Helmut, I suppose that is why it is a political problem...something consciously to be adopted for discussion of dark questions...the light to guide our researches...something befitting to belong to the ancestry of pragmaticism.
best, Jerry Rhee On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 12:59 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > > > Supplement: Ok, Karl Marx would have needed a time machine. Bad example. > Jerry, list, > yes, that was my question: Natural or conventional. And, if a law is > conventional, who has /have come to the convention: The evolution at some > stage of its, or humans in their culture. With beauty it may be hard to > distinguish: Are there kinds of beauty, that are natural (symmetry?), and > others that are conventional (fashion?) > I think, what you wrote: "conventional law in natural laws name" is > something that is quite dangerous. Maybe, if Karl Marx would have read > Peirce before stating his laws and claiming them for scientific, there > would have been less trouble? > Best, > Helmut > 09. Juli 2016 um 01:24 Uhr > "Jerry Rhee" <jerryr...@gmail.com> > > Helmut, list, > > I think what you're getting at is whether it ought to be sign, object, > interpretant or object, sign interpretant...or whether to start with s, o, > i and then get to o, s, i. > > They both "work" because first, second and third are all individually > stable. That is, they can be considered at least partially good. However, > there is a difference between epithumia and eros as it relates to claims > being made about the Beautiful. > > To ask your question, then, is to ask what constitutes natural law or > whether natural law is really conventional law in natural law's name. That > is, whether natural law is physis or nomos. > > The following statement should lead you to a fuller discussion of the > topic: > "The distinction between nature and convention, between *physis* and > *nomos*, is therefore coeval with the discovery of nature and hence with > philosophy." > ~Strauss, Natural Right and History > > Hth, > Jerry Rhee > > > On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: >> >> Jerry, >> indeed, maybe even in German, "Muster" (pattern) is a better term than >> "Schema" for what I have meant. My computer has had a virus, so I dont know >> exactly, what CP 5.189 includes, but if it merely is the part about >> abduction, the surprising fact that is observed, then I would say, that it >> does not include the origins-part I have mentioned. That would be to ask, >> what is the origin of this or that abduction, this or that myth. A widely >> accepted myth for example is what is teached in every economics class in >> the first semester: That shortage of goods is a natural, thus unavoidable, >> fact. But comparing the amount of produced food with the number of people >> existing would show, that everybody should have enough to eat. So this >> economics-doctrine is a myth, an abduction. So where does it come from, who >> has done this abduction first? Who have suffered from shortage, not only >> during a bad year, but during all their lives, and why, and who have made >> them suffer, and why? Who are interested in making up this doctrine, and >> why? To answer these questions with abductive anti-myths though would be >> and often have been making matters worse. So, abductions exist ok, but they >> should and could be investigated with scientific methods like deductions >> and more or less complete inductions, like in a thorough social history >> research, that was what I was trying to say. >> Best, >> Helmut >> >> 08. Juli 2016 um 21:28 Uhr >> "Jerry Rhee" <jerryr...@gmail.com> >> >> ...but doesn't CP 5.189 satisfy as a schema with all criteria you just >> imposed? >> >> What's natural about a schema? >> >> best, >> Jerry R >> >> On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 1:27 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> Supplement: Please replace in my below post "scheme" with "pattern". I >>> am not a native speaker, and the german term "Schema" means in English both >>> "pattern" and "scheme", but in this case "pattern" is more appropiate, as >>> it does not suggest a personal intention like "scheme" does, but may as >>> well be a result of habit or evolution, which is what I have meant. >>> Jerry, John, Gary, Olga, (...), list, >>> Gary wrote: >>> "Yet throwing that proverbial baby out with the bath water is exactly >>> what some scientists would like to do, and in attempting and recommending >>> and nearly insisting on this, they are in effect meaning to reduce all >>> 'true' knowledge to that which is 'precise' and 'verifiable', making >>> virtually everything but science culturally 'relative' (at best)." >>> John wrote: >>> "I think it helps even in these areas, though, to keep some of the >>> scientific attitude and remain somewhat skeptical of untested results, >>> taking them as at best tentative (and not God-given or from some other >>> source of certainty). Our past experience has shown us that almost none of >>> these other areas are universal for all space and time, or even between >>> cultures." >>> I think, that all that is not an outcome of a scientific investigation, >>> can nevertheless be investigated with the scientific method. Not that it >>> will grantedly deliver a clear evidential result. But investigation with a >>> scientific attitude can be done. Classification of human behaviour or human >>> ways of having problems, articulated in myths, in religion, literature, >>> philosphy, and so on, can be tried by first tentatively assigning and then >>> validating these aspects to different systems levels of the subsumptive >>> systems hierarchy (Stanley N. Salthe): From which systems level is the >>> particular behaviour scheme, problem scheme, or myth, inherited? Is it the >>> universe (action and reaction...), then it is