Edwina, Helmut, List: Just wondering--is it right to say that the immediate object *exists*? As object, it falls under Secondness (actuality); but as immediate, it falls under Firstness (possibility).
Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 10:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Helmut, list - the dynamic object, i.e., an objective existentiality, > doesn't determine the immediate object [which exists only within the > semiosic interaction] ONLY via efficient causality [which does operate > within a linear temporality in that semiosic interaction] , but via final > causality - which operates as a continuity of the process of Mind. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> > *To:* jerryr...@gmail.com > *Cc:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L > <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Thursday, August 18, 2016 10:20 AM > *Subject:* Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abductive Form of Inference - CP 5.189 vs. > CP 6.469 > > Jerry, Jon, list, > I think that this example shows, that ordinality is not necessarily in > accord with categoriality, because categorically induction is secondness > and deduction thirdness. > So, what is ordinality? Does it merely mean the sequence in time, or does > it mean the causation / determination sequence? This question would be > irrelevant, if both causation and temporality always were in accord with > each other. But: There is a temporality possible, which is not based on > causation: The temporal sequence of contingent events. And: May there be a > causation backwards in time, like with an anticipation? Is it so, that with > an anticipation, though the immediate object yet is existing, the dynamical > object is anticipated, i.e. exists in the future merely, so if you say, > that the dynamical object too determines the sign, this would be a > causation backwards in time? > Best, > Helmut > >
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