Hi Clark, list:
You said, “My interest in the Neglected Argument tends to be towards how it illuminates abduction rather than God.” I think that is how all Peirceans view the NA. You said, “The question I’d ask is less about Peirce’s religious beliefs than his more epistemological stances. Let’s say he has a recurring encounter with a ghost (or pick any other entity we don’t have compelling scientific evidence for like aliens to avoid the religious connotations). At what point does he think that it’s true there is a ghost present?” I think the problem here is that your point is Cartesian. That is, there is no reason to think that he will *genuinely* have “recurring encounters with a ghost”. So, there is no point in doubting the consequences because it’s not a genuine concern. You said, “The argument against this as epistemology is that we can draw a fairly clear distinction between being unable to doubt and being justified in ones beliefs.” Justification is not just a condition for you only, as you say. It is a condition for the community. That is, if we are only capable of knowing what Peirce is doing and limit ourselves only to his thought (as magnificent as that alone is), then it is still not sufficient justification enough for others who don’t know of Peirce but is interested in the stuff of which he thought. That is, we should look at the moon, not the finger. You said, “The problem with more traditional epistemology of the “justified true belief” sort is that elements of justification could only be such if the knower knew them.” Here, I think is the crux of the problem. It requires knowing and knowing is approached by opinion. Opinion that can only be revealed as false or true in the future. So, how do you justify a true opinion? You said, “It is possible that two plus two is not equal to four, but we do not doubt it for a moment. Mathematical reasoning is beyond all doubt, but fallible." (CP 2.197)” While that is true, our situations, especially in situations where we doubt and contradict the assertions of each other, are rarely, if ever, as simple as 2+2 = 4. You said, “How is this to be reconciled?” Hintikka says that the fundamental problem of contemporary epistemology is to know what abduction is. The question of abduction is nothing else than the logic of pragmaticism. So, what is that? CP 5.189…one, two, three…C, A, B. “Peirce wrote that pragmaticism was “not a new way of thinking,” but claimed among its early adherents Berkeley, Locke, Spinoza and Kant. He revisited this theme in 1906 in an extended metaphor about the “river of pragmatism,” whose waters flow through the work of such figures as Socrates, Aristotle, Locke, Berkeley, Kant, Comte, and Spinoza: “They run, where least one would suspect them, beneath the dry rubbish-heaps of *Spinoza*.” In 1910, Peirce again referred to Spinoza’s pragmatism, writing that pragmatism is “an old way of thinking… practiced by Spinoza, Berkeley, and Kant.” ~Shannon Dea “Spinoza holds the view that the method of interpreting the Bible is identical with the method of interpreting nature.” ~Leo Strauss So, how does Peirce say to interpret nature? CP 5.189... Hth, Jerry Rhee On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 2:46 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > The Being thread didn’t really go as far as I expected, although I know > many people are out of town right now. (And I will be next week) I thought > I’d raise a different topic. > > At various times people have been discussing Peirce and religion. I’ll > confess I’ve not followed such exchanges closely. My interest in the > Neglected Argument tends to be towards how it illuminates abduction rather > than God. > > It’s always struck me that while Peirce considers himself Christian his > beliefs are much closer to an odd mix of Buddhism and deism. An example of > this is the writing on miracles and in particular immortality. Say for > example CP 6.553: > > Besides, scientific studies have taught us that human testimony, when not > hedged about with elaborate checks, is a weak kind of evidence. In short, > the utter unlikeness of an immortal soul to anything we cannot doubt, and > the slightness of all the old arguments of its existence, appear to me to > have tremendous weight. > > The question I’d ask is less about Peirce’s religious beliefs than his > more epistemological stances. Let’s say he has a recurring encounter with a > ghost (or pick any other entity we don’t have compelling scientific > evidence for like aliens to avoid the religious connotations). At what > point does he think that it’s true there is a ghost present? > > My sense is that Peirce’s epistemology more or less boils down to we have > to believe what we can’t doubt. While in various places he does distinguish > this from epistemology proper, it seems that what can’t be doubted after > sufficient inquiry is justified belief. So Peirce writes for instance, > > Now that which you do not at all doubt, you must regard as infallible, > absolute truth. (“What Pragmatism Is” CP 5.416) > > The argument against this as epistemology is that we can draw a fairly > clear distinction between being unable to doubt and being justified in ones > beliefs. That is Peirce’s focus is the state of our mind with doubt. But > justification in epistemology is much more about ethics and whether one > *should* doubt. The old ought vs is distinction would seem to apply here. > > One solution is that the ethics is not tied to some static conception of > justification but having done ones duty in terms of inquiry. The other, > more common, view is to apply to Peirce an externalist epistemology. (Maybe > not the same as Alston’s or Plantinga’s but in the same general area) One > sort of externalism is to tie epistemology not to the individual but to the > community (as Peirce does in his Critical Common Sensism) > > The problem with more traditional epistemology of the “justified true > belief” sort is that elements of justification could only be such if the > knower knew them. But to know them entails some connection with doubt. Once > we make that move it seems justification doesn’t add anything not already > encompassed by conditions of doubt. That is we get an context-sensitive > epistemology where the context sensitivity is to knowledge of the very > conditions of knowledge. > > My sense is that that which we don’t doubt is to be considered > epistemologically justified but not infallible. This from Peirce’s famous > statement “It is possible that two plus two is not equal to four, but we do > not doubt it for a moment. Mathematical reasoning is beyond all doubt, but > fallible." (CP 2.197) Of course this is uncontroversial in epistemology > where conditions of justification typically don’t guarantee truth in > non-foundationalist epistemologies. (Which these days is nearly all > epistemology) > > This takes me back to the immortality statement. Peirce might be having it > both ways there. It’s one thing to acknowledge human witnesses are > untrustworthy. But of course the individual themselves typically can’t > doubt their own testimony which is their beliefs. How is this to be > reconciled? > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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