universal. Does it apply to >>> all organisms (they have to eat...), it is an organismic affair. Is it >>> mammal-specific (care for babies...), it is mammal-specific. Is it about >>> primates? Is it the human species (to do with hunting, collecting,...), >>> then it is human. Is it culture specific... I guess, that in less cases >>> than we think, something is culture-specific. Cultures however often claim >>> certain properties: Moses brought the comandments from the mountain. But in >>> other cultures, killing, stealing, adultery, and so on, are forbidden as >>> well (Kants imperative: "Apriori" in the sense of universally pure >>> reason?). And there are problem schemes, that only occur in special >>> situations, and may well be avoided, such as fighting, hatred, envy, and >>> war: Both chimpanzees and bonobos, on either sides of the Kongo river, are >>> descendants of our ancestors, and the bonobos have found a way (we not >>> necessarily would have to absolutely exactly copy, I guess) to avoid these >>> problems. So we might be able too, and it would be wrong to say, that war >>> is a necessary behaviour or unavoidable problem scheme of humans. There >>> even is an urgency to do a scientific investigation about the origins of >>> myths (and on the other hand the origins of values), because there never >>> will be peace, if we believe philosophers, who claim, that envy, war, or >>> fight (or masters and slaves, Nietzsche with his superhuman) are necessary >>> human or even universal conditions, and deny values. The results of this >>> investigations would be, which problems are avoidable, and how, and which >>> are unavoidable, and how they might be solved. Talking too much again, >>> Best, >>> Helmut >>> >>> >>> 06. Juli 2016 um 22:16 Uhr >>> "Jerry Rhee" <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> John C, Gary R, Peirce-list: >>> >>> Are those things you say or things Peirce says of scientific method? >>> >>> Thanks, >>> Jerry R >>> >>> On Wed, Jul 6, 2016 at 1:56 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Olga, John, list, >>>> >>>> Thank you for your thoughts in this matter, Olga. It is so nice to see >>>> you on peirce-l, and I'll look forward to future posts from you. Indeed, >>>> your first post has already elicited this, in my opinion, excellent outline >>>> by John Collier. >>>> >>>> John, thank you for this excellently well balanced assessment of the >>>> situation. I'm about to head off to Victoria, BC, Canada for a nine day >>>> vacation commencing tomorrow and am caught up in preparations for that, yet >>>> I'd like to briefly comment on some of your concluding remarks. You wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> JC: When dealing with things outside the scope of science, and even >>>> inside (given the fallibility of science) other areas of human knowledge >>>> are need. They are what we can fall back on. Myth, religion, literature, >>>> philosophy and so on can be very useful as long as we don’t place them on >>>> the same level of precision and verifiability as we can science. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I think it helps even in these areas, though, to keep some of the >>>> scientific attitude and remain somewhat skeptical of untested results, >>>> taking them as at best tentative (and not God-given or from some other >>>> source of certainty). Our past experience has shown us that almost none of >>>> these other areas are universal for all space and time, or even between >>>> cultures. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, fallibilism in all things scientific as well as those outside the >>>> scope of science. Yet, I wonder a bit about your emphasis in the first of >>>> the two paragraphs above on "the same level of precision and verifiability" >>>> as we sometimes--but not always--have seen in science, and slightly >>>> question whether these other non-scientific areas ought be characterized as >>>> that which we can "fall back on." >>>> >>>> Recently, as a result of reading Michael Shapiro's study on sound and >>>> meaning in Shakespeare's Sonnets, I've been looking quite closely at a >>>> number of the sonnets with increased appreciation of Shakespeare's >>>> accomplishment in that genre. I've also been involved in a rather intensive >>>> look at his *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, having just seen my 7th >>>> production of it this year (4 theatrical productions, two ballets, and a >>>> filmed version). After these several hundreds of years Shakespeare still, >>>> it seems to me, sheds light--and, typically, new light with each re-reading >>>> or re-hearing--on human relations and 'vital' matters of "the human heart." >>>> These are, I think necessarily *not* precise, and they are at best >>>> only *vaguely* verifiable (while, however, my emotional response to a >>>> line of dialogue, say, can be confirmed by an entire audience's similar >>>> reaction--say laugher, or a communal gasp). >>>> >>>> As to the second paragraph above, I would tend not so much to think >>>> that we should approach such forms as music, literature and the like from a >>>> "scientific attitude," but, again, rather with a sense of *fallibility* >>>> since, as you wrote, " Our past experience has shown us that almost >>>> none of these other areas are universal for all space and time, or even >>>> between cultures." Still, for example, some of Shakespeare's insights >>>> have held for hundreds of years and across many, many cultures (one might >>>> note that his work has been translated into 80 languages). You continued: >>>> >>>> >>>> JC: So even if science has its built in limitations, and is far from >>>> being able to answer all the questions we might have about humans in the >>>> world, elements of the scientific attitude are still very helpful. But I >>>> think it would be to throw the baby out with the bathwater to just ignore >>>> everything that doesn’t meet current scientific standards. