Ben, List: Although we discussed aspects of this question before, fresh citations may shed a different hue on the meaning of the CSP's usage in various contexts. Frankly, I think that your reading of the meaning of the term "symbol" is to rigid.
First, CSP's trichotomy separates the concept of a sign (qualisign, sinsign and legisign) sharply and distinctly from the concept of symbol (and its association of symbol, index and icon) as the identities associated with and related to the first row terms. If my recall is correct he asserts that the terms (icon, index and symbol) contains parts of one another. (This is consistent with chemical units where all three are used in representation and all three are representations are products of the human mind from analysis of data and historical precedence. In this sense, the formulations of arguments (rhema, dicisign, arguments, that is logically meaningful terms) necessary draws on the immediacy of (icon, index, symbol) meanings to formulate the arguments, general or not. In Natural Propositions, FS cites the book of Mark Greaves, the Philosophical Status of Diagrams, (from the Stanford group). This book compares CSP's logical diagrams with various other forms - Aristotle, the Square, Venn, and so forth. This book is an historical perspective that compares logics and diagrams. An extra-ordinary book to be sure! Are symbols used in diagrams? Are symbols used in graphs? Are symbols used in calculations? CSP writes wrt 'beta' graphs, "It reasonings generally turn upon the properties of individual objects to one another." 4.510-4.511, (Greaves, p. 167 ) When looking at the trichotomy as a whole, I believe that you are seeking to outlaw the intertwining and interlacing of meanings of terms, under the guise of "independence". For example, > Nevertheless, a symbol that incorporates an index (supplied by one's mind or > more physically) makes a sign that can represent an individual action as an > instance of a practice, a form of conduct, a norm, a general. > makes no sense to me. The atomic symbols incorporate indices (physically measurable attributes. And they are NOT generals. > More generally speaking, to the extent that an individual is an instance of a > general, it is the individual that represents the general, not vice versa, > Peirce's idea here being that generals, norms, etc., govern, more-or-less > determine, individuals, not vice versa (or not significantly vice versa); and > objects influence, more-or-less determine, signs to represent them, not vice > versa, so the individuals take the sign role, the generals the object role, > in such cases. > Again, I find this gloss to be meaningless. In the natural sciences, a species is a species is a species. The concept of a individual (species) is fundamental to the logic of biology and medicine as well as chemistry. It is necessary for logic. The sentence seems to me to be an ad hoc mixture of concepts of set theory, mathematical independence, and shapeless philosophical usages. In the pragmatic world, a symbol may represent you as your name, Ben, or a collection (your family). Grammatically, this is merely a case of single or plural with respect individuals. What philosophical point is gained by invoking this sort of sentence? For closure, I return to my opening remark, your gloss here is to rigid for my simple mind. Cheers Jerry On Jul 23, 2015, at 11:52 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > Hi, Jerry, > > You're welcome again. Now, in Peirce's view, symbols not only are generals > but also do not, of themselves, symbolize anything but generals, so that > excludes individual actions from being symbolized. Nevertheless, a symbol > that incorporates an index (supplied by one's mind or more physically) makes > a sign that can represent an individual action as an instance of a practice, > a form of conduct, a norm, a general. More generally speaking, to the extent > that an individual is an instance of a general, it is the individual that > represents the general, not vice versa, Peirce's idea here being that > generals, norms, etc., govern, more-or-less determine, individuals, not vice > versa (or not significantly vice versa); and objects influence, more-or-less > determine, signs to represent them, not vice versa, so the individuals take > the sign role, the generals the object role, in such cases. (I give an > example in an appendix to this message.) A symbol is itself individually > instanced, in Peirce's system, not by a concrete individual symbol, which > doesn't exist in Peirce's system, but instead by a kind of indexical sinsign > that points to one's experience of the symbolized object. > > But is the question you're asking something more like: Are there unconscious, > instinctual, merely animal-level symbols? In Peirce's system, they're > certainly allowed, since a symbol is a sign that represents by norm or > disposition of interpretation regardless of (non-)resemblance or dynamical > (non-)connection to its object. Such a norm or disposition could be > instinctual. There are places (I forget where off-hand) Peirce says that not > all symbols are artificial (I mean in the sense that words are), some are > natural in some sense. Unfortunately I don't remember those discussions well. > Best, Ben > Appendix: So, let's say you have an accurate computer-program model of a > storm. Indices help make the program part of a representation of the storm; > but without the indices, the program is a general diagram, and the actual > storm an individual diagram, of the same object, a mathematical structure. > (It would be an impossibly lucky program, to have been made without indexical > connection to the actual storm yet mirror the storm so well that indices > merely need to be added to make the result able to represent the storm to an > interpretant.) > > On 7/23/2015 11:38 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: > >> Thanks again, Ben. >> (Where would this list serve be without you?) >> >> After reading this again, it became obvious to me (I am a slow learner) that >> the underlying issue here is the origin of symbolization with respect to >> biological / human actions. >> >> Ben, do you suppose that instinctual actions (such as those that are >> directly comparable to animal behavior, such as fight or flight, or >> feeding,) are not symbolized? The quasi-hypotheses being merely mental >> patterns of spontaneous neuronal assemblies that manifest the material >> reality by activating communication toward the ecosystem through internal >> electrical musculatures? >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> On Jul 23, 2015, at 10:16 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: >> >>> Hi, Jerry, you're welcome. Yes, some of the pages contain few words. If >>> something looks wrong, you can check it against the manuscript online at >>> http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL.HOUGH:12486086 (also linked at my >>> transcription >>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm ) and >>> please do let me know if something's missing. I don't think I missed >>> anything but sometimes it takes one a few days to see an error, because, I >>> guess, of slowness of change of frame of mind. >>> >>> MS 831 is undated but one can see that it must have been written after the >>> publication of _Studies in Logic_ (1883) because Peirce mentions its >>> publication. >>> >>> Another way maybe to narrow the date down: In MS 831, Peirce uses the >>> words "inference" and "reasoning" to mean pretty much the same thing, and >>> uses "quasi-inference" to mean instinctive or otherwise automatic >>> inference. There comes a time when he uses "reasoning" to mean "conscious, >>> deliberate inference," thus widening the sense of "inference" to encompass >>> instinctive inference (quasi-inference in MS 831). I'm not sure how >>> consistent he was about that in later years, but assembling the dates of >>> later quotes on reasoning and inference might help suggest a more specific >>> time period during which he wrote MS 831. >>> >>> Best, Ben >>> >>> On 7/23/2015 10:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: >>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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