>”That said the type of question of being that Heidegger does seems largely >absent in Peirce.”
I do not disagree. And after glancing quickly through Joseph’s linked article, I take the point being made. However, people have a limited time on this earth, and it would be interesting to see the narrative evolve were it possible to bring key thinkers together. In my 2001 Semiotica article, I referenced Peirce’s observation “the man is the thought” to make my point “the culture is the thought”. There is no reason why, given enough time, Peirce would not have come to appreciate the importance of phenomenology au Heidegger. Ultimately we are all talking about the same thing (might I suggest – knowing how to be), and the fact that some people are bringing different lenses to the conversation does not mean that they are necessarily wrong to do so. Framed in the context of knowing how to be, might that not ultimately be what both pragmatism and phenomenology distill to? Phenomenology (Heidegger) concerns itself with being, and pragmatism concerns itself with establishing the things that matter… I suggest that there necessarily exists a common point of intersection between them. Or to put it another way… There is much more to pragmatism than simply exercising mind-body predispositions to establish the things that matter. Humans in culture observe what others are doing in order to fast-track the learning process, and it is not trivial or incidental. We are not talking just “memes”… think of our accents when we speak. Imitation au Dawkinsian memetics is simplistic, but imitation in the context of pragmatism and knowing how to be plays a very important role. Why would Peirce, given enough time on this earth, not come to a similar understanding? I mean, once we go down this path, other possibilities with important and practical consequences enter into the narrative… for example, gender roles within the context of culture. And as per the point that I’ve made in other conversations… imitation is integral to overcoming entropy. Knowing how to be brings physics and philosophy together into a shared narrative. From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] Sent: Friday, 3 June 2016 4:46 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [Sadhu Sanga] New Experiences On Jun 2, 2016, at 5:26 AM, Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au> wrote: To cut a long story short… it all revolves around knowing how to be. To those familiar with Heidegger, Dasein is the closest analogy to what I have in mind. For those familiar with CS Peirce, pragmatism relates. Yes, Heidegger’s phenomenology engages with a lot of background practices and other types of things rather than just what normally goes under consciousness. In that regard his phenomenology in some ways is much more like the role experience plays in Peirce. People, like the original list originator Joe Ransdell, argue against Peirce as a phenomenologist. But most of his critiques apply more to Husserl styled phenomenology rather than what comes later. That said the type of question of being that Heidegger does seems largely absent in Peirce. http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/PHENOM.HTM To the point about how different must one be to have a different state of being, I think it depends somewhat. The Peircean answer would most likely be in terms of continuity. That is the way of being of two twins raised in the same how is quite close. The way of being of a person raised in an educated middle class home in the 21st century west is quite different from someone raised in more primitive conditions thousands of years ago. Yet they’re still similar. To borrow Nagel, move towards what it’s like to be a bat and the difference is enough that we’d call it a great difference.
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