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Yet throwing that proverbial baby out with the bath water is exactly >>>> what some scientists would like to do, and in attempting and recommending >>>> and nearly insisting on this, they are in effect meaning to reduce all >>>> 'true' knowledge to that which is 'precise' and 'verifiable', making >>>> virtually everything but science culturally 'relative' (at best). You >>>> concluded: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> JC: I haven’t discussed the abuse of science, which like other sources >>>> of power gets misused by powerful and/or charismatic people, but it is a >>>> danger that at least science itself is in principle capable of meeting >>>> through it very methods. >>>> >>>> >>>> We probably have seen the misuse of science in the interest of power >>>> increase in modern times (although this is a moot point), while there are >>>> other questions regarding science which come to mind which I can't get into >>>> now, but which include some parts of science and metaphysics (e.g. aspects >>>> of cosmology, string theory, etc.) sometimes seeming, to this observer at >>>> leas,t to smack of science fiction as much as of science. In addition, as >>>> my friend and colleague, Alan Wolf (now head of the physics department at >>>> Cooper-Union in NYC) commented when I asked him where chaos theory was >>>> headed, Alan being one of the earliest researchers into mathematical chaos >>>> theory: "It's pretty much reached a dead end." This is just to suggest that >>>> science and mathematics have sometimes been, imo, given too much emphasis >>>> in the popular imagination, and that that weight can't always be sustained. >>>> >>>> Well, this is all certainly too rouch to be of much value, as opposed >>>> to your thoughtful post, John, which I'll reread and continue to reflect on >>>> in the days to come. Meanwhile, I personally hold science in high regard, >>>> and will continue to take a scientific attitude in considering science and >>>> cenoscopic science. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary R >>>> >>>> >>>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>>> >>>> *Gary Richmond* >>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>>> *Communication Studies* >>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>>> *C 745* >>>> *718 482-5690* >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jul 6, 2016 at 3:30 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Dear Olga, List, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Science has both advantages and limitations due to its method. On the >>>>> advantage side, one can come up with ideas galore, but to be accepted as >>>>> scientific they have to be tested and alternative explanations of the >>>>> phenomena be shown to not provide an explanation. This requires that a) >>>>> all >>>>> scientific hypotheses must be falsifiable, b) there must be methods for >>>>> testing these hypotheses (not quite the same as (a)), and c) due to the >>>>> mutual dependence of (a) and especially (b) on other assumptions (called >>>>> “auxiliary assumptions” in most places, science has to progress piecemeal >>>>> based on previous scientific knowledge. Science is also subject to major >>>>> shifts (revolutions) when we have ignored evidence (e.g., the properties >>>>> of >>>>> the very small as found in quantum mechanics) or misinterpreted it (e.g., >>>>> Mercury’s precession values). Typically, though, much of established >>>>> science is retained at least as an approximation in any new theory. I >>>>> could >>>>> add a lot (found in Kuhn, Feyerabend and other >>>>> anti-reductionist-empiricists) about how science can progress in order to >>>>> add to scientific knowledge, but it would take too long here. Suffice to >>>>> say that these things further limit point (b). On the disadvantage side, >>>>> the problems follow from the same factors, especially (b) and (c), since >>>>> it >>>>> means that science must proceed piecemeal, and at any given time there >>>>> will >>>>> be large areas that are not accessible to current science with it current >>>>> methods and presuppositions. Much of this area to which current science is >>>>> blind is exactly there area that is of most interest in our human >>>>> pursuits. >>>>> I might add that when science does try to deal outside of its current >>>>> scope >>>>> it often gets into trouble. I am thinking in particular of recent work >>>>> that >>>>> shows that fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) has serious >>>>> problems as it has been used in at least thousands of important >>>>> neuropsychological studies, meaning they will need to be done over again, >>>>> at the very least. This is hardly the only example, just one that is >>>>> currently shaking things up. At least, though. The very methods of science >>>>> can (and did in this case) find such problems and show how to correct >>>>> them. >>>>> The biggest strength of science is not its scope or ability to find >>>>> general >>>>> truths about the world, but its self-correcting character. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> When dealing with things outside the scope of science, and even inside >>>>> (given the fallibility of science) other areas of human knowledge are >>>>> need. >>>>> They are what we can fall back on. Myth, religion, literature, philosophy >>>>> and so on can be very useful as long as we don’t place them on the same >>>>> level of precision and verifiability as we can science. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I think it helps even in these areas, though, to keep some of the >>>>> scientific attitude and remain somewhat skeptical of untested results, >>>>> taking them as at best tentative (and not God-given or from some other >>>>> source of certainty). Our past experience has shown us that almost none of >>>>> these other areas are universal for all space and time, or even between >>>>> cultures. