological, i.e. theoretical. Howard’s “classical” version of phenomenology is based on this theory. Peirce’s phenomenology, on the other hand, eschews theoretical distinctions in favor of direct observation of the phenomenon, which in his view (and mine) should precede epistemological theorizing, and even semiotic theorizing. [[ I will so far follow Hegel as to call this science Phenomenology although I will not restrict it to the observation and analysis of experience but extend it to describing all the features that are common to whatever is experienced or might conceivably be experienced or become an object of study in any way direct or indirect. ]] -- Peirce, EP 2.143 Gary f. From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk] Sent: May 2, 2015 4:56 AM To: Howard Pattee Cc: Gary Fuhrman; <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>; Peirce-L 1 Subject: [biosemiotics:8567] Re: Natural Dear Howard, lists - I certainly do not think Howard's considerations in this sub-thread are irrelevant to the book. When I have not interfered it is because in this matter I largely agree with Howard (until now, that is!). At 09:21 AM 5/1/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote: I've got my own book to finish, so I for one need to get off this detour. My apologies for taking it in the first place. I accept your apology. It may be a detour from your book, but I don't think that my discussion of the subject-object distinction is a "detour" from Frederik's book. Like John Bell ( <http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/bell/Against_Measurement.pdf> Against Measurement) Frederik believes that the "received subject-object dichotomies" are a "quagmire" (p' 307). A common issue in the book (e.g., p. 6 and p. 307) is that Peircean signs and semiotics can avoid the subject-object distinction. Certainly - he avoids the subject-object distinction coming out of the German idealist tradition where "subject" is confused with "human being", with "consciousness" and much more. Peirce sometimes explicitly says that his use of the term "subject" is to address a part of propositions (that is, as a correlate to "predicate"). But, of course, that is only about how to use certain terms. The nature of the subject-object distinction should be as important to phenomenologists as it is for physicists. In physics, the subject-object distinction is at the foundation of empiricism. This distinction must be made clearly, "if the method is not to proceed vacuously, i.e., if a comparison with experiment is to be possible" [von Neumann]. . Does Peirce claim explicitly that his semiotics and signs eliminate the epistemic subject-object distinction? Or is this only an interpretation by some of his followers? All I have read is Peirce's comment that pretty well matches Hertz's epistemology that clearly distinguishes subject and object. As mentioned, P rarely if ever uses those terms about it. But that does not, of course, imply that related concepts are absent. P rather speaks about "observer", "scientist", "mind" etc. - and his generalized conception of "mind" grants that it can not be identified with conscious human persons only (cf. the famous "sob to Cerberus") So here I agree with Howard (and I guess P would do so as well) that the right direction is to generalize the observer-phenomenon distinction so as to cover all biological organisms. Best F
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