Clark, List: Great stuff. Just a couple of quick questions for now.
CG: In this case the dynamic object sets at the start of semiosis but contains within it virtually all the ways it can be represented. Now the actual mechanics of that representing are of course unique and tied to chance. But in terms of potential the original dynamic object *determines* the immediate object and then the interpretant through the sign. Would it then be accurate to say that the Dynamic Object virtually contains the Immediate Object, which virtually contains the Sign, which virtually contains the Immediate Intepretant, which virtually contains the Dynamic Interpretant, which virtually contains the Final Interpretant? I am still getting a handle on what exactly we (and Peirce) mean by "virtual." CG: I probably should have added that Peirce either directly or indirectly gets the term “dynamic” from Plato. In Plato in places like *The Sophist* we talk of the lively possibility (*dunamis*) of being. This also pops up in Aristotle as well where we oppose Potential and Actuality. Potential as *dunamis* is sometimes called power, capacity or possibilty. Again if we’re talking about an object’s being as being able to be represented then this terminology makes perfect sense. If this is the case, then what accounts for Peirce's consistent assignment of "Dynamic" to the *actual* Object and Interpretant, rather than the *possible* (Immediate) Object and Interpretant? Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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