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So even if science has its built in limitations, and is far from being >>>>> able to answer all the questions we might have about humans in the world, >>>>> elements of the scientific attitude are still very helpful. But I think it >>>>> would be to throw the baby out with the bathwater to just ignore >>>>> everything >>>>> that doesn’t meet current scientific standards. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I haven’t discussed the abuse of science, which like other sources of >>>>> power gets misused by powerful and/or charismatic people, but it is a >>>>> danger that at least science itself is in principle capable of meeting >>>>> through it very methods. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> John Collier >>>>> >>>>> Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate >>>>> >>>>> University of KwaZulu-Natal >>>>> >>>>> http://web.ncf.ca/collier >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *From:* Olga [mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu] >>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 05 July 2016 11:35 PM >>>>> *To:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >>>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The auhor's claim: There is no *distinctly* >>>>> scientific method >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Gary, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> List, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I am certainly overwhelmed and lost in translation so have mercy on >>>>> me, simply try to find this merely amusing.... but how taking into account >>>>> "revelation" or "miracles" >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "how is it that the results of science are more reliable than what is >>>>> provided by these other forms?" >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Imho science is way behind in defining certain processes, concepts or >>>>> things comparing to other forms... >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> As an example of revelation, >>>>> >>>>> Dmitri Mendeleev <http://www.famousscientists.org/dmitri-mendeleev/> was >>>>> obsessed with finding a logical way to organize the chemical elements. It >>>>> had been preying on his mind for months but... he made his discovery in a >>>>> dream... >>>>> >>>>> Imho science is slowly describing in its own language of numbers and >>>>> parameters what can be or was already fully grasped by a human mind and >>>>> vivid imagination. It seems to me that >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Quantified precision with exceptions defeats *ideal* as a whole. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the >>>>> Word was God." >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Word - ideal. Exceptions are limiting the whole without seeing the >>>>> whole picture... >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If we talk about courage with exceptions, then retreating for the sake >>>>> of winning in a long run, well known in history, is an exception of the >>>>> exception? :) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Once again, my sincere apologies, I'm not an expert in this field... :) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Peace to all! Life to all! Love to all! >>>>> >>>>> Olga >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 05 Jul 2016, at 22:55, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> List, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I found this very short provocative essay of interest. >>>>> http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/04/opinion/there-is-no-scientific-method.html?ref=opinion >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The author's conclusion: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If scientific method is only one form of a general method employed in >>>>> all human inquiry, how is it that the results of science are more reliable >>>>> than what is provided by these other forms? I think the answer is that >>>>> science deals with highly quantified variables and that it is the >>>>> precision >>>>> of its results that supplies this reliability. But make no mistake: >>>>> Quantified precision is not to be confused with a superior method of >>>>> thinking. >>>>> >>>>> I am not a practicing scientist. So who am I to criticize scientists’ >>>>> understanding of their method? >>>>> >>>>> I would turn this question around. Scientific method is not itself an >>>>> object of study for scientists, but it is an object of study for >>>>> philosophers of science. It is not scientists who are trained specifically >>>>> to provide analyses of scientific method. >>>>> >>>>> James Blachowicz >>>>> <http://www.luc.edu/philosophy/faculty_blachowicz.shtml> is a >>>>> professor emeritus of philosophy at Loyola University Chicago and the >>>>> author of “Of Two Minds: The Nature of Inquiry >>>>> <http://www.sunypress.edu/p-2705-of-two-minds.aspx>” and “Essential >>>>> Difference: Toward a Metaphysics of Emergence >>>>> <http://www.sunypress.edu/p-5374-essential-difference.aspx>.” >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Gary R >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *Gary Richmond* >>>>> >>>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>>>> >>>>> *Communication Studies* >>>>> >>>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>>>> >>>>> *C 745* >>>>> >>>>> *718 482-5690* >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ----------------------------- >>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. 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