Dear Howard, iists - Did I not already answer this? (below) I do not think Peircean semiotics avoids that question. I think it avoids the subject-object terminology in order not to import anthropocentric conceptions from German idealism.
Best F Den 04/05/2015 kl. 15.46 skrev Howard Pattee <hpat...@roadrunner.com<mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com>> : I would still like some comment on my original question to Frederik (re p. 306 in NP ): How do the Peircean signs and triads avoid facing the subject-object relation (which Peirce himself called "obscure and mysterious")? ------------------------------------------------------------ Dear Howard, lists - I certainly do not think Howard's considerations in this sub-thread are irrelevant to the book. When I have not interfered it is because in this matter I largely agree with Howard (until now, that is!). At 09:21 AM 5/1/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote: I've got my own book to finish, so I for one need to get off this detour. My apologies for taking it in the first place. I accept your apology. It may be a detour from your book, but I don't think that my discussion of the subject-object distinction is a "detour" from Frederik's book. Like John Bell ( Against Measurement<http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/bell/Against_Measurement.pdf>) Frederik believes that the "received subject-object dichotomies" are a "quagmire" (p' 307). A common issue in the book (e.g., p. 6 and p. 307) is that Peircean signs and semiotics can avoid the subject-object distinction. Certainly - he avoids the subject-object distinction coming out of the German idealist tradition where "subject" is confused with "human being", with "consciousness" and much more. Peirce sometimes explicitly says that his use of the term "subject" is to address a part of propositions (that is, as a correlate to "predicate"). But, of course, that is only about how to use certain terms. The nature of the subject-object distinction should be as important to phenomenologists as it is for physicists. In physics, the subject-object distinction is at the foundation of empiricism. This distinction must be made clearly, "if the method is not to proceed vacuously, i.e., if a comparison with experiment is to be possible" [von Neumann]. . Does Peirce claim explicitly that his semiotics and signs eliminate the epistemic subject-object distinction? Or is this only an interpretation by some of his followers? All I have read is Peirce's comment that pretty well matches Hertz's epistemology that clearly distinguishes subject and object. As mentioned, P rarely if ever uses those terms about it. But that does not, of course, imply that related concepts are absent. P rather speaks about "observer", "scientist", "mind" etc. - and his generalized conception of "mind" grants that it can not be identified with conscious human persons only (cf. the famous "sob to Cerberus") So here I agree with Howard (and I guess P would do so as well) that the right direction is to generalize the observer-phenomenon distinction so as to cover all biological organisms. Best